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Summary
An altruistic trait reduces the reproductive success of its bearer, while at the same time in-
creasing the reproductive success of other individuals in the population. If this trait is aimed
at defending against a parasite or predator, it is called an altruistic defense trait. The act of
defending entails a cost to the individual and helps the population by reducing the pressure
from parasite or predator. Determining whether such a costly defense mechanism can evolve
is not trivial, as the benefit is not provided immediately, but is mediated by the parasite or
predator population.
In this dissertation, a stochastic model is introduced to study the evolution of an altruistic
defense trait. The host and parasite (or, equivalently, prey and predator) populations are
structured in demes, that are connected by migration. There are two types of host (prey)
individuals—one has a reproductive disadvantage compared to the other but locally reduces
the parasite (predator) growth rate. The interactions are described by a birth-death process,
for which the diffusion approximation is computed. It takes the form of stochastic Lotka-
Volterra equations. For these, the relative frequency of altruists is shown to converge to
spatially structured Wright-Fisher diffusions in the limit of infinitely large population sizes.
Then, the many-demes limit of these diffusions is computed and a condition for extinction or
fixation of altruists, depending on the ecological model parameters, is derived. Furthermore,
the invasion process is considered. In a non-altruistic population, altruists arise in small
positive frequency in a single deme and a condition for survival is obtained.
The robustness of the theoretical prediction regarding the success of an altruistic defense
allele is tested with computer simulations using two different models. First, the individual-
based model that is the starting point of the theoretical analysis is simulated. Here, finite
population sizes are assumed. Individuals produce offspring, die, or migrate at specified
rates. The other simulation model approximates the limit process describing the relative
frequency of altruists, as obtained in the theoretical analysis. For this, infinite population
sizes and a complete separation of ecological and evolutionary time scales are assumed.
Thus, with these two simulation models, the effect of assuming an infinite population size
compared to a finite one can be investigated together with the consequences of a separation
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of time scales. Furthermore, some extensions of the simplified model are investigated with
the simulation approaches, i.e., assuming random fluctuations of the competition strengths
within species as well as varying the migration schemes.
Finally, the concrete case of slave rebellion in ants is investigated. A detailed model of
interactions between slavemaking ants and their hosts on a patch of forest is defined and
studied with extensive computer simulations. First, field data from New York State and
West Virginia is used in an Approximate Bayesian Computation approach to find plausible
parameter settings. With these, several simulation series are performed to understand the
mechanisms that are relevant for the evolution of a hypothetical allele for slave rebellion. A
metapopulation of several connected patches is simulated to assess whether a benefit on a
larger spatial scale may influence the evolution of slave rebellion.
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Zusammenfassung
Ein altruistisches Merkmal reduziert den Fortpflanzungserfolg seines Trägers, während es
gleichzeitig den Fortpflanzungserfolg anderer Individuen in der Population steigert. Wenn
dieses Merkmal der Verteidigung gegen einen Parasiten oder Räuber dient, spricht man von
altruistischer Verteidigung. Der Akt der Verteidigung geht zu Kosten des Individuums und
hilft der Population, indem es den Druck durch Parasiten oder Räuber senkt. Zu bestimmen,
ob solch ein kostenbehafteter Verteidigungsmechanismus evolvieren kann, ist nicht trivial,
da der Vorteil nicht direkt zum Tragen kommt, sondern mittelbar durch den Parasiten bzw.
Räuber wirkt.
In dieser Dissertation wird ein stochastisches Modell eingeführt, um die Evolution ei-
nes altruistischen Verteidigungsmerkals zu studieren. Die Wirte und Parasiten (bzw. Beu-
te und Räuber) sind in Subpopulationen strukturiert, die durch Migration verbunden sind.
Es gibt zwei Typen von Wirts- (Beute-) Individuen. Ein Typ hat, verglichen zum anderen,
einen Nachteil in der Fortpflanzung, aber reduziert lokal die Wachstumsrate der Parasiten
(Räuber). Die Interaktionen sind durch einen Geburts-Todes-Prozess beschrieben, für wel-
chen die Diffusionsapproximation berechnet wird. Sie hat die Form stochastischer Lotka-
Volterra-Gleichungen. Für diese wird gezeigt, dass die relative Häufigkeit der Altruisten im
Grenzwert von unendlichen Populationsgrößen gegen räumlich strukturierte Wright-Fisher
Diffusionen konvergiert. Dann wird der Grenzprozess für unendlich viele Subpopulationen
bestimmt und eine Bedingung für Aussterben oder Fixierung der Altruisten, in Abhängigkeit
der ökologischen Modellparameter, wird hergeleitet. Außerdem wird der Invasionsprozess
betrachtet. In einer nicht-altruistischen Population treten Altruisten in kleiner positiver Fre-
quenz in einer einzigen Subpopulation auf, und eine Bedingung für ihr Überleben wird er-
mittelt.
Die Robustheit der theoretischen Resultate im Hinblick auf den Erfolg eines Allels für
altruistische Verteidigung wird mit Computersimulationen anhand zweier unterschiedlicher
Modelle getestet. Zunächst wird das individuenbasierte Modell simuliert, das den Ausgangs-
punkt der theoretischen Analyse darstellt. Hier werden endliche Populationsgrößen ange-
nommen. Individuen produzieren Nachwuchs, sterben oder migrieren mit festgelegten Ra-
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ten. Das andere Simulationsmodell approximiert den in der theoretischen Analyse ermittel-
ten Grenzprozess, der die relative Häufigkeit der Altruisten beschreibt. Hier werden unend-
liche Populationsgrößen und eine komplette Trennung der ökologischen und evolutionären
Zeitskalen angenommen. Daher kann mit diesen beiden Simulationsmodellen der Effekt der
Annahme unendlich großer Populationen im Vergleich zu endlich großen zusammen mit
den Folgen einer Trennung der Zeitskalen untersucht werden. Außerdem werden einige Er-
weiterungen des vereinfachten Modells mit Hilfe der Simulationsansätze untersucht, indem
zufällige Fluktuationen des Konkurrenzdrucks innerhalb der Spezies angenommen und die
Migrationsmuster variiert werden.
Schließlich wird der konkrete Fall von Sklavenrebellion bei Ameisen betrachtet. Ein de-
tailliertes Modell für Interaktionen von Sklavenhalterameisen und ihren Wirten in einem
Waldgebiet wird definiert und mit umfassenden Computer-Simulationen studiert. Zunächst
werden Feld-Daten aus den amerikanischen Bundesstaaten New York und West Virginia
genutzt, um plausible Parameter-Einstellungen zu bestimmen. Anhand dieser werden meh-
rere Simulationsserien durchgeführt, um Mechanismen und Parameter zu finden, die relevant
sind für die Evolution eines hypothetischen Allels für Sklavenrebellion. Eine Metapopulati-
on mehrerer verbundener Gebiete wird simuliert, um zu untersuchen, ob ein Vorteil auf einer
größeren räumlichen Skala die Evolution der Sklavenrebellion beeinflussen kann.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Altruism
1.1.1 The puzzle of altruism
In his famous book The origin of species, Darwin (1859) introduced the theory of evolution
via natural selection. Although being generally accepted, at first it remained a challenge to
explain why there exist self-sacrificial behaviors in nature. Despite Darwin (1859, Chapter
8) noting that “selection may be applied to the family, as well as to the individual”, the pos-
sibility of an individual disadvantage being overcome by an advantage to the group or even
the species was generally rejected (see Fisher, 1958 and Wright, 1948, as well as Hamilton,
1963 for a brief overview). When viewing the individual as the agent that natural selection
acts upon, it seems impossible that any character could evolve that harms the reproductive
success of its bearer. If such a character at the same time increases the reproductive success
of other individuals, then that character is called altruistic. Sometimes this is also referred
to as strong altruism. On the other hand, weak altruism describes an action that entails a
relative decrease in the focal individual’s reproductive success compared to its interaction
partners, although in absolute terms it might be beneficial for the actor (Wilson, 1979).
At first sight, it seems like non-altruistic individuals—often referred to as free-riders
or cheaters—would have a selective advantage compared to altruists. These cheaters can
exploit the helping of altruists without contributing any help themselves, and thereby not
suffering any costs in terms of reproductive success. Hence, a cheater should on average have
more descendants than an altruist and thus, altruists should over time be driven to extinction.
That reasoning would also suggest that any altruistic trait should be kept from reaching high
frequencies in any given population. Consequently, it should be highly improbable to find
any form of cooperation in nature.
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1.1.2 Altruism in nature
Despite the apparent disadvantage of altruistic traits, there are numerous variations of altru-
ism occurring in nature. A famous example of altruistic behavior observed in nature is food
sharing in vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984, 1990). After two consecutive nights without a
meal from blood of their prey, vampire bats die. Individuals that did not obtain food during
one night are fed by others in their group and thus saved from dying of food deprivation.
This is of course costly to the helper, who sacrifices a share of food and thereby risks ear-
lier starvation. Another case of altruism is the production of costly public goods in bacteria
(Diggle et al., 2007). Bacterial cells use diffusible signal molecules as a means to commu-
nicate with each other. This process—known as quorum sensing (Williams et al., 2007)—is
open to exploitation. Members of the group can refuse to produce the signals themselves
to save the associated production cost but instead completely rely on others to invest in the
necessary communication. A different kind of altruistic behavior is shown by coatis living
in small groups. They groom each other, which can provide the benefit of a reduction in
the number of ectoparasites (Wilkinson, 1988). This social grooming infers the cost of time
investment, which reduces time spent foraging and, probably more importantly, it reduces
vigilance times, thereby increasing the risk of an attack (Wilkinson, 1988). An extreme ex-
ample of altruism is that of sterility among social insects. In the phenomenon known as
“eusociality”, certain individuals completely forgo reproduction to instead spend their time
helping others and raising their offspring (e.g., Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009). Consequently,
these individuals will not have any offspring to carry their genes to the next generation. This
baffling case has already been discussed by Darwin (1859) and is still debated in recent
literature (Nowak et al., 2010; Abbot et al., 2011)
1.1.3 Explanations of the evolution of altruism
Resolutions to the puzzling existence of altruism and explanations on how it may evolve are
provided by the theories of inclusive fitness and group selection and by game theory. An
overview of the different mechanisms that can explain the evolution of cooperative behavior
is given by West et al. (2007a). One main idea is to incorporate spatial structure into the
analysis, which may allow altruists to co-occur and help each other more than non-altruists.
1.1.3.1 Kin selection
The theory of inclusive fitness, which is also referred to as kin selection, is introduced by
Hamilton (1963, 1964a,b). The idea is that the spread of a gene is not determined by whether
12
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it is beneficial to its bearer but rather to the gene itself. Instead of looking at the direct fitness
effect of the behavior on the actor, the evolutionary success of a gene can be determined by
investigating the inclusive fitness, which also takes into account the effect that the behavior
has on other individuals. By promoting the reproductive success of other individuals, a gene
that is detrimental to its bearer may spread if the relatedness to the beneficiaries as well as
the amount of benefit is large enough. This result is known as Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton,
1963, 1964a,b), which, more precisely, states that an altruistic trait will spread if
r · b > c, (1.1)
where r is the relatedness of the actor to beneficiaries, b is the increase in reproductive suc-
cess of the beneficiaries, and c is the loss in reproductive success of the actor. The relatedness
r is strictly defined as a regression coefficient (Gardner et al., 2011, Box 5), but can be in-
terpreted as a measurement of sharing a focal gene compared to the population average gene
frequency (Bourke, 2011, Box 1). A high relatedness thus means a high chance of sharing a
certain gene, which does not necessarily have to be caused by kinship. When determining b
and c, it is important to only account for changes in reproductive success caused by the be-
havior in question. Actually, equation (1.1) is the abbreviated version of Hamilton’s formula.
The extended form says that an action is selectively favored if∑
i∈I
ri · bi > 0, (1.2)
where I denotes the set of all individuals in the population, bi denotes the effect in terms
of reproductive success that the action of the focal individual has on any individual i ∈ I
(including itself), and ri denotes their relatedness (e.g., Grafen, 2007; Lion et al., 2011).
Note that the effect in terms of reproductive success of performing the altruistic action is
negative for the focal individual itself. Thereby, calling the focal individual i0, the term −bi0
is commonly referred to as “cost” c, with c > 0. Furthermore, since the relatedness of the
focal individual to itself equals one, equation (1.2) can be rewritten as∑
i∈I\i0
ri · bi > c, (1.3)
to resemble equation (1.1). An alternative interpretation of Hamilton’s rule is the “neighbor-
modulated fitness”, where fitness effects of all other individuals in the population on the
reproductive success of the focal individual are captured in the bi terms. This is equivalent
to the inclusive fitness view described above (e.g., Gardner, 2008, Box 2). Hamilton’s rule
13
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not only predicts under which conditions altruism evolves, but it similarly also predicts if
cooperation (b > 0, c < 0 in notation of equation (1.1)), selfishness (b < 0, c < 0), spite
(b < 0, c > 0), or any other set-up of mixed positive and negative effects (using equation
(1.2)) can evolve (Bourke, 2011).
1.1.3.2 Group selection
Another explanation of the evolution of altruism is provided by the theory of group selection,
which captures the “process of genetic change which is caused by the differential extinction
or proliferation of groups of organisms” (Wade, 1978). An overview of the development
of the theory of group selection is given by Traulsen and Nowak (2006), who attribute the
first mathematical model of group selection to Wright (1945). In group selection models,
the relatedness between individuals is not calculated. Instead, it is assumed that the popula-
tion is split into groups that are in direct competition with each other. The idea then is that
groups with a large frequency of altruists have an advantage over groups with a low altruist
frequency. A classical model of group selection is the haystack model proposed by May-
nard Smith (1964), which describes a population of mice structured in separated haystacks.
A single biallelic locus determines whether a mouse is timid or aggressive, with timidity
being recessive. If a haystack contains both types, then the aggressive ones will drive out all
timid mice from the haystack, such that each haystack consists of only timid or only aggres-
sive mice when migration occurs. During migration, all haystacks are abandoned and there
is random mating across the whole population. Then the haystacks are freshly populated,
each by a single fertilized female. Timid groups are assumed to produce more migrants and
a condition is derived under which this group-level advantage can override the individual
disadvantage, such that timidity is selectively favored. The author himself deems this model
too artificial to be further pursued (Maynard Smith, 1964). Nevertheless, it is an example of
when group selection can predict the evolution of self-sterilizing behavior under restrictive
conditions. A review of group selection models is given by Wade (1978). The models dis-
cussed in Wade (1978) make assumptions that disfavor the effect of group selection. They
all show that only under very restrictive parameter settings, can a negative within-group
selection be overcome by between-group selection. Since it is deemed unlikely that any nat-
ural population would adhere to such narrow parameter ranges, these studies conclude that
group selection is not strong enough to be a driver of changes in gene frequencies on an
evolutionary scale (see Wade, 1978, and the references therein). However, Wade (1976) ex-
perimentally shows that group selection can overcome individual selection for a population
of Tribolium castaneum. Wade (1978) suggests that changing some of the assumptions that
14
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are implicit in previous models might show an increased effect of group selection. One of
the restricting assumptions is that of a “migrant pool”, that each deme contributes to in equal
amount (Wade, 1978). From this migrant pool, colonists that form new subpopulations are
drawn randomly. By introducing a “propagule pool” to which each deme sends groups of
migrants (the propagules) and recolonizing empty sites with a randomly chosen propagule
from that pool, Slatkin and Wade (1978) adapt classical models to allow for a larger effect
of group selection on a quantitative trait. This is achieved by diminishing the stage of com-
plete mixing among migrants, which is present in classical models using a migrant pool.
Consequently, between-deme variance of the quantitative trait is increased and the effect of
selection on the level of groups is stronger. The result of Slatkin and Wade (1978) rests on
the assumption that the variance of the trait is the same in each deme. Although this is an ide-
alization, they argue that it is reasonable if there is gene flow between demes, which reduces
differences in variance. Furthermore, they refer to Lande (1976) who shows (for polygenic
traits with linked loci) that mutation can enhance genetic variation. More generally, this
result by Lande (1976) is important for all models of group selection, due to showing how
variance between demes can be maintained (which is necessary for group selection to act),
even if selective forces tend to reduce it. Thereby, group selection may be more relevant than
suggested by several models, for which genetic drift and random sampling from the migrant
pool are the only forces of maintaining genetic variation between demes (Wade, 1978).
Wade (1978) notes that the assumption of all demes sending off the same number of
migrants restricts the possibility for group selection to act in numerous models. By allowing
for empty sites within demes and determining the amount of migrants in dependence of the
current size of a deme, Alizon and Taylor (2008) remove this assumption from their model
and show that altruism can be favored. Furthermore, their approach reduces the impact
of competition among altruists, which has been shown to negate cooperative benefits and
prevent the evolution of altruism in other models (Wilson et al., 1992; Taylor, 1992).
The haystack model of Maynard Smith (1964) also makes the assumption of a migrant
pool, from which individuals are randomly drawn to mate and start colonies at empty sites,
but with the modification that a fixed proportion of migrating females mates with males from
their own group. Thereby, global mixing in the migration stage is reduced and the strength of
group selection is enhanced. Furthermore, Maynard Smith (1964) notes that times at which
groups are reproductively isolated are necessary to ensure variation between groups. How-
ever, as Wade (1978) notes, this is merely a consequence of the extreme amount of individual
selection assumed in the model, in which a single non-altruist will take over any group of
altruists. Moreover, Wade (1978) states that although some reduction of population mixing
is necessary for group selection to be important, between-deme variance can be maintained
15
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even for moderate levels of migration, as shown by Wright (1931).
It is unclear how well the conditions in various models reflect the situation of natural pop-
ulations (Maynard Smith, 1964). Yet, in a review of experimental studies of group selection,
Goodnight and Stevens (1997) reckon that group selection may be more common than previ-
ously thought. Further models of group selection are developed by Van Valen (1971), Wilson
(1975), and Traulsen and Nowak (2006). In the model by Traulsen and Nowak (2006), indi-
viduals in groups with many cooperators have a higher fitness. If the maximum group size
is reached, a group can split in two, which will cause another group to be removed. Thereby,
groups with many cooperators will split earlier than other groups, which can lead to a selec-
tive advantage of altruists under a simple condition of the model parameters. The theory of
group selection can be seen as a special case of the more general idea of multilevel selec-
tion, which states that selection can act on different levels (Wade, 1982; Bijma et al., 2007;
Gardner, 2015). These levels are not restricted to individuals and groups, but can also refer
to families, species or genes. In particular, several levels may be involved simultaneously,
as, e.g., in the scenario of interactions at the levels of individuals, families, and groups, in-
vestigated by Wade (1982). Therein, total gene frequency change of the allele in question is
split into its components acting on the different levels. Selection on each level may work to
increase or decrease the frequency of the allele, and therefore, Wade (1982) concludes, that
all relevant levels have to be taken into consideration, when determining the success of the
allele. Similarly, Bijma et al. (2007) show how to generalize the group selection approach.
They partition the effect of selection into the different components, in the setting of individ-
uals living in groups and groups forming metagroups. In particular, this approach of Bijma
et al. (2007) can be applied to any number of levels of selection.
As pointed out by Gardner (2015), explaining the evolution of altruism by multilevel
selection is actually an example of the more general Simpson’s paradox, which is also known
as the Yule-Simpson effect (Yule, 1903; Simpson, 1951; Blyth, 1972). This classical result
from statistics describes how the aggregation of data from several groups can reverse the
trend occurring within each group. In the case of altruism this would mean that within each
group, there is a negative correlation between behaving altruistically and offspring numbers,
while overall there can be a positive correlation. This is due to the fact that group sizes vary
and larger (or faster-splitting) groups contribute more, when the population is viewed as a
whole.
16
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1.1.3.3 Connection of kin selection and group selection
A formal link between kin and group selection can be established using a very general con-
cept of evolutionary change, the Price equation (Price, 1970; Marshall, 2011). This famous
result partitions changes in gene frequencies across generations in changes due to selection
and changes due to transmission (see also Gardner, 2008, 2015). Let w be the number of
offspring of an individual in the population, let z be the individual’s value of the character
being investigated, such as behaving altruistically, denote their population averages by w̄
and z̄, respectively, and define the change in character value between the individual and its
offspring by ∆z. Then the Price equation determines the change in population average of
the character value, ∆z̄, to be
∆z̄ = Cov
[
w
w̄
, z
]
+ E
[
w
w̄
∆z
]
. (1.4)
Hence, the causes for gene frequency changes can be separated. The first part denotes change
due to selection and the second part denotes change due to transmission. The Price equation
holds for any kind of ploidy, dominance, or epistasis, for sexual as well as asexual repro-
duction, and for random or deterministic mating (Price, 1970). Furthermore, applicability
is not restricted to changes in gene frequencies, but also holds for any other type of entity
that changes over time (Gardner, 2008). Variants of the Price equation for kin and group
selection are derived by Queller (1992). Similarly, Marshall (2011) shows how Hamilton’s
rule and the approach of group selection theory can both be derived using the Price equation.
The relative importance of kin versus group selection is intensely debated in recent
literature (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Lehmann et al., 2007; Fletcher and Zwick, 2007;
Van Veelen, 2009; Traulsen, 2010; Nowak et al., 2010; Abbot et al., 2011; Marshall, 2011;
Gardner et al., 2011). Van Veelen (2009) and Nowak et al. (2010) state that the inclusive
fitness approach does not always work and can lead to wrong conclusions. Nowak et al.
(2010) have provoked several responses supporting the theory of kin selection (Abbot et al.,
2011; Boomsma et al., 2011; Strassmann et al., 2011; Ferriere and Michod, 2011; Herre and
Wcislo, 2011) with a total of over 140 authors. Furthermore, Rousset and Lion (2011) point
out that the main argument of Nowak et al. (2010) against inclusive fitness theory is based
on a misinterpretation of the cost and benefit terms in Hamilton’s rule, and conclude that it is
invalid. Traulsen (2010) and Van Veelen et al. (2012, 2014) state that there are fundamental
differences in the underlying theories of group and kin selection and that they cannot always
be used interchangeably. On the other hand, Wade (1980) and Marshall (2011) derive the
equivalence between the two approaches. Birch and Okasha (2015) clarify that the contra-
dictions regarding the validity of kin selection theory stem from the fact that there are three
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different formulations and interpretations of Hamilton’s rule. First, there are approaches for
which cost and benefit are defined as payoff parameters of the particular model (e.g., Nowak
et al., 2010; Van Veelen et al., 2012). These definitions require some restrictions, such as an
additive payoff structure, for Hamilton’s rule to apply (Birch and Okasha, 2015). Second, in
some approaches cost and benefit terms are partial regression coefficients, determining how
the focal individual’s genotype (or phenotype) is associated with its fitness and the fitness of
its interaction partners (e.g., Queller, 1992; Gardner et al., 2011). This is the most general
formulation and it is true for any model because it makes no assumptions about how the sta-
tistical relationships arise (Birch and Okasha, 2015). Third, other approaches use first-order
approximations of the general formulation by replacing the regression coefficients with par-
tial derivatives of a fitness function (e.g., Taylor and Frank, 1996; Lehmann and Rousset,
2010). These approximations are valid only if selection is weak and fitness effects are addi-
tive. Hence, the contradicting views on the validity and generality of Hamilton’s rule stem
from the use of different approaches (Birch and Okasha, 2015), meaning that Hamilton’s rule
always holds in its most general form, but that special care needs to be taken considering the
assumptions, when using the other two approaches. The critiques against inclusive fitness
theory are reviewed by Bourke (2011), who concludes that none of the advances is effective
and, consequently, that inclusive fitness theory is deservedly the “leading theory for social
evolution”. West et al. (2007b) discuss some confusions in the usage of different terms re-
lated to altruism, kin and group selection, and state that these semantical issues unnecessarily
hinder the progress of the field. Okasha (2010) criticizes the debate as a whole for demand-
ing too many resources, because both approaches—kin and group selection—have provided
valuable insights and merely offer different ways of understanding the evolution of social be-
havior. Similarly, acknowledging the value of both approaches, Lion et al. (2011) argue that
most of the debate stems from implicit differences in the simplified models and that further
discussion of these differences is of little help when studying evolutionary change in nature.
1.1.3.4 Game theory
Further important insights in understanding the evolution of altruistic behavior have been
provided by evolutionary game theory (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and May, 1992;
Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Fletcher and Zwick, 2007; Taylor et al., 2007).
In the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, individuals can either cooperate or defect and payoffs
are determined by the strategies of the interacting partners. This problem has been intensely
studied with several extensions, such as multiple interaction partners, spatial structure, and
repeated interactions (Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987; Farrell and Ware, 1989; Nowak and
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May, 1992; Hauert and Schuster, 1997; Nowak, 2006). A major role in the game theoretic
approaches is attributed to reciprocity (e.g., Trivers, 1971), which is captured by strategies
such as ”tit-for-tat” (mirror the behavior of the opponent in the previous round) or ”win-stay,
lose-shift” (change strategy when performing poorly) in the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma
(Nowak, 2006). A review of conditions favoring cooperation under direct, indirect, and net-
work reciprocity as well as under kin and group selection is provided by Nowak (2006). Ex-
amples of reciprocity in nature are given by Milinski (1987), McGregor (2005), and Bshary
and Grutter (2006). The Prisoner’s dilemma game is used by Turner and Chao (1999) to
explain the evolution of selfishness in an RNA virus. Furthermore, the evolution of coop-
eration is is investigated in public goods games (see Archetti and Scheuring, 2012 for a
review). Here, cheating takes the form of exploiting a public good, which can lead to a phe-
nomenon known as the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). In the original description
of Hardin (1968), a pasture is described that can be used freely by several farmers. For any
single farmer it is advantageous to bring as many cattle as possible. Thus, the common
ground can get exploited and thereby be rendered useless for all farmers. In general, when
selfish behavior leads to the extinction of a population, this is an instance of “evolutionary
suicide” (Parvinen, 2010).
1.1.3.5 Recognition
Apart from the theories discussed above, the occurrence of altruism can be explained if
altruistic behavior is linked to some trait that can be recognized by others (Hamilton, 1964b,
pp. 24–25). Then, altruists can target their helping behavior to other carriers of that trait,
which diminishes the advantage of non-altruistic free-riders. Dawkins (1976) elaborates
on this idea with the example of a hypothetical green beard. Hence, this concept became
known as the “greenbeard effect” (see Gardner and West, 2010, for an overview). There
still remains the possibility of cheating, if individuals can obtain the green beard without
behaving altruistically, which at first led to the conclusion that the practical relevance of the
greenbeard effect is low (Grafen, 1984; West et al., 2007a). Nevertheless, there are several
examples—predominantly in microorganisms—of greenbeards in nature. These examples
are reviewed by Gardner and West (2010), who conclude that the importance of greenbeard
effects may have previously been underestimated.
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1.2 Altruistic defense
1.2.1 Parasitism
Parasitism is a wide-spread phenomenon in nature and coevolutionary processes are major
factors in the shaping of biodiversity (Thompson, 1999). The impact of parasites on host
species can be massive and the coevolution of host and parasite can be interpreted as an
“arms race” (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979), capturing the fact that higher parasite virulence
can be countered by improved host defense. Such reciprocal evolution can put high selective
pressure on both hosts and parasites. Similarly, the “red queen” hypothesis (Van Valen, 1973,
1974) describes how evolution of hosts and parasites may cancel each other out, such that
the system can remain stable over a long period of time.
A famous approach to describe host-parasite interactions is to model population size
changes with differential equations, known as Lotka-Volterra equations (Lotka, 1920; Volterra,
1926). Denoting the population sizes of hosts and parasites by h and p, respectively, and
choosing appropriate model parameters α, β, γ, δ ∈ R+, the changes over time are then
given by
dh
dt
= αh− βhp,
dp
dt
= −γp+ δhp.
(1.5)
Equation (1.5) is the simplest form of Lotka-Volterra dynamics and it captures the fluctua-
tions of host and parasite population sizes, until, depending on the choice of parameters, a
stable equilibrium is reached. There exist various extensions, such as adding multiple popu-
lations, intra-species competition, spatial structure, or stochasticity.
Spatial structure can have a strong impact on the dynamics of host-parasite systems
(Débarre et al., 2012) and various models of non-panmictic populations have been studied
in recent years with computer simulations (e.g., Haraguchi and Sasaki, 2000; Rauch et al.,
2002, 2003; Best et al., 2011).
A special case is that of “social parasites”. These are social insects that parasitize and
exploit whole societies. Typically, social parasites and their hosts are closely related species.
This observation is termed “Emery’s rule” (Emery, 1909). By exploiting the social system
of another species, the cost of parental care can be reduced or completely avoided. Among
the approximately 13 000 known species of ants, there are roughly 200 that are socially
parasitic, but note that the number of extant species may be much higher (Buschinger, 1986;
Brandt et al., 2005a; Ward, 2014). A review of the different types of social parasites in ants
is given by Buschinger (1986). One example of social parasitism is that of slavemaking
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in ants, described in Section 1.2.3. The high level of relatedness between social parasites
and their hosts makes close coevolutionary dynamics and a stepwise arms race especially
likely (Foitzik et al., 2003). Another special case apart from social parasites is that of avian
brood parasites such as cuckoos (Davies et al., 1989) and cowbirds (Ortega, 1998) who lay
their eggs in nests of other species. They trick the host birds into caring for their brood,
by mimicking visual and acoustic cues, such as color patterns for eggs (Davies and Brooke,
1989) or calls of the young (Langmore et al., 2003).
1.2.2 Altruistic defense
Due to the large impact of parasites, the host species can greatly benefit from improved
defenses. Depending on the system that is studied, defense mechanisms can take numerous
forms and it can even be associated to some cost. Boots and Bowers (2004) investigate
evolution of costly immunity, while costly resistance is considered by Boots and Haraguchi
(1999). Duncan et al. (2011) give an overview of studies that show cost of resistance against
parasites in various species. Furthermore, Duncan et al. (2011) experimentally demonstrate
an association of resistance against a parasite with lower reproductive output in Paramecium
Caudatum. After contact to the parasite is removed, the selection pressure to maintain the
costly defense is eliminated and productivity slowly increases over time. A review of various
modeling approaches of different defense mechanism with an associated cost is given in
Boots et al. (2009). An overall conclusion is that costly defense behavior can be worthwhile,
if selection pressure from parasites is strong enough. Hence, altruistic defense can play
an important role in the coevolutionary process of hosts and parasites. Especially in the
context of a strong population structure, resistance is beneficial for the hosts (Best et al.,
2011). Determining conditions for the evolution of altruistic defense traits can be difficult
with existing methodology. Benefits of altruistic defense are not provided immediately, but
are mediated by the parasite population. Thus, there may be a time lag between an act of
defense and its benefit for the host population, and an entangling of effects of the different
actions can be challenging.
There are numerous examples of altruism taking the form of defense against a parasite
or predator. When a pathogen infects bacteria, these bacteria can commit suicide, which
prevents secondary infections and thereby protects the host population (Labrie et al., 2010).
Such a suicidal defense mechanism against infection can be selectively favored in a spatially
structured population, as shown experimentally and with simulations by Fukuyo et al. (2012).
Suicidal defense in bacteria is also investigated by Berngruber et al. (2013) with a theoretical
model and experimental verification of the results. The model is—similar to other studies
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on host-parasite interactions—based on deterministic Lotka-Volterra equations (Boots and
Haraguchi, 1999; Boots and Bowers, 2004; Miller et al., 2007; Best et al., 2009). Typically,
these models describe the numbers of host individuals in different states. Individuals change
their states from susceptible to infected, sometimes also to recovered or back to susceptible.
Hence, such models are called SI, SIR, SIS, or SIRS (see Boots et al., 2009 for further
examples). Berngruber et al. (2013) state that, contrary to other forms of altruism, altruistic
defense depends on parasite presence, which implies that benefits of altruistic acts are not
constant. In particular, this leads to the conclusion that altruistic defense only evolves at
intermediate levels of mixing that simultaneously allow for a spread of parasites and for a
population structure that is sufficiently strong for altruism to be selectively favored. Similar
to the case of bacteria, social insects show various self-destructive defense behaviors against
attackers (reviewed by Shorter and Rueppell, 2012). Ground squirrels can make alarm calls
when they detect an approaching predator (Sherman, 1977). The caller may put himself
at danger of being noticed first by the predator, but nearby squirrels are warned and get a
chance to seek shelter. This behavior is mainly observed when the group consists of close
kin (Sherman, 1977; Dunford, 1977). Recently, slave rebellion was discovered as a defense
mechanism of ants against their slavemakers (Achenbach and Foitzik, 2009), which can be
interpreted as another instance of an altruistic defense trait (Pamminger et al., 2014).
1.2.3 The slavemaking ant Protomognathus americanus and its hosts
The slavemaking ant Protomognathus americanus and its closely related three host species
Temnothorax longispinosus, T. curvispinosus, and T. ambiguus occur in the northeastern part
of North America. They live in mixed deciduous forests and build their nests in acorns,
small hollow sticks, or hickory nuts on the ground (Achenbach and Foitzik, 2009). New
colonies of P. americanus are founded by a mated queen that invades a host nest and kills
or drives out all queens and adult workers that are present in the nest (Wesson, 1939). This
happens during mid to late summer, when there are worker pupae in the host nest (Foitzik
and Herbers, 2001b).
There is a critical time of chemical learning for young host workers shortly after eclosion,
during which they can strongly be influenced by allospecific odors and learn the recognition
cues of their parasites (Hare and Alloway, 1987; Achenbach et al., 2010). Henceforth, the
enslaved Temnothorax workers carry on to perform their tasks of foraging and brood care in
the slavemaker nest.
Further manipulation of host ants by their parasites is achieved by physical aggression
(Heinze et al., 1994) and via the use of glandular secretions as chemical weapons to induce
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fights between host individuals (Foitzik et al., 2003).
Typically, P. americanus nests contain a single queen and only a few slavemaker workers
(Herbers and Stuart, 1998), while nests of T. longispinosus can contain zero, one, or multiple
queens (Alloway et al., 1982). Colonies of P. americanus and their hosts are polydomous,
i.e., they can span multiple nest sites that exchange queens, workers, and brood (Alloway
et al., 1982). P. americanus is an obligate social parasite, meaning that it needs its host
species to survive. Workers of P. americanus are not able to maintain the nest, forage, care
for the brood, or even feed themselves (Wesson, 1939; Stuart and Alloway, 1985). Instead,
their task is to replenish the slave count of the colony (Buschinger, 1986). In order to do
so, they scout for nests of the host species in the vicinity. When a host nest is found, the
slavemaker worker then gathers more workers and slaves from the colony and together they
raid the host nest. They kill or drive out all queens and adult workers that are present in the
nest and then proceed to steal the pupae and transport them to the slavemaker colony. The
stolen brood will then join the slave force. In a slavemaker population studied by Foitzik and
Herbers (2001b), a mature nest performs an estimated number of six raids per year. There
is a high frequency of two thirds of males being produced by workers of P. americanus
(Foitzik and Herbers, 2001a), while worker reproduction is less important in the host species
(Herbers and Cunningham, 1983). The impact of slavemakers on the host species can be
massive, with the chance of a single colony being raided in any given year going up to over
50% (Foitzik and Herbers, 2001b). Furthermore, Foitzik and Herbers (2001a) find no local
survivors of raided host nests and they conclude that raids completely destroy the targeted
host nest or force all survivors to move far away. In either case, slavemaker presence can
dramatically alter the fate of a host colony. A study by Foitzik et al. (2001) finds local
variation regarding severity of raids between populations of P. americanus as well as local
variation in effectiveness of defense between T. longispinosus populations. This is consistent
with the idea of a geographic mosaic of coevolution (Thompson, 1999), which can be caused
by population structure. Across the geographic range, there are coevolutionary hot and cold
spots, referring to the strength of selective pressure due to the host-parasite interactions. Such
a pattern has been identified numerous times for interactions between slavemaking ants and
their hosts (Blatrix and Herbers, 2003; Brandt and Foitzik, 2004; Fischer and Foitzik, 2004).
One contributor to this geographic mosaic of coevolution may be the variation in slavemaker
presence of different species, as shown by Johnson and Herbers (2006) for interactions of P.
americanus and T. duloticus.
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1.2.4 Slave rebellion
Gladstone (1981) argues that slave rebellion would never evolve in ants. He bases this con-
clusion on the fact that slaves never reproduce and on the possibility that a refusal to work
could induce the slavemakers to go on more raids. These two points mean that rebellion
would not give a direct fitness advantage to slaves and could even be harmful to nearby host
nests.
Nevertheless, Achenbach and Foitzik (2009) give evidence for rebellion among slaves of
T. longispinosus. Slaves attack and kill pupae of their slavemaker P. americanus instead of
caring for them. This behavior is observed across different geographic locations, with strong
variation in its intensity (Pamminger et al., 2013).
The cuticular hydrocarbon profiles of pupae of P. americanus and their Temnothorax
hosts are highly divergent (Achenbach et al., 2010). Hydrocarbons are used by insects for
many different functions (see Howard and Blomquist, 1982, 2005, for an overview). One
of these functions is recognition of species and nest membership (Lahav et al., 1999). The
highly divergent profiles can thus be used by enslaved host workers to identify and kill pu-
pae of their parasite, instead of raising them. P. americanus cuticular hydrocarbon profiles
resemble those of their local hosts more closely than those of distant ones. This indicates
that the rebellion behavior of enslaved host workers evolved only recently and that now there
is strong selective pressure on parasites to adapt by mimicking cuticular hydrocarbon pro-
files of local host populations (Achenbach et al., 2010). Hence, in this case, the hosts are
apparently one step ahead in the coevolutionary arms race.
Pamminger et al. (2014) show that the rebellion behavior can be an instance of altru-
istic defense. Having the defense trait may be associated with a cost to the individual for
developing the necessary structures. Furthermore, carriers of the rebel allele may mistake
conspecific offspring in free-living nests for enemies and thus they might be prone to acci-
dental killings in their mother nests (Metzler et al., 2015). Such erroneous killings of own
offspring occur in hosts of avian brood parasites (Davies et al., 1996). This is caused by the
strong selective pressure induced by their parasites to accept only a very limited range of
phenotypes of eggs in their nests.
Viewing a whole nest as a “superorganism” (Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009) permits the
idea of slave rebellion being an altruistic trait. Free-living nests that contain rebels pay the
cost of a reduced growth rate. They benefit host nests in the area by reducing slavemaker
pressure, once their workers get enslaved and kill slavemaker offspring. Similarly, the queens
themselves can be seen as the agents in this system. A queen that bears the rebel allele has
a nest with rebel workers and the above reasoning applies. Hence, even though the slaves
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themselves do not get a direct fitness advantage from rebellion, the trait could still evolve via
indirect fitness benefits, even if it is costly (Pamminger et al., 2014).
1.3 Goals and outline
The overall goal of this dissertation is to better understand the evolution of altruism in the
form of defense against a parasite or predator. This is achieved in three parts.
The first part consists of the mathematical analysis of a model for the evolution of an
allele for altruistic defense in a population that is structured in demes. In this part, the goal is
to derive an analytical result on the success of an altruistic defense allele. In Section 2.1, the
model that forms the basis of the analysis is introduced and the ideas and techniques of the
mathematical analysis are described. All technical details and proofs, as well as intermediary
results, are provided in Chapter 4. The starting point is an individual-based model of altruists,
cheaters, and parasites, which is introduced in Section 2.1.1. Interactions of host and parasite
(or prey and predator), as well as the population structure, make it difficult to determine the
success of altruists. Thus, an important first goal is to obtain an expression that describes the
frequency of altruists. To that end, the diffusion approximation of the individual-based model
is derived in Section 4.1.2. The resulting system of diffusions is shown in Section 4.1.3. In
Section 4.1.4, all intermediary results and all proofs in the derivation of the process X , as
given by equation (3.2), are shown. This process describes the relative frequency of altruists
in each deme in the limit of large populations under the assumption of a complete separation
of ecological and evolutionary time scales. Further simplification is achieved in Section 4.1.5
by assuming uniform migration across all demes and taking the limit of many demes. This
leads to a single one-dimensional process describing the average altruist frequency. Section
4.1.6 then explores the longterm behavior of this process. A condition for the success of an
altruistic defense allele is derived that assumes positive frequency of the allele in an infinite
number of demes with infinite population sizes. Finally, the invasion of an altruistic defense
allele in a population of non-altruists is analyzed in Section 4.1.7 and a condition for possible
survival of the allele after arising at low frequency in a single deme is derived. The ideas and
techniques of the steps described above are presented in a less technical manner in Sections
2.1.2 to 2.1.7. All key results are provided in Section 3.1.
The goal of the second part is to evaluate the results from part one in relaxed settings.
Deriving the result in the first part includes taking the limits of infinite population sizes,
infinitely many demes, and an infinite time horizon. Hence, the result can—at best—only
approximate the situation of any natural population. In fact, it is possible that taking these
limits qualitatively changes the outcome of the system compared to the finite setting. The
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amount of deviation from the theoretical prediction is checked in the second part with com-
puter simulations of two different models that are described in Sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2.1,
respectively. Both models assume finitely many demes and (of course) a finite time horizon.
First, the individual-based model with finite population sizes that forms the starting point of
part one is simulated. Second, the process X , describing the altruist frequency under infinite
population sizes and a complete separation of time scales is approximated in a discretiza-
tion scheme. This allows for an investigation of the differences between finite and infinite
population sizes as well as the effect of a separation of time scales. To better understand
how the success of altruists can be influenced and check the robustness of the results, some
extensions are added to both models and various parameter settings are explored. Details of
the simulation studies are provided in Sections 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.2, respectively. Results are
presented in Section 3.2.
The third part examines a specific altruistic defense trait found in nature—slave rebel-
lion in ants. Here, the goal is to understand how the situation in a natural population may
influence the results from the theoretical prediction and to find mechanisms and parameters
that are relevant for the success of this specific altruistic defense trait. In order to obtain a
model that closely resembles the situation in the field, many details regarding the ecology of
the system of slavemakers and their host are incorporated. A patch of forest with individual
host and slavemaker ants, organized in nests, is modeled. All details of the model are given
in Section 2.3.1. The different simulation studies are described in Section 2.3.2. First, in
Section 2.3.2.1, suitable parameter sets are determined using field data. With these param-
eter sets, several simulation series are performed to find conditions that allow a spread of
rebellion, under variable cost settings (Sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.5) and fixed costs (Sections
2.3.2.3 and 2.3.2.6). To verify that rebellion can only spread in the presence of slavemak-
ers and is not a purely random phenomenon, additional simulations (described in Section
2.3.2.4) are performed. In Section 2.3.2.7, a metapopulation with several patches of forest
that are connected via migration is studied to check how this additional level of population
structure influences the evolution of rebellion. Results are shown in Section 3.3.
In Chapter 5, the findings of the three parts are discussed.
26
Chapter 2
Models and methods
2.1 Mathematical analysis and asymptotics
In this section, a stochastic model is introduced and the ideas and techniques of the mathe-
matical analysis, which is performed in Chapter 4, are described.
2.1.1 Individual-based model
In this section, an individual-based model for the evolution of an altruistic defense trait is
defined. Assume there is a parasite population and a host population with two types of host
individuals—altruists and cheaters—and that these populations are structured in demes that
exchange migrants.
The model describes the numbers of altruists, cheaters, and parasites. For each type,
birth, death, and migration rates are specified. These rates incorporate randomness in repro-
duction, competition within species (to account for limited space and resources per deme),
and interactions between hosts and parasites. Hosts suffer from parasite presence, while
parasites need hosts to survive and grow. Altruists provide the benefit of locally reducing
parasite growth and pay the cost of an increased death rate compared to cheaters. Starting
from an initial configuration of altruists, cheaters, and parasites in each deme, the popula-
tions evolve according to the transition rates given in equation (2.1) below. These rates refer
to exponentially distributed waiting times of the transition events. One transition event con-
sists of a single reproduction, death, or migration of one individual. All parameters of the
model are shown in Table 2.1.
Denote the set of all demes by D, which is assumed to be finite (e.g., D = {1, . . . , D},
for some D ∈ N) or countable (e.g.,D = N). Assume that the numbers of altruists, cheaters,
and parasites are ak, ck, pk ∈ N0
(
where N0 = N ∪ {0}
)
, in each deme k ∈ D, respectively.
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Parameter Description Domain
λ host growth rate R+
K host carrying capacity R+
δ host death per parasite R+
α additional death rate of altruists R+
ν parasite death rate R+
γ parasite competition R+
η parasite growth per host R+
ρ parasite death per altruist (0, η)
κH host migration rate R+
κP parasite migration rate R+
βH randomness in host reproduction R+
βP randomness in parasite reproduction R+
N population size scaling N
D number of demes N ∪ {∞}
T time horizon R+
m migration matrix [0,∞)D×D
A0 initial altruists per deme (units of N ) N
C0 initial cheaters per deme (units of N ) N
P0 initial parasites per deme (units of N ) N
Table 2.1: Parameters of individual-based model.
Then the transition rates are given by
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak + 1k=i, ck, pk)k∈D : ai
(
βH + λ
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak − 1k=i, ck, pk)k∈D : ai
(
βH +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
+ α
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck + 1k=i, pk)k∈D : ci
(
βH + λ
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck − 1k=i, pk)k∈D : ci
(
βH +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk + 1k=i)k∈D : pi
(
βP + η
ci
N
+ (η − ρ)ai
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk − 1k=i)k∈D : pi
(
βP + ν + γ
pi
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak − 1k=i + 1k=j, ck, pk)k∈D : ai κHN m(j, i)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck − 1k=i + 1k=j, pk)k∈D : ci κHN m(j, i)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk − 1k=i + 1k=j)k∈D : pi κPN m(j, i),
(2.1)
where 1k=i = 1, if k = i and 1k=i = 0, otherwise. Note that for all i, j ∈ D, m(j, i) de-
scribes migration from deme i to deme j. It is assumed for every i ∈ D that
∑
k∈Dm(k, i) =
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k∈Dm(i, k) = 1. In this model, the transition rates at any point in time only depend on
the current state of the process. Such a process for which only the current state is relevant
to determine the next transition is called a “Markov process” (e.g., Klenke, 2008, who also
provides a general introduction to probability theory). Because the past history is not taken
into consideration, Markov processes are also said to be “memoryless”.
The model will be analyzed analytically in the remainder of Section 2.1. All technical
details are provided in Chapter 4. A simulation approach of the model is described in Section
2.2.1.
2.1.2 Diffusion approximation
In this section, the approach of Section 4.1.2 is described. The model presented in Sec-
tion 2.1.1 is hard to analyze. Hence, the first step is to transform the discrete model to a
continuous “diffusion process” (e.g., Klenke, 2008). This process takes the form of stochas-
tic differential equations, describing changes in population sizes continuously in time. The
changes consist of deterministic components, to account for the trend of how the population
sizes change due to ecological and evolutionary forces, and random components, to describe
the uncertainty in reproduction and death events (“genetic drift”). The transformation of
the model is achieved by a “diffusion approximation” (Ethier and Kurtz, 1986). Examples
of diffusion approximations for the Wright-Fisher model and the Moran model are given in
Chapter 7 of Durrett (2008).
For the model introduced in the previous section, individuals are added or removed at
discrete points in time and the process makes jumps of size one. By dividing the numbers of
individuals by N , the jumps are reduced to size 1/N and for large N , a continuous process
can be approximated. Thus, instead of jumps at discrete points in time, small changes occur
continuously for the resulting diffusion, which approximates the original Markov process. A
representation of the diffusion limit is computed via equation (4.2).
2.1.3 Diffusion model
In Section 4.1.3, the diffusion model for altruists, cheaters, and parasites, which is obtained
by the diffusion approximation, is formally described. Equation (4.9) gives the numbers of
altruists, cheaters, and parasites, at time t, in deme i, counted in units ofN individuals—e.g.,
ANt (i) = 2 means that in deme i there are 2N altruists at time t. Note that these processes are
continuous approximations of the birth-death process of Section 2.1.1, though, and thereby
(most of the time) are not integer-valued, even after multiplication by N . An introduction
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to diffusions and stochastic differential equations can be found in Klenke (2008), Karlin and
Taylor (1981), or Øksendal (1998). In fact, equation (4.9) belongs to the class of Lotka-
Volterra equations (Lotka, 1920; Volterra, 1926), which describe host-parasite or predator-
prey dynamics. For these types of equations, the interactions of host and parasite (or predator
and prey) will lead to fluctuations over time until an equilibrium is reached. The equilibrium
values can be obtained by setting the amount of change in both types to zero. However, in
the present scenario, deriving these equilibrium values is complicated, as spatial interactions
with random components are considered.
2.1.4 Convergence of the relative frequency of altruists
In Section 4.1.4, a process X , describing the relative frequency of altruists among hosts, is
approximated from the diffusion model for large population sizes. This simplifies the further
analysis, because then only X needs to be understood, instead of simultaneously observing
A, C, and P .
First, an equivalent representation of the processes A, C, and P is derived in Lemma
4.1.2, such that the numbers of altruists, cheaters, and parasites are described by H , F ,
and P , where H = A + C describes the total number of host individuals and F = A/A+C
describes the relative frequency of altruists among all hosts. Thus, the goal is to determine
the dynamics of F , which still depends on H and P .
In Lemma 4.1.3, it is shown that (under certain assumptions) hosts will never go extinct
in any of the demes. In fact, this result is shown to hold with probability one, which for
practical purposes means that it can be assumed to always hold (see “almost surely” and
“null set” in Klenke, 2008, Chapter 1). The result is obtained by comparing H with a similar
process, which is easier to analyze and which is shown to provide a lower bound for H . In
Lemma 4.1.4, the analogous result is stated for P .
In population genetics, a typical assumption is that of weak selection, weak migration,
and weak genetic drift. This is achieved by scaling the corresponding terms with the inverse
of the population size and considering large populations. Consequently, it takes a long time
to observe an effect of these evolutionary forces. In contrast, the ecological forces of repro-
duction, death, host-parasite interactions and intra-species competition are unscaled in the
model and thus, act much faster. Hence, the equilibrium values for H and P—which can be
derived analogously to the classical Lotka-Volterra equations (Lotka, 1920; Volterra, 1926),
but which here depend on F—are reached before the evolutionary forces show any effect.
Meanwhile, F is not influenced by the ecological interactions in large populations. Thereby,
a complete “separation of time scales” is achieved and it takes a long time until a change in
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F occurs. Once this change becomes noticeable, H and P are already at their equilibrium
values. By speeding up the processes appropriately, ongoing changes occur in F while H
and P stay at their equilibrium values at all times. This intuition is made rigorous in Theorem
3.1.1, which rests on a so-called “Lyapunov function”. This is a non-negative function that
decreases along trajectories of the considered differential equation and is zero at the equilib-
rium, while being positive at every other point (e.g., Wirsching, 2006). In Theorem 4.1.9,
this Lyapunov function is derived analogous to the standard Lotka-Volterra case. The proof
of Theorem 4.1.9 relies on the boundedness of the expected values of several terms of H
and P , which is shown in Lemma 4.1.6, Lemma 4.1.7, and Lemma 4.1.8. In these lemmas,
the interactions between hosts and parasites—according to the Lotka-Volterra fluctuations—
have to be accounted for. If H gets larger, then P grows faster, which in turn leads to a
decrease in H . Thus, in order to show boundedness of the relevant expected values, the
processes have to be considered simultaneously by combining them in a suitable way. An
important tool in proving these results is Itô’s lemma (e.g., Klenke, 2008), which allows to
derive the dynamics for functions of H and P . Finally, the proof of Theorem 3.1.2, which
rests on the above-mentioned results, is provided. It formalizes the idea that the processes
describing the numbers of hosts and parasites can be substituted by their equilibrium values
to obtain a description of the altruist frequency on the evolutionary time scale.
The results in Section 4.1.4 are shown for countable sets of demes, which are infinitely
large. An example of a countable set is N, the set of all natural numbers. In this setting,
simply summing the number of individuals over all demes would (typically) lead to infinite
amounts and thus not allow for comparing different configurations or obtaining a useful
notion of boundedness. Thus, it is necessary to introduce a way of assigning sizes or weights
to configurations of individuals in these infinitely many demes. Thus, the σ-norm (‖ · ‖σ)
is introduced, which assigns weights to all demes in a way that typical configurations (e.g.,
at most M individuals per deme, for some M ∈ N) have finite sizes. The results apply to
finite sets of demes as well, where the σ-norm could simply be replaced by the sum over all
demes.
2.1.5 McKean-Vlasov limit
In Section 4.1.5 the process X , as derived in Section 4.1.4, is simplified further. For this,
it is assumed that there are D demes, which are connected by uniform migration. The idea
here is that the terms describing immigration events in the case of uniform migration are of
the form 1
D
∑D
j=1 ψ(X
D
t (j)), for some function ψ. This means that these immigration terms
are averaged over all demes. In the case of many demes, this expression will approximate
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the expected value, E[ψ(XDt (i))]. Thus, the average over all demes can be replaced by the
expectation in the limit of many demes, which greatly reduces the complexity of the process
(from D dimensions to only one dimension). The result is first presented in a general setting
in Proposition 4.1.13. Applicability to the present scenario of the altruistic defense allele is
then verified in Lemma 4.1.14.
2.1.6 Long-term behavior of the average altruist frequency
In Section 4.1.6, the long-term behavior of the process Z describing the average altruist
frequency in the case of many demes with uniform migration is investigated. This process
contains an expectation term, stemming from the average over many demes, as described
in the previous section. The idea is to use the insight that if the process is at equilibrium,
then this expected value stays constant over time (Lemma 4.1.15). Hence, Z is compared to
another process, Ẑ, for which the expectation term is replaced by a constant, which makes
this second process easier to analyze. If both processes start at the same value, then it is
shown that the expectation term in Z gets larger or smaller than the constant term in Ẑ,
depending on α and β. This is true for any constant term and it is concluded that Z goes
to extinction or fixation, depending on α and β. In the critical case α = β, there is an
equilibrium of altruists and cheaters and the distribution of the types is specified in Theorem
3.1.3.
2.1.7 Invasion of an altruistic defense allele
Thus far, the assumption is that both altruists and cheaters are present in all demes. This
does not consider the case of a recently arisen altruistic allele. Hence, in Section 4.1.7 it
is assumed that the altruistic allele is present only in a single deme and in low frequency,
possibly due to a recent mutation event. The aim is to determine the possibility of invasion
in a structured population of non-altruistic individuals. Large populations are assumed and
the corresponding process for the altruist frequency (as derived in Section 4.1.4) is analyzed
under uniform migration. If, in the beginning, the altruist frequency is positive only in a
single deme and there is a large number of demes, then it is very rare that altruists migrate
to a deme where other altruists are already present. Hence, this case can be neglected (until
altruists have established in a sufficient number of demes) and the immigration term can be
set to zero in the process describing the altruist frequency in any deme with altruists. In
Proposition 4.1.17, this simplification is used to derive the condition for certain extinction of
altruists.
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2.2 Simulations on the evolution of altruistic defense
2.2.1 Small populations
2.2.1.1 Simulation model
The evolution of altruists, cheaters, and parasites is modeled on a set of D demes. The
simulation scheme is outlined in Box 2.1 and all model parameters are described in Table
2.2. First, the initial sizes of altruists, cheaters, and parasite in each deme are set to A0N ,
Box 2.1: Simulation scheme for simulations with finite population sizes.
Set ai := A0N, ci := C0N, pi := P0N, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , D}
Set t := 0
while t < T &
∑D
i=1 ai > 0 &
∑D
i=1 ci > 0 do
Set t := t+ 1
r
, where r is the sum of all rates
Pick random transition with probabilities
proportional to rates (see Box 2.2)
Update population sizes according to the chosen
transition event
Update transition rates with new population sizes
end while
C0N , and P0N , respectively. In each simulation step, a single transition is performed, which
can be a birth, death, or migration event for one of the three types in any deme. First, the
inverse of the sum of all transition rates is added to the time that has passed. This corresponds
to the expected value of the time until the next transition occurs, which is used instead of
the true value (which is exponentially distributed with a rate of the sum of all transition
rates) for computational efficiency. The transition is randomly chosen with probabilities
proportional to the transition rates, which are given in Box 2.2. After the numbers of
individuals are updated with respect to the randomly chosen transition event, the transition
rates are adjusted accordingly. If the time that has passed exceeds the specified time horizon
or if there is a fixation of altruists or cheaters, then the simulation run terminates. Otherwise,
the next transition step is performed. The process of finding the next transition is split in two
steps. These steps involve, first, identifying the corresponding deme which the transition
occurs in and second, determining one transition among all possibilities in that deme. For
computational efficiency, a binary tree is used in the first step to find the deme for the next
transition. The tree has one leaf per deme and the sum of all rates of each deme is stored
in the corresponding leaf. Any node holds the sum of all values of the leaves that descend
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Box 2.2: Transition rates when the numbers of altruists, cheaters, and parasites are ak,
ck, and pk, respectively, in all demes k ∈ D, with D := {1, . . . , D}. For all i ∈ D, the
rates are given by
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak + 1k=i, ck, pk)k∈D : ai
(
βH + λ
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak − 1k=i, ck, pk)k∈D : ai
(
βH +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
+ α
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck + 1k=i, pk)k∈D : ci
(
βH + λ
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck − 1k=i, pk)k∈D : ci
(
βH +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk + 1k=i)k∈D : pi
(
βP + η
ci
N
+ (η − ρ)ai
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk − 1k=i)k∈D : pi
(
βP + ν + γ
pi
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak − 1k=i + 1k=j, ck, pk)k∈D : ai κHN
1
D
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck − 1k=i + 1k=j, pk)k∈D : ci κHN
1
D
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk − 1k=i + 1k=j)k∈D : pi κPN
1
D
from that node. This means that the root stores the total sum of all rates. Its left child holds
the sum of the rates for the first half of all demes and its right child holds the corresponding
sum for the second half of all demes. If a node has an odd number of descending leaves,
the left child has one descendant more. The deme for the next transition is then found in the
following way. A random real number r is drawn uniformly between zero and the sum of
all transition rates. The active node is set to be the root. If r is smaller than the value of the
left child of the active node, then the active node is set to be the left child. Otherwise, the
value of the left child is subtracted from r and the active node is set to be the right child.
This procedure is repeated until the active node is a leaf and the deme for the next transition
is the one corresponding to that leaf. In the second step, the transition is determined. If r
is less than the sum of all rates of altruists, i.e., birth, death, and migration rate, then the
transition involves the altruists. In that case, if r is less than the altruist birth rate, the number
of altruists in the corresponding deme is increased by one. Otherwise, the altruist birth rate
is subtracted from r. Then, if r is less than the altruist death rate, the number of altruists in
the corresponding deme is decreased by one. Otherwise, a migration occurs and the number
of altruists in the corresponding deme is decreased by one and the number of altruists in a
random deme, drawn uniformly among all demes, is increased by one. Note that the target
deme of the migrant may also be the current deme. In that case nothing happens. If the
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transition does not involve altruists, the procedure is repeated for cheaters and parasites until
the transition is found. An outline of how the next transition is found is given in Box 2.3.
2.2.1.2 Simulation study
Simulations with different parameter settings were performed in order to check if the pre-
diction from the theoretical analysis holds in the case of finite populations in finitely many
demes.
In the finite setting, randomness is inherent to the simulation model, even without the
added randomness introduced by βH and βP . This may mean that a disfavored type that
would go extinct in the infinite model may prevail in the finite setting due to chance. To
check this effect, simulation series α was performed with different values of the altruist
disadvantage α and different values of the effect of altruistic defense, ρ, which led to different
values of the “benefit”, b = ρ δ
δν+λγ
(i.e., b = β/βH).
To further understand how this randomness in the finite model affects the outcome, sim-
ulation series βH was performed for different values of βH .
In the setting of N < ∞, the time scales of evolutionary and ecological forces are not
separated. Thus, different migration rates may play a more pronounced role. A low value of
κH may mean that effects within demes dominate the dynamics, while a very large value may
remove the effect of population structure. The influence of κH was investigated in simulation
series κH .
In simulation series af , the assumption of having identical conditions in each deme was
relaxed. After each year, each deme had a change in the competition rates, independently
for hosts and parasites, both with probability of pf . If such a change occurred, a normally
distributed random number r with mean zero and standard deviation af λ/KN for hosts or
af γ/N for parasites was drawn. The new competition rate was then set to λ/KN + r in the
case of hosts or γ/N + r in the case of parasites. If the resulting value was non-positive, a
new random number was drawn (until a positive value was obtained). The effect of these
fluctuations was investigated for different values of af .
The values for all parameters in the different simulation series are shown in Table 2.2.
All data was analyzed using R (R Core Team, 2015). Wilson confidence intervals were
computed with the function binconf, logistic regression was achieved with the function glm
for a binomial distribution with a logit link. Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed to check for
significance using the function kruskal.test and p-values were adjusted for multiple testing
with the Bonferroni-Holm correction via the function p.adjust.
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Box 2.3: Procedure to determine the next transition event for simulations with finite
population sizes.
Draw uniform real number r between zero and sum of all
rates
Set active node to be the root of the binary search
tree (described in text)
while active node not leaf do
Set rl to be the value of left child of active node
if r < rl then
Set active node to be left child of active node
else
Set r := r − rl
Set active node to be right child of active node
end if
end while
Next transition occurs in deme corresponding to leaf
that is active node (following rates refer to that
deme)
if r less than sum of rates of altruists then
Transition among altruists
else
Decrease r by sum of rates of altruists
if r less than sum of rates of cheaters then
Transition among cheaters
else
Transition among parasites
end if
end if
Find transition among type (altruist/cheater/parasite):
if r less than birth rate of type then
Add individual of type to deme
else
Decrease r by birth rate of type
if r less than death rate of type then
Remove individual of type from deme
else
Remove one individual of type from deme and add
one individual of type to random deme
end if
end if
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Parameter Description α βH κH af
ρ parasite death per altruist var var var var
λ host growth rate 1 1 1 1.5
K host carrying capacity 2 2 2 2
δ host death per parasite 1 1 1 0.5
α additional death rate of altruists var 1 1 1
ν parasite death rate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
γ parasite competition 2 2 2 1.5
η parasite growth per host 1 2 2 4
κH host migration rate 1 1 var 1
κP parasite migration rate 1 1 1 1
βH randomness in host reproduction 1 var 1 1
βP randomness in parasite reproduction 1 1 1 1
N population size scaling 500 500 500 500
D number of demes 50 50 50 50
T time horizon 2.5E6 2.5E6 2.5E6 2.5E6
A0 initial altruists per deme (units of N ) 1 1 1 1
C0 initial cheaters per deme (units of N ) 1 1 1 1
P0 initial parasites per deme (units of N ) 1 1 1 1
pf probability of fluctuating competition 0 0 0 0.02
af amount of competition fluctuation 0 0 0 var
Table 2.2: Parameters of individual-based model with values used in the different simulation
series.
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2.2.2 Large populations
Theorem 3.1.2 shows that the frequency of altruists in any given deme converges to the
dynamics of the process X , as given by equation (3.2), when time is sped up by a factor
of N in the limit of an infinitely large population, N → ∞. In this section, the simulation
procedure of approximating the dynamics of the process X is described.
2.2.2.1 Simulation model
The dynamics of the process X , given by equation (3.2), is approximated by the following
simulation scheme. At the beginning of the simulation, Xi is set to x0 in each deme i ∈
{1, . . . , D} and the current time t is set to zero. The discretization is achieved by choosing
a small, positive step size dt, and approximating the change of the Brownian motion in each
time step by dWi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , D}, which is normally distributed with mean zero and
standard deviation
√
dt. In each simulation step, corresponding to a time interval of length
dt, the value of Xi is updated as
Xi := Xi +
[
κ(a−Xi)
( D∑
j=1
m(i, j) a−Xi
a−Xj − 1
)
− αXi(1−Xi)
]
dt
+
√
β(a−Xi)Xi(1−Xi)dWi,
(2.2)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , D}, where the migration rate m(i, j) from deme j to deme i depends on
the migration scheme that is used. Note that β corresponds to b · βH in the setting of Section
4.1.4.1. If Xi < ε, then Xi is set to zero, or if Xi > 1− ε, then Xi is set to one (see Box 2.5
for details). Then, t is increased by dt and if t is an integer-valued multiple of T/1000, then
the average value of X across all demes is computed. If that average value is zero or one, or
if t ≥ T , then the simulation run is terminated. An overview of the simulation procedure is
shown in Box 2.4.
2.2.2.2 Simulation study
In order to assess how well the results from the theoretical analysis could predict the out-
come under finitely many demes, simulations were performed for a fixed value of altruist
disadvantage α and different values of the “benefit” term, β. This was done for different
values of the number of demes, D, to check how well the setting of infinitely many demes
in the theoretical analysis could be approximated. In further analyses, the robustness of the
system towards different migration schemes was investigated. The different schemes were
uniform migration, nearest-neighbor migration on a circle, migration to the four immediate
38
2.2. SIMULATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ALTRUISTIC DEFENSE
Box 2.4: Simulation scheme for simulations with infinite population size.
Set Xi := x0, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , D}
Set t := 0 and avg := 1
D
∑D
i=1Xi
while t < T & avg /∈ {0, 1} do
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , D} do
Draw dWi ∼ N (0,
√
dt)
Set Xi := Xi +
[
κ(a−Xi)
(∑D
j=1 m(i, j)
a−Xi
a−Xj − 1
)
− αXi(1−Xi)
]
dt
+
√
β(a−Xi)Xi(1−Xi)dWi
if Xi < ε then
Set Xi := 0
else if Xi > 1− ε then
Set Xi := 1
end if
end for
Set t := t+ dt
if t mod T
1000
= 0 then
Set avg := 1
D
∑D
i=1Xi
end if
end while
Box 2.5: Cutoff in simulations of process X .
The discretization may introduce a bias away from the boundaries, if Xi attains values
very close to zero or one. This is due to the fact that near zero or one, steps in direction
of the boundaries cannot exceed the boundaries, while steps away from the boundaries
are taken in full size. To compensate for that, values below or above the cutoff values
of ε or 1 − ε, respectively, are set to the corresponding boundary values of zero or one.
In simulation series ε, a suitable cutoff value was determined. Here, suitable means
large enough such that the bias does not affect the outcome and small enough such that
immigration can still drive demes away from fixation or extinction. Note, however, that
if the process is simulated for a very long time, this effect may be overcome by chance.
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Parameter Description ε U N 2D T
β random fluctuation (“benefit”) var var var var var
α altruist disadvantage 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05
κ migration rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 0.1
a see Section 4.1.4.1 2 2 2 2 3
D number of demes 500 var var var var
x0 initial altruist frequency per deme 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
T time horizon 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
dt time step size of discretization 1E-5 1E-5 1E-5 1E-5 1E-5
ε cutoff value var 1E-7 1E-7 1E-7 1E-7
Table 2.3: Parameters of diffusion simulations with values for runs with uniform migration
(U), nearest-neighbor migration (N), two-dimensional nearest-neighbor migration (2D), and
migration along edges of a binary tree (T). Entries marked with “var” vary for the simulation
series and the values are provided in the corresponding plots.
neighbors on a two-dimensional lattice, and migration to connected nodes on a binary tree,
where the root was connected to its two children, any inner node was connected to its two
children and its parent node, and any leaf was connected to its parent node as well as its two
neighboring leaves (i.e., the leaves form a circle along which migration occurs). See Box 2.6
for details on the migration patterns. The parameters used in the different settings are shown
in Table 2.3.
Box 2.6: Migration patterns for the simulations series with uniform migration (U),
nearest-neighbor migration (N), two-dimensional nearest-neighbor migration (2D), and
migration along edges of a binary tree (T). Note that m(i, j) refers to migration from
deme j to deme i.
U m(i, j) = 1
D
, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , D}
N m(i, j) = 1
2
, if i next to j on circle; m(i, j) = 0, otherwise
2D m(i, j) = 1
4
, if i next to j on two-dimensional lattice; m(i, j) = 0, otherwise
T m(i, j) = 1
3
, if j > 1 is parent or child of i or if i and j are neighboring leaves;
m(i, j) = 1
2
, if j = 1 and i ∈ {2, 3}; m(i, j) = 0, otherwise
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2.3 Evolution of slave rebellion in ants
2.3.1 Simulation model
In this section, the simulation model of Metzler et al. (2015) is described in detail. A brief
outline of the simulation scheme is provided in Box 2.7, Box 2.8, and Box 2.9. Model
parameters and variables are summarized in Table 2.6, Table 2.4, and Table 2.5.
In each simulation run, the interactions of slavemaker ants with one host species are
simulated on a grid that represents a patch in a forest of 100 m × 100 m. The grid is given
a torus structure to avoid boundary effects and it consists of 200 × 200 grid points, each
representing 0.5 m × 0.5 m. The simulated time corresponds to T years, with T = 5000 in
most simulation series.
During the set up of the simulation run, each grid point is assigned a host nest (i.e.,
a nest of the host species, irrespective of parasite contact) with probability 8750/40 000, or a
slavemaker nest with probability 875/40 000, or no nest with probability 30 375/40 000. Thus, nest
densities are similar to those found in the field (Foitzik et al., 2009). Note that field nest
densities vary depending on the location, which is accounted for in the simulations, by sim-
ulating a long time span of (at least) 5000 years. This allows for a burn-in time, such that the
model can adapt to the specified parameters. If a grid point is assigned a host nest, this nest
gets a random number of workers, uniformly distributed between zero and hmax. Further-
more, the nest gets a queen who has the rebel allele on each chromosome with probability
fA. Her age is a randomly chosen integer value between zero and ah. The queen is mated to
a single male, who possesses the rebel allele with probability fA. Both queen and male are
assigned microsatellites on six loci according to empirical distributions found in the field.
All loci are assumed to be inherited independently, i.e., without linkage, and mutation is not
included in the simulation. If a grid point is assigned a slavemaker nest, this nest gets a ran-
dom number of slavemaker workers and slaves, uniformly distributed between zero and pmax
or smax, respectively. In addition, the nest gets a queen and her age is a uniformly chosen
integer value between zero and ap. This concludes the set up.
One year corresponds to 40 000 time steps. A single time step includes choosing a ran-
dom grid point and performing nest actions if a host or slavemaker nest inhibits the chosen
point. This happens in each simulation step with probability η/η+qh+qp, where qh and qp
denote the numbers of host and slavemaker queens, respectively, currently on their nuptial
flights in the area and η determines the rate at which new nests are founded. Because there
are 40 000 grid points, each one of them is picked once per year, on average, to perform its
actions.
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On the other hand, with probability qh/η+qh+qp, a mated host queen is chosen from the
pool of queens currently on their nuptial flights, and she attempts to found a new nest on
the grid. To that end, a random grid point is chosen. If it is empty, the queen founds a nest
there. Otherwise the procedure is repeated up to a total of nh times. If no empty grid point
is drawn, then no new nest will be founded. Independent of the success of the foundation
of a new nest, a host queen and a host male are removed from the pool of sexuals. With
probability qp/η+qh+qp, a mated slavemaker queen is picked from the pool of queens on their
nuptial flights, and she searches the grid for a host nest to invade. A total number of np grid
points are chosen, until a host nest is found. If none of these np grid points harbors a host
nest, then no new slavemaker nest is founded. Otherwise, the first found host nest is invaded
by the slavemaker queen and all host queens and adult workers in the nest are removed. The
offspring is kept alive and will form the basis of the slave force. In either case, i.e., if a new
slavemaker nest is founded or not, a slavemaker queen is removed from the pool of sexuals.
If a host or slavemaker queen is chosen to attempt the foundation of a new nest, this does
not count as a time step. The pool of sexuals is represented by double ended queues for host
queens and males. Newly added sexuals are attached to the end of the queue. If a sexual is
removed from a pool, it is taken from the front of the queue. In the simulation, there is no
distinction between slavemaker queens, because their genotypes are not tracked. Hence, the
pool of slavemaker queens is represented by an integer, which gets increased or decreased if
queens are added or removed.
In a time step, a random grid point is chosen. If no nest is present, then nothing happens.
If there is a host nest, then its (annual) actions are performed. First, if there are no workers
present and the nest is at most one year old, then the current number of workers is set to
five. Afterwards, if there are less than hmax workers in the nest, and the nest has not recently
been raided by slavemakers, then additional offspring is produced. Let h denote the current
number of host workers in the nest. Then the number of new worker offspring is drawn
from a Poisson distribution with mean λh · h · (1 − h/hmax). If rebels are present in the nest,
each newly produced worker is removed with probability µk. After production of offspring,
if there are less than h1 workers present, then the whole nest is removed with probability
µh1. If there are more than h2 workers, then the whole nest is removed with probability
µh2. If there are less than h2 and more than h1 workers in the nest, then it gets removed with
probability µh1 +(h−h1) ·µh2−µh1/h2−h1, where h denotes the number of workers currently in
the nest. In case the nest is not removed, each worker dies with probability µh. If there is at
most one worker left alive in the nest and the nest is not older than one year, or if there are at
most three workers left alive in the nest and the nest is older than one year, the whole nest gets
removed. Otherwise, if the nest has more than hxmin workers it produces a random number
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of queens, according to a Poisson distribution with mean λxh · (h−hxmin). If there are rebels
in the nest, each newly produced queen is killed with probability µk. The remaining queens
and equally many males are added to the pool of sexuals currently on their nuptial flights.
With a probability of pqr, each of these queens returns to her home nest after mating with a
male from the pool of sexuals. That male and the returning queen are removed from the pool
of sexuals and the mated queen is included in the nest, leading to a polygynous nest. Then,
each queen in the nest dies with probability 1/1+e−(a−ah)bh , where a is the age of the queen.
If this renders the nest queenless, it is henceforth treated as a satellite nest, as described
below, and the nest performs no further actions in this simulation step. Otherwise, the age of
each surviving queen is increased by one. The age of the nest corresponds to the age of the
oldest queen. If there are more than hsmin workers present in the nest, a satellite nest is built
with probability min{1, (h − hsmin) · ζ}. If that happens, two random numbers are drawn
independently from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation db. They
are rounded to integers and added to the x and y coordinates of the current nest, respectively.
If at the resulting coordinates (taken modulo 200, to account for the torus structure) there is
no nest, the satellite nest is built there. Otherwise, the procedure is repeated up to a total of
ten times. If no vacant grid point can be found, then the satellite nest does not get built. In the
case that a vacant spot is found, a new nest will be established there. With probability psh, or
if the pool of males is empty, this nest does not get a queen. Otherwise it gets a queen, who
stems from the mother nest, i.e., she inherits the genotype from a randomly drawn (mated)
queen of the mother nest. The new queen mates with a male from the pool of sexuals. This
male then gets removed from the pool. Independent of the new nest having a queen or not,
each worker from the mother nest joins the satellite nest with probability uh. The nests then
belong to the same colony and exchange workers. This does not affect the simulation run, but
when relatedness values are calculated for the summary statistics, and ants are sampled from
the nests, each sampled ant is chosen from another nest of the same colony (if the colony is
larger than one nest) with probability phx.
Queenless host satellite nests are treated like nests with a queen, except for the following
differences. They are removed if they become older than three years, i.e., if they are selected
to perform their annual actions for the fourth time. Furthermore, they do not found satellite
nests to extend the colony and they do not produce females, i.e., workers or queens, but only
males. The number of males produced is Poisson distributed with mean 2 ·λxh · (h−hxmin),
where h is current worker count of the satellite nest. These males are then added to the pool
of sexuals.
When a slavemaker nest is selected in a time step to perform its actions and if the number
of slaves and slavemaker workers combined is less than wmax, then new workers are pro-
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duced. The amount of new workers is Poisson distributed with mean s · λs · (1 − s+p/wmax),
where s and p denote the numbers of slaves and slavemaker workers in the nest, respectively.
If there are rebels among the slaves in the nest, then each newly produced slavemaker worker
is killed with probability µr. Then, with probability max{1,min{0, (1− s/smax) · µp1}}, the
whole nest gets removed. In case the nest does not get removed, each slavemaker worker dies
with probability µp, if there are at most pmax slavemaker workers in the nest. Otherwise, this
dying probability is increased by p−pmax/p, with p denoting the number of slavemaker work-
ers. Similarly, if there are at most smax slaves in the nest, each slave dies with probability µs.
If more slaves are present, this is increased by s−smax/s, where s is defined as the number of
slaves in the nest. Genotypes of the slaves are stored in the slavemaker nest. To that end, for
each host nest that slaves in the slavemaker nest originate from, the genotypes of all queens
and males are stored, together with the number of slaves that this host nest contributes to the
current slave force. The choice of which slaves get removed in case of death is performed
uniformly among all slaves.
If there are more than sxmin slaves left in the nest, then a random number of new slave-
maker queens is produced, according to a Poisson distribution with mean λxs · (s − sxmin),
where s denotes the number of slaves in the nest. If there are rebels among the slaves, then
each of the newly produced queens is killed with probability µr. The surviving ones are
then added to the pool of sexuals, currently on their nuptial flight. Slavemaker males are not
considered in the simulation, because slavemaker genotypes do not play a role.
If there is at least one slavemaker worker in the nest, then a Poisson distributed number of
raids, with mean p · nr, is performed, where p denotes the number of slavemaker workers in
the nest. To determine which nest is raided, two random numbers are drawn independently
from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation dr. They are rounded
to integers and added to the x and y coordinates of the current nest, respectively. If at the
resulting coordinates (taken modulo 200, to account for the torus structure) there is a host
nest, then it gets raided. Otherwise, the procedure is repeated up to a total of ten times. If
no host nest is found, then no raid is performed. If a host nest with a queen is found, then
the number of host worker offspring is determined, as described above. If the nest survives
the raid, then it will not produce further offspring the next time it is selected to perform its
actions. Each newly produced host worker offspring is taken by the raiding slavemakers with
probability fr. Furthermore, during the raid, each host queen, each adult host worker, and
each adult slavemaker worker is killed with probabilities ξf , 1 − αh, and ρ, respectively. If
there are rebels in the slavemaker nest, then each of the newly captured slaves is killed before
reaching adulthood with probability µq. In case that there are no host queens remaining in
the raided nest, either because there were none present prior to the raid, or because they were
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all killed during the raid, and if there are more than five slavemaker workers in the current
slavemaker nest, the host nest has a chance of being captured by the raiding slavemakers and
turned into a satellite nest. The probability of this happening is max{1/2+ p−6/20, 1}, where p
denotes the number of slavemaker workers in the current slavemaker nest. If a satellite nest is
built, then max{4, bp/3c} (where b·c denotes the “floor function”) of the slavemaker workers
from the originating slavemaker nest stay there and the satellite nest gets a new slavemaker
queen with probability ppq. If the raided nest is not turned into a slavemaker nest and no
surviving host workers are left, the nest is removed. After all raids are performed, if there
are less than four slaves in the slavemaker nest and it is older than a year, or if there is at
most one slave and the slavemaker nest is not older than one year, then the slavemaker nest
is removed. With probability 1/1+e−(a−ap)·bp , the slavemaker queen dies, where a denotes her
age. If the queen survives, her age is increased by one. Otherwise, the slavemaker nest is
rendered queenless. If a queenless slavemaker nest is picked to perform its actions and it is
older than three years, then it is removed. It cannot produce workers or queens and it is not
removed if it has less than four slaves after performing raids. Apart from these differences,
queenless slavemaker nests are treated in the same way as slavemaker nests with a queen.
Unlike host nests, slavemaker nests are never polygynous in the simulation model.
After a time step has been performed, a random number of host queens and males and
slavemaker queens immigrate to the area and are added to the pool of sexuals. These numbers
are chosen according to a Poisson distribution with mean mh/40 000 for hosts, independently
for queens and males. For slavemaker queens, this number is Poisson distributed with mean
mp/40 000. Immigrating host queens and males are assigned random genotypes with proba-
bility fA of having the rebel allele on a given chromosome. Microsatellites are distributed
according to empirical field observations, matching the frequencies of the initial simulation
setup. After the immigration, random numbers of host queens and males are removed from
the front of the double ended queues, representing the pools of sexuals. This number is bino-
mially distributed with parameters qh and µxh, where qh denotes the number of host queens
in the pool, for queens, and with parameters m and µxh, where m denotes the number of
host males in the pool, for males. Furthermore, a random number of slavemaker queens is
removed from the pool, according to a binomial distribution with parameters qp and µxp,
where qp denotes the current number of slavemaker queens in the pool.
Param. Prior Meaning
fA {0,U(0, 1)} Rebel allele frequency in the beginning and in migrants
hmax lnN (80, 15) Capacity for host workers in host nests
smax lnN (80, 15) Capacity for slaves in slavemaker nests
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pmax lnN (20, 5) Capacity for slavemaker workers in slavemaker nests
wmax lnN (80, 15) Capacity for sum of slavemaker workers and slaves
in slavemaker nest
λh lnN (2, 1.5) Relative productivity of host workers
λs lnN (2, 1) Relative productivity of slaves
µr Beta(0.8, 0.125) Fraction of slavemaker offspring that is killed when
rebels are present
µk Beta(0.05, 0.05) Fraction of host offspring in free nest that is killed
when rebels are present
µq Beta(0.3, 0.15) Fraction of captured slave offspring that is killed
by rebels in a slavemaker nest
µh Beta(0.3, 0.1) Death prob. of a host worker in host nest per year
µs Beta(0.3, 0.1) Death prob. of a slave per year
µp Beta(0.3, 0.1) Death prob. of a slavemaker worker per year
hxmin lnN (13, 3) Minimum number of workers needed to produce
queens and males in hosts
sxmin lnN (13, 3) Minimum number of slaves needed to produce
queens and males in slavemakers
λxh lnN (0.25, 0.1) Increase of number of produced sexuals per worker
in hosts
λxs lnN (0.25, 0.1) Increase of number of produced sexuals per slave
in slavemakers
pqr Beta(0.005, 0.005) Prob. of a host queen to return to her nest
after mating
h1 lnN (5, 2) Upper bound for number of workers in host nest such
that the annual death prob. of the nest is µh1
µh1 lnN (0.1, 0.05) Prob. of host nest death if it has at most h1 workers
h2 lnN (40, 10) Lower bound for number of workers in host nest such
that the annual death prob. of the nest is µh2
µh2 Beta(0.02, 0.01) Prob. of host nest death if it has at least h2 workers
ah lnN (25, 5) Age of host queen with annual dying prob. 0.5
ap lnN (25, 5) Age of slavemaker queen with annual dying prob. 0.5
bh Beta(0.45, 0.12) Influence of age to dying prob. of host queen
bp Beta(0.45, 0.12) Influence of age to dying prob. of slavemaker queen
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µp1 Beta(0.1, 0.08) Maximum annual dying prob. for slavemaker nests
hsmin lnN (35, 5) Minimum number of workers required for a host nest
to be able to build a satellite nest
ζ Beta(0.04, 0.02) A host nest with h > hsmin workers has prob.
min{1, (h− hsmin)ζ} to build a satellite nest
db lnN (2, 1.1) Branching distance of host nests
psh Beta(0.8, 0.1) Prob. that a newly founded satellite host nest does
not get a queen
uh Beta(0.3, 0.1) Fraction of host workers that move to a newly
founded satellite nest
phx Beta(0.1, 0.1) Proportion of workers that is exchanged between nests
of a host colony
nr lnN (0.5, 0.15) Expected annual number of raids per slavemaker worker
dr lnN (2.7, 1.2) Raiding distance
fr Beta(0.65, 0.15) Fraction of host offspring that is raided
αh Beta(0.75, 0.15) Fraction of host workers in the raided nest that survive
ρ Beta(0.05, 0.05) Fraction of slavemaker workers that are killed on a raid
ξf Beta(0.9, 0.1) Prob. that a host queen dies while her nest is raided
ppq Beta(0.1, 0.05) Prob. that a satellite slavemaker nest founded during
raid gets a queen
µxh U(0, 1) Prob. for each host individual in the pool to die or
emigrate in one time step
µxp U(0, 1) Prob. for each slavemaker queen in the pool to die or
emigrate in one time step
η lnN (250, 200) Determines the rate at which new nests are founded
nh lnN (10, 5) Number of sites a host queen checks to find a free one,
when attempting to found nest
np lnN (10, 5) Number of sites a slavemaker queen checks to find
a host nest, when attempting to invade a nest
mh lnN (20, 20) Mean number of immigrating host queens and males
per year
mp lnN (2, 2) Mean number of immigrating slavemaker queens
per year
Table 2.4: Prior distributions for ABC analysis. Table adapted from Metzler et al. (2015).
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Box 2.7: Simulation scheme. Parameters are described in Table 2.4 and Table 2.6.
Set t := 0
while t < T do
Draw uniform real number rand ∈ (0, η + qh + qp)
if rand < η then
Choose random grid point
if there is a host or slavemaker nest then
Perform nest actions (see Box 2.8 and Box 2.9)
end if
Host and slavemaker sexuals immigrate to the pool
Random deaths of sexuals in the pool
Set t := t+ 1
N2
else if rand < η + qh then
Set trial := 0
do
Choose random grid point
Set trial := trial + 1
while grid point not empty & trial < nh
if empty site found then
Host queen from pool builds nest at empty site
else
Remove a host queen and male from the pool
end if
else
Set trial := 0
do
Choose random grid point
Set trial := trial + 1
while no host nest at grid point & trial < np
if host nest found then
Slavemaker queen from pool invades host nest
else
Remove a slavemaker queen from the pool
end if
end if
end while
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Box 2.8: Simulation scheme for annual host nest actions. See Table 2.4, Table 2.5, and
Table 2.6 for a description of the parameters and variables.
if h < hmax then
if h = 0 & age of nest < 2 then
Set h := 5
end if
Produce offspring
end if
Whole nest may be removed with probability depending on
current nest size
Each worker dies with probability µh
if h ≤ 1 | (h ≤ 3 & age of nest > 1) then
Remove nest
end if
Produce queens and males and send them in the pool of
sexuals
Each queen dies with probability depending on her age
if h > hsmin then
A satellite nest may be built with probability
depending on current nest size
end if
Box 2.9: Simulation scheme for annual slavemaker nest actions. See Table 2.4, Table
2.5, and Table 2.6 for a description of the parameters and variables.
if p+ s < wmax then
produce offspring
end if
Whole nest may be removed with probability depending on
current nest size
Each slavemaker worker dies with probability µp
(increased if p > pmax)
Each slave dies with probability µs (increased if s > smax)
Produce queens and send them in the pool of sexuals
A Poisson(p · nr)-distributed number of raids on host nests
in the vicinity is performed
if s ≤ 1 | (s ≤ 3 & age of nest > 1) then
Remove nest
end if
Whole nest may be removed with probability depending on
current nest age
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Variable name Meaning
h Number of workers in current host nest
s Number of slaves in current slavemaker nest
p Number of slavemaker workers in current slavemaker nest
a Age of a queen in the current nest
qh Number of host queens currently on their nuptial flights.
qp Number of slavemaker queens currently on their nuptial flights.
Table 2.5: Names of variables as used in the specification of the simulation model.
Parameter Description Value
T Time horizon in years 5000
N Number of grid points on horizontal and vertical axis 200
H0 Expected value of number of host nests on the grid 8750
at the beginning of the simulation
P0 Expected value of number of slavemaker nests on the grid 875
at the beginning of the simulation
Table 2.6: Model parameters that are fixed across different simulation studies, together with
the respective values. See Table 2.4 for parameters chosen according to prior distributions or
samples from posterior distributions.
2.3.2 Simulation study
In this section, the various simulation series of the simulation study in Metzler et al. (2015),
investigating the evolution of slave rebellion in ants, are described. A simplified overview is
given in Figure 2.1.
2.3.2.1 Prior simulations
The simulation model incorporates a lot of biologically relevant aspects of the system of ant
slavemakers and their hosts. Although the ecology of Protomognathus americanus and Tem-
nothorax longispinosus is studied intensively (Herbers, 1989; Foitzik and Herbers, 2001a,b;
Herbers and Foitzik, 2002; Brandt and Foitzik, 2004; Foitzik et al., 2004; Fischer and Foitzik,
2004; Brandt et al., 2005a,b; Fischer-Blass et al., 2006; Brandt et al., 2007; Foitzik et al.,
2009; Achenbach and Foitzik, 2009; Achenbach et al., 2010; Pohl and Foitzik, 2011; Pen-
nings et al., 2011; Scharf et al., 2011; Konrad et al., 2012; Pamminger et al., 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014), it is still difficult to exactly determine parameter values that resemble the situ-
ation in the field. Furthermore, ecological parameters can vary across geographic locations.
To account for the complexity of the system, the simulation model has 47 parameters. This
leads to a huge parameter space and a crucial first step is to find appropriate parameter
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Prior simulations
Posterior simulations
with fixed cost
Posterior simulations
without slavemakers
Posterior simulations
Simulations with potential for
rebellion with fixed cost
Simulations with potential
for rebellion
Metapopulation
simulations
Figure 2.1: Overview of the simulation study to investigate the evolution of slave rebel-
lion in ants. Arrows indicate which simulation series was used to determine parameters of
subsequent simulation series.
ranges. Many of the parameters relevant for our model are extremely difficult to obtain from
field observations, as they would require constant monitoring of all ants in the area. Never-
theless, the existing studies help narrowing down the parameter space. The resulting prior
distributions are provided in Table 2.4 for all parameters. Further reduction of the parameter
ranges can be obtained using the Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) methodology
(see Csilléry et al., 2010, for a review). In the first simulation series (Prior simulations),
all parameters were drawn independently from the specified prior distributions to perform
10 000 simulation runs. For half of these runs, the rebel allele was absent. In the other
half, the rebel allele frequency was drawn uniformly from the interval (0, 1). In the ABC
approach, the generated output was compared to field data from New York State and West
Virginia, gathered by Pamminger et al. (2014). This comparison was achieved using 14 sum-
mary statistics. These are average number of host workers in host nests, average number of
slaves in slavemaker nests, fractions of queenless and polygynous nests among host nests,
relatedness of host workers within host nests, relatedness of host workers between host nests
at distances of at most 0.8 m, at distances between 0.8 m and 1.75 m, and at distances be-
tween 1.75 m and 3 m, relatedness of slaves within slavemaker nests, relatedness of slaves
and free-living host workers between slavemaker nests and host nests at distances of at most
0.8 m, at distances between 0.8 m and 1.75 m, and at distances between 1.75 m and 3 m. Re-
latedness values were calculated from six microsatellite loci using equations (6) and (10) of
Queller and Goodnight (1989). All of the above summary statistics refer to nests with at least
five host workers for host nests and at least five slaves for slavemaker nests. The remaining
two summary statistics are number of host and slavemaker nests per square meter. A list of
all summary statistics with observed values from the field data gathered in New York and
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Summary statistics Observed Observed
NY WV
Avg. number of host workers 21.04 18.03
Avg. number of slaves 26.9 27.32
Fraction of queenless host nests 0.3756 0.3319
Fraction of polygynous host nests 0.0335 0.0596
Number of host nests per m2 0.9 0.6
Number of slavemaker nests per m2 0.15 0.1
Relatedness within nests 0.4614 0.5879
Relatedness between nests, dist≤0.8 m 0.1217 0.2704
Relatedness between nests, 0.8 m<dist≤1.75 m 0.0536 0.0738
Relatedness between nests, 1.75 m<dist≤3 m 0.0111 0.0217
Relatedness of slaves within nests 0.2578 0.3612
Rel. slaves/free ants betw. nests, dist≤0.8 m 0.1224 0.1827
Rel. slaves/free ants betw. nests, 0.8 m<dist≤1.75 m 0.0481 0.0145
Rel. slaves/free ants betw. nests, 1.75 m<dist≤3 m 0.0293 0.0635
Table 2.7: Summary statistics used in the ABC analysis together with observed values from
New York (NY) and West Virginia (WV) by Pamminger et al. (2014). Table is adapted from
Metzler et al. (2015).
West Virginia by Pamminger et al. (2014) is provided in Table 2.7. The summary statistics
were chosen to be independent of the existence of rebellion behavior. The ABC analysis was
performed with the R-package abc (R Core Team, 2015; Csilléry et al., 2012) and the local-
linear regression method by Beaumont et al. (2002) was used. This was done separately for
the New York and the West Virginia data. For each of the two data sets, among all of the
10 000 simulation runs, those 5% were kept that produced summary statistics most similar
to the observed ones under Euclidean distance. The corresponding 500 parameter sets per
location were retained as samples of the posterior distributions.
2.3.2.2 Posterior simulations
For each of the 500 parameter sets per location, obtained as samples from the posterior dis-
tributions in the Prior simulations, ten independent simulations were performed. Hence,
this simulation series (Posterior simulations) consisted of 10 000 simulation runs. The cost
parameter describing the influence of the rebel allele in free-living host nests ranged from
values as low as 0.0003 to values as large as 0.6818. The runs in the Prior simulations ac-
counted for various levels of frequency of the rebellion allele as well as its complete absence.
Furthermore, the ABC analysis was performed without conditioning on the existence of the
rebellion allele. The goal of this simulation series was to find conditions under which the
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rebel allele can spread in the population, starting at a low frequency. Thus, the frequency of
the rebel allele in the beginning of the simulation and in immigrating host ants was fixed to
0.01. First, all simulations that led to a final host nest density of less than 0.1 per m2 were
excluded. Then, to check the success of the rebellion allele, its frequency at the end of each
simulation run was computed.
Furthermore, the parameter combinations were checked for their potential of showing an
increased rebel allele frequency over a long period of time. In all simulations, allele counts
were stored only at the end of each simulation run, to keep the runtime of the program low.
Thus, for the long-term calculations of rebel frequencies, nest counts were used as a proxy.
A host nest was counted as a rebel nest, if at least one parent of the nest had at least one
rebel allele. Otherwise, it was counted as a non-rebel nest. Then, the average numbers of
rebel host nests and non-rebel host nests per year in the last 1000 years of each simulation
were computed. From these, the ratio of the average number of rebel nests divided by the
average number of all host nests (i.e., the sum of the averages for rebel and non-rebel nests)
was calculated.
2.3.2.3 Posterior simulations with fixed cost
The cost parameter determines the probability that a host pupae in a free-living host nest con-
taining bearers of the rebel allele is erroneously killed before reaching adulthood. A larger
value of the cost parameter means that rebel host nests produce fewer adult queens, males,
and workers, and therefore have a stronger disadvantage compared to non-rebel host nests.
Thus, the cost parameter is likely to have a strong impact on the possibility of the rebel allele
reaching a high frequency and successfully establishing in the host population. In the runs of
the Posterior simulations, the cost parameter varied between 0.0003 and 0.6818. Extremely
large values can completely rule out the possibility of the rebel allele evolving, while very
low values may mean that the rebel allele bears practically no cost. In this simulation series,
the goal was to find conditions for the rebel allele to evolve, when it is costly, without the
cost being extremely large. Thus, in this simulation series (Posterior simulations with fixed
cost), two scenarios of a costly rebel allele were explored and the parameter was fixed to
0.01 and 0.05. Apart from that, the same parameter sets as for the Posterior simulations
were used. For both cost settings, for each of the 500 parameter sets of both locations, three
simulation runs were performed. This yields a total of 6000 simulation runs. For these, long-
term rebel nest frequencies over the last 1000 simulated years were computed, similar as for
the Posterior simulations.
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2.3.2.4 Posterior simulations without slavemakers
The benefit that the rebel allele brings to the host population lies in the reduction of slave-
maker pressure. Thus, the rebel allele should not be able to reach high frequencies, if there
are no slavemakers in the area. In order to test this hypothesis, slavemakers were excluded
entirely in this simulation series (Posterior simulations without slavemakers). Otherwise, the
same parameter sets as those for the Posterior simulations were used. For both locations—
New York and West Virginia—for each of the 500 parameter sets, three simulations were
performed, leading to a total of 3000 simulation runs.
To compare the results to the simulations with slavemakers from Section 2.3.2.2, those
runs with a final host nest density below 0.1 per m2 were excluded. Then, for each parameter
set, the mean value of the final rebel allele frequency was computed from the remaining
runs. In the same way, the mean final rebel allele frequency was computed for the first
three of the ten simulations per parameter set from the Posterior simulations. Parameter sets
leading to a mean final rebel allele frequency below 10−5 in both cases—with and without
slavemakers—were excluded from the further analysis. With the remaining parameter sets,
the null hypothesis that it is equally likely that simulations with or without slavemakers lead
to a higher final rebel allele frequency, was tested.
2.3.2.5 Simulations with potential for rebellion
In this simulation series (Simulations with potential for rebellion), those parameter sets from
the Posterior simulations were examined that showed the potential for an increased rebel
frequency over a long time period. To that end, parameter combinations from the Poste-
rior simulations that led to at least one simulation for which the rebel nest frequency aver-
aged over the last 1000 years of the simulation was above 5%, were selected. For each of
the selected parameter sets, 20 additional simulation runs were performed, with the goal of
checking whether the increased rebel frequency over a long time-period was reproducible.
2.3.2.6 Simulations with potential for rebellion with fixed cost
The choice of parameter sets for this simulation series (Simulations with potential for rebel-
lion with fixed cost) was performed in an analogous manner to the choice for the Simulations
with potential for rebellion, but based on the simulations of the Posterior simulations with
fixed cost. For all parameter combinations of the Posterior simulations with fixed cost that
led to an increased average rebel nest frequency over the last 1000 years of the simulation,
as described in Section 2.3.2.2 for the Simulations with potential for rebellion, 40 additional
simulations were performed. To check whether the increased rebel frequency over a long
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time-period found in the parameter sets of the Posterior simulations with fixed cost was re-
producible, the current simulations were checked for the two criteria that (a) during the last
1000 years of the simulation, the average host nest density was larger than 0.1 per m2 and (b)
during the last 1000 years of the simulation, the rebel allele frequency among all produced
host queens and males was larger than 0.01.
Furthermore, to test for deme-level effects, the average rebel allele frequency among all
produced host queens and males during the last 1000 years over all 40 simulation runs was
computed for all 37 parameter sets.
To investigate effects of single parameters, all parameter combinations that showed an
increased rebel allele frequency among produced sexuals, as well as a minimum nest density
of 0.1 per m2, were compared to a random sample of all 1000 parameter combinations of
the Posterior simulations with fixed cost. All parameters were compared individually using
a Wilcoxon rank test. The Bonferroni-Holm correction was applied to account for multiple
testing.
2.3.2.7 Metapopulation simulations
In a given simulation, a high rebel nest frequency may protect the host population from
immigrating slavemakers. This could result in an increased productivity of host nests, which
in turn might lead to a high number of emigrating host queens and males. These would
then be likely to carry the rebel allele as well and thus, spread it to other locations. In
order to assess the possibility of this scenario, a metapopulation of 20 demes was simulated
in this simulation series (Metapopulation simulations). Each deme was represented by the
grid of 200× 200 points, as described in Section 2.3.1. Here, a time span of 5200 years was
simulated. During the first 200 years, the frequency of the rebel allele among all immigrating
host queens and males was set to 0.01. After this burn-in time, for the remaining 5000 years,
the frequency of the rebel allele among immigrating host queens and males was set to the
average rebel allele frequency among all host queens and males produced in the 20 demes.
In case that the host population went extinct in all 20 demes, the rebel allele frequency
among immigrants was again set to 0.01. The rate of immigration was set to the value of the
corresponding parameter combination, and thus was independent of the productivity of the
metapopulation. Ten independent simulations were performed per parameter set. Among
the parameter combinations of the Simulations with potential for rebellion with fixed cost,
those were chosen for the present simulation series, which fulfilled both criteria—(a) and
(b), described in Section 2.3.2.6—in more than a quarter of the 40 simulation runs.
In each simulation, every ten years, for all host nests with coordinates (i, j), such that
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i, j ∈ {3, 8, 13, 18, . . . , 198} (i.e., all nests at the center of disjoint blocks of 5 × 5 grid
points) fitness and rebel allele frequencies among queens and fathers of the nests were
recorded. Nest fitness here was defined as the sum of the number of males and twice the
number of queens, produced by the nest within the following ten years (or until the nest
died, if that occurred earlier). From these values, the within-deme and between-deme com-
ponents of Queller’s group selection variant of the Price equation (equation (22) in Queller,
1992; see also Price, 1970) could be approximated. The within-deme component was cal-
culated as the average of the covariance of relative nest fitness (i.e., nest fitness divided by
the sum of all nest fitness values in the deme) and allele frequency, taken over all 20 demes,
weighted by the number of host nests found at the coordinates specified above in a deme
(which acts as a proxy for the deme’s host population density). The between-deme compo-
nent was computed as the covariance of the rebel allele frequency in the whole deme and the
deme-wide average relative nest-fitness.
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Results
3.1 Mathematical analysis and asymptotics
The results presented in this section are based on Hutzenthaler et al. (2015). A condition for
fixation or extinction of an altruistic defense allele is obtained, starting from an individual-
based model of populations structured in demes. The diffusion approximation of this model
is derived and after taking the limits of infinitely large populations, infinitely many demes,
and an infinite time horizon, the result is reached. This result states that the allele for al-
truistic defense will fixate or go extinct, depending on the ecological model parameters. A
stable equilibrium between altruists and cheaters is reached only for the critical values of
the model parameters. An overview of the steps involved in the derivation is given in Fig-
ure 3.1. The technical details as well as the proofs can be found in Chapter 4. A simple
individual-based model for the evolution of an altruistic defense allele is specified in Section
2.1.1. The numbers of individuals of the different types—altruists, cheaters, and parasites—
structured in demes form the states of a Markov chain. Transition rates are given by (2.1).
This simple model incorporates random birth and death events, interactions between hosts
and parasites, intra-species competition, migration, and the effect of the altruists. Namely,
altruists provide help to all hosts by lowering the growth rates of parasites in their deme,
while at the same time suffering the cost of having an increased death rate compared to
cheaters. In order to analytically handle this model, its diffusion approximation is derived in
Section 4.1.2. The resulting diffusion model, given by equation (4.9) in Section 4.1.3, is an
extension of a classical Lotka-Volterra equation (Lotka, 1920; Volterra, 1926) with stochas-
ticity, spatial structure, and altruistic defenders. This model is analyzed in Sections 4.1.4 to
4.1.7. There are added immigration terms in the diffusion equations—
∫ t
0
ιNH
ANs (i)
ANs (i)+C
N
s (i)
ds,∫ t
0
ιNH
CNs (i)
ANs (i)+C
N
s (i)
ds, and
∫ t
0
ιNP ds—which, if they are large enough, prevent the host and
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#Altruists
#Hosts in particle model (2.1)
ANtN (i)
ANtN (i)+C
N
tN (i)
, i ∈ D
Xt(i), i ∈ D
Zt
{
1, if α < β
0, if α > β
Diffusion approximation Section 4.1.2
N →∞ Theorem 3.1.2
D →∞ Proposition 4.1.13 and Lemma 4.1.14
t→∞ Theorem 3.1.3
Figure 3.1: Simplified overview of the results from the theoretical analysis on the relative
frequency of an altruistic defense allele in a structured host population.
parasite populations from local extinction due to random fluctuations, in the finite setting
N <∞, as shown in Lemmas 4.1.3 and 4.1.4. Note that either altruists or cheaters may die
out, while the total host population is prevented from going extinct due to the immigration
terms. First, the equations for altruists, cheaters, and parasites are transformed, to obtain the
equivalent equations (4.14), (4.15), and (4.16), describing the total number of host individ-
uals, the relative altruist frequency among all hosts, and the number of parasite individuals,
respectively. The goal is to understand the evolution of the altruistic defense allele. Thus, the
dynamics of the process FN that solves equation (4.15) is analyzed. For all N ∈ N, the pro-
cess FN still depends on the process HN , which in turn depends on PN , and the first results
in Section 4.1.4 are concerned with the behavior of the latter two processes. Theorem 4.1.9
extends the results on a well-known Lyapunov function (e.g., Dobrinevski and Frey, 2012)
to the spatial setting. Its proof rests on Lemmas 4.1.6, 4.1.7, and 4.1.8, which show bound-
edness of the expected value of weighted sums of functionals of HN and PN . Intuitively,
these lemmas show that under certain assumptions, the interactions of HN and PN keep (the
expected value of) either process, as well as certain combinations of the two, from becoming
“too large” or “too small”. As these processes are strongly connected, it does not suffice to
investigate them separately. Instead, it is necessary to check their behavior by combining
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them in a suitable way, as is done in the aforementioned Lemmas. Proofs of Lemmas 4.1.6,
4.1.7, and 4.1.8 and Theorem 4.1.9 are given in Section 4.1.4.3. An immediate consequence
of Theorem 4.1.9, after using a time substitution, is Theorem 3.1.1. This result formalizes
the effect of a complete separation of time scales in the present scenario. The assumptions
of weak selection, weak migration, and weak genetic drift ensure that evolutionary forces
act much slower than ecological forces. Under this separation of time scales, the relative
altruist frequency FN , which in a large population is influenced only by evolutionary forces,
stays constant over long periods of time, while numbers of hosts and parasites change more
rapidly, due to ecological forces. Thus—as in the case of classical Lotka-Volterra equations
(Lotka, 1920; Volterra, 1926)—an equilibrium between hosts and parasites is reached after
a period of fluctuations, but before any changes in FN can be seen. By speeding up the pro-
cesses appropriately, numbers of hosts and parasites will immediately be at their equilibrium
values and stay at these values—which depend on FN—at all times. The mathematically
rigorous statement of this insight is given in Theorem 3.1.1.
Theorem 3.1.1. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.3, let Assumption 4.1.1 hold, assume that
supN∈N(N max{κNH , κNP , αN , ιNH , ιNP , βNH , βNP }) <∞ and let h∞ and p∞ be given by (4.13).
Then we get for all sets D̂ ⊆ D and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
sup
N∈N
N
∫ t
0
E
[∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
HNuN(i)− h∞
(
FNuN(i)
))2
+
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
PNuN(i)− p∞
(
FNuN(i)
))2 ]
du <∞.
(3.1)
To the best of my knowledge, this result is new even in a panmictic setting, and apart
from proving for every t ∈ [0,∞) the L2([0, t] × l1σ × Ω;R)-convergence of (HN·N , PN·N) to
(h∞(F
N
·N), p∞(F
N
·N)) as N → ∞, it also shows the rate to be at least 1/2. Theorem 3.1.1
states that, when all processes are sped up by a factor of N , then HN and PN can be ap-
proximated for large N by functions h∞ and p∞ of FN , as given by equation (4.13). Using
this approximation in equation (4.15) leads to the limit process of
(
FN·N
)
N∈N, as N → ∞.
Theorem 3.1.2 shows this limit process X , which then describes the altruist frequency on
the sped-up evolutionary time scale. Convergence in distribution is denoted by “=⇒” (e.g.,
Klenke, 2008). Theorem 3.1.2 provides a simplified expression for the relative altruist fre-
quency. This is achieved by making use of the separation of time scales together with the
insight from Theorem 3.1.1 that numbers of hosts and parasites are always at their equilib-
rium values, when the processes are studied on the evolutionary time scale. Replacing these
expressions then yields an equation for the altruist frequency, which no longer depends on
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the numbers of hosts and parasites per deme and is thus easier to analyze.
Theorem 3.1.2. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.3, let Assumption 4.1.1 hold, assume that∑
i∈D supN∈N σiE
[
HN0 (i)
]
< ∞, that supN∈N(N max{κNP , ιNH , ιNP , βNP }) < ∞, that there
exist κ, α, β ∈ [0,∞) such that limN→∞ κNHN = κ, such that limN→∞ αNN = α, and such
that limN→∞ βNHNb = β and assume that F
N
0 =⇒ X0 as N →∞ in l1σ. Then the SDE
dXt(i) =κ
∑
j∈D
m(i, j) a−Xt(i)
a−Xt(j)
(
Xt(j)−Xt(i)
)
dt− αXt(i)(1−Xt(i)) dt
+
√
β(a−Xt(i))Xt(i)(1−Xt(i)) dWt(i), t ∈ (0,∞), i ∈ D
(3.2)
(where {W (i) : i ∈ D} are independent standard Brownian motions) has a unique strong
solution and (
FNtN
)
t∈[0,∞) =⇒ (Xt)t∈[0,∞) (3.3)
as N →∞ in C([0,∞), l1σ).
The proof, which is given in Section 4.1.4.4, builds on Theorem 3.1.1 and uses a stochas-
tic averaging result from Kurtz (1992). Due to Theorem 3.1.2, in order to analyze the evo-
lution of the altruistic defense allele, now only X has to be studied, instead of keeping track
of AN , CN , and PN (or, equivalently, of HN , FN , and PN ). The process X is still D-
dimensional, though. Further simplification is achieved by taking the McKean-Vlasov limit,
which is also denoted as the many-demes limit or the mean field approximation. To take that
limit, assume a finite set of demes D = {1, . . . , D}, for some D ∈ N, with uniform migra-
tion between demes. If exchangeability of the starting value of X across demes is assumed,
then the uniform migration leads to an averaging of the immigration terms. In the limit of
D → ∞, this average converges to the expected value. Thus, for infinitely many demes,
the altruist frequency in each deme can be described by the same one-dimensional process.
These ideas are formalized in Section 4.1.5. In Proposition 4.1.13, the result is shown in a
general setting and in Lemma 4.1.14, applicability to the case of altruistic defense traits is
confirmed. The process describing the evolution of the altruistic defense allele is thereby
reduced to one dimension. Informally speaking, these results show that if the population is
structured in many demes, then the influence of any single deme is reduced and the effects
of migration are averaged over the whole population. Thereby, under appropriate starting
conditions, the altruist frequency in any deme can be approximated by the average altruist
frequency across all demes. The longterm behavior of the resulting process is investigated
in Section 4.1.6. Theorem 3.1.3 provides a simple condition that determines whether the al-
truistic defense allele goes to fixation or extinction. The critical case of coexistence between
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altruists and cheaters is covered as well. The proof is given in Section 4.1.6.3. Theorem
3.1.3 states that in the setting of large populations structured in many demes, where altruists
can be observed in each deme in the beginning, then altruists will take over the population
if α < β, i.e., if their “cost” is lower than their “benefit” to the host population. If this is
not the case, then altruists will go extinct. Furthermore, the scenario of coexistence between
altruists and cheaters would only occur in the critical case of α = β, and is thus unlikely to
be observed in natural populations.
Theorem 3.1.3. Let α, β, κ ∈ (0,∞), let a ∈ (1,∞), let (Ω,F ,P, (Ft)t∈[0,∞)) be a filtered
probability space, let W : [0,∞)× Ω→ R be a standard (Ft)t∈[0,∞) Brownian motion with
continuous sample paths, and let Z0 : Ω → [0, 1] be an F0/B([0, 1])-measurable mapping.
Then the SDE
dZt =κ(a− Zt)
(
(a− Zt)E
[
1
a−Zt
]
− 1
)
dt− αZt (1− Zt) dt
+
√
β(a− Zt)Zt(1− Zt) dWt
(3.4)
has a unique solution. Furthermore, if E[Z0] = 1, then P[Zt = 1 for all t ∈ [0,∞)] = 1, if
E[Z0] = 0, then P[Zt = 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞)] = 1 and if E[Z0] ∈ (0, 1), then
lim
t→∞
E
[∣∣Zt − 0∣∣] = 0, if α > β,
lim
t→∞
E
[∣∣Zt − 1∣∣] = 0, if α < β,
Zt
t→∞
=⇒
∫
·
m(z) dz, if α = β,
(3.5)
wherem(z) = 1
c
z
2κ
β
(aθ−1)−1(1−z)
2κ
β
(1−θ(a−1))−1(a−z)
2α
β
−1 for z ∈ (0, 1), where c ∈ (0,∞)
is a normalizing constant and where θ = E[ 1
a−Z0 ].
Thus, if the altruistic defense allele starts in positive frequency in each deme in an infinite
dimensional space, then it will go to fixation if α < β or it will go extinct if α > β. If
α = β, then there will be coexistence of altruists and cheaters with the specified equilibrium
distribution of the altruist frequency.
The previous statements assume that the altruistic defense allele is already present in
positive frequency across infinitely many demes. The case of invasion into a population of
non-altruistic individuals is thereby not covered by these results. This gap is closed in Section
4.1.7. There, the altruistic defense allele is assumed to have arisen in small frequency in a
single deme, possibly due to a mutation event. Then, Proposition 4.1.17 shows that the
survival probability of an invading defense allele in an infinite dimensional space is positive,
if and only if α < β. Thus, for large populations structured in many demes, a newly arisen
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altruistic defense allele has a chance of establishing in the host population only if its “cost”
is not too large (α < β). Otherwise, it will surely go extinct.
3.2 Simulations on the evolution of altruistic defense
3.2.1 Small populations
To assess the robustness of the results from the theoretical analysis in a setting with small
populations living in finitely many demes, several simulation series were performed. The
parameter values of all simulation series are shown in Table 2.2. For each parameter con-
figuration, 100 simulation runs were performed. Data was analyzed using R (R Core Team,
2015).
In simulation series α, the effect of finite population sizes on the theoretical prediction
was tested for different values of α and b (where b = β/βH). Results are shown in Figure
3.2, where each point gives the mean value of the 100 simulation runs. All final frequencies
were either zero or one, i.e., extinction or fixation of altruists was observed in each run. Bars
denote Wilson confidence intervals on the 5% level and the curves are obtained from logistic
regression. None of the curves agree with the theoretical result that predicts extinction of
altruists for α > b and fixation of altruists for α < b (note that βH = 1 is fixed in simulation
series α and thus, b = β). Qualitatively, the trend can be seen, but α and b have to be suffi-
ciently far apart for fixation or extinction of altruists to be stable across different simulation
runs with the same setting. For α = 1, extinction of altruists was observed in all 100 simula-
tions for each of the values of b. For α = 0.5 and α = 0.4, there was no significant difference
between the results for the different values of b (Bonferroni-Holm corrected p-values of 0.37
and 0.10, respectively). For all other values of α, there was significant difference between the
results for the different values of b (all Bonferroni-Holm corrected p-values below 0.0002).
Thus, for the selective disadvantage of altruists to be large enough, to overcome even small
benefit effects of b ≤ 0.05, α has to be chosen sufficiently large.
Effects of randomness in host reproduction introduced by βH were investigated in sim-
ulation series βH (see Figure 3.3). Results were derived analogously to those of simulation
series α, above. Note that the results for b = 0.7 were excluded for the logistic regres-
sion. There is no significant difference between the results for the different values of βH
for b = 0.6 (Bonferroni-Holm corrected p-value of 0.11). For all other values of b, there
was a significant difference (maximum corrected p-value of 2E-6). In the simulations with
b = 0.7, the parasite population went extinct in 94, 98, 96, and 82 runs out of the 100 runs
for βH = 0, βH = 0.1, βH = 1, and βH = 10, respectively. For all other values of b, the
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Figure 3.2: Results for simulation series α. Each point shows the average final altruist
frequency across 100 runs. See text for details.
parasite population never went extinct in any of the simulations.
Simulation series κH investigated the effect of host migration rates. Results are shown in
Figure 3.4. They were derived analogously to those of simulation series α, above. Among
the simulations with κH = 0.01, there were eight and five runs out of 100 total, for b = 0.2
and b = 0.3, respectively, where neither extinction nor fixation of altruists had occurred
by the end of the simulation. This means there were both altruists and cheaters present in
the host population and final altruist frequency was strictly between zero and one. These
runs were excluded from the computation of confidence intervals, logistic regression, and
significance. For b = 0 and b = 0.1, all simulations led to extinction of altruists, while
for b = 0.4 and b = 0.5, all simulations showed fixation of altruists. Intermediate values
of b showed no significant difference between different settings of κH (all Bonferroni-Holm
corrected p-values above 0.39).
The effect of random fluctuations in host carrying capacity was studied in simulation
series af . Results were derived analogously to those of simulation series α, above, and are
shown in Figure 3.5. For b = 0, all simulations led to extinction of altruists, while for b = 0.4
and b = 0.5, all simulations showed fixation of altruists. There was a significant effect of the
amount of fluctuation, af , for b = 0.2 (Bonferroni-Holm corrected p-value of 5.6E-7). For
b = 0.1 and b = 0.3, the effect of af was not significant (corrected p-value of 0.52 for both).
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Figure 3.3: Results for simulation series βH . Each point shows the average final altruist
frequency across 100 runs. See text for details.
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Figure 3.4: Results for simulation series κH . Each point shows the average final altruist
frequency across 100 runs. See text for details.
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Figure 3.5: Results for simulation series af . Each point shows the average final altruist
frequency across 100 runs. See text for details.
3.2.2 Large populations
Several simulation series were performed, to check how well the condition derived in the
theoretical analysis could predict the outcome in a setting of infinitely large populations
living in finitely many demes. The parameters of all simulation series are shown in Table
2.3. Data was analyzed using R (R Core Team, 2015).
First, simulation series ε was performed, to find a suitable cutoff value to account for the
discretization (see Box 2.5). For each parameter set, 25 simulations were performed. Since
in simulation series ε, α is set to 0.05, the predicted value is zero for β < 0.05 and one for
β > 0.05 (recall that β = b · βH). Final altruist frequencies for all runs are shown in Figure
3.6. Points are spread out horizontally. The actual values of β are 0.01, 0.03, 0.07, and 0.09.
Extinction or fixation of altruists occurred in all runs for ε = 10−7, in 97 of the 100 runs for
ε = 10−6, in the 25 runs with β = 0.01 but never with other values of β for ε = 10−8, and in
none of the runs for ε = 0.
The value ε = 10−7 was then used in simulation series U, N, 2D, and T, with 100 runs per
parameter set. Mean values with standard errors from these simulation series are shown in
Figure 3.7 and root mean squared errors of the simulation results compared to the theoretical
prediction are shown in Figure 3.8. The simulations with β = α were excluded from the
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Figure 3.6: Final altruist frequencies from simulation series ε. Points are spread out hori-
zontally. Dashed gray lines indicate the theoretical predictions. See text for details.
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computation of root mean squared errors.
In simulation series U, the prediction from the theoretical results was checked for uni-
form migration between the demes, with different total deme numbers. For each parameter
setting, 100 simulation runs were performed. For β = α, there were 84 runs with D = 500
and one run with D = 50 that did not show extinction or fixation of altruists. All other
runs had a final altruist frequency of either zero or one. Results are shown in Figure 3.9.
Each point indicates the final altruist frequency of one simulation run. Points are spread out
horizontally. The actual values of β are 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.045, 0.05, 0.055, 0.06, 0.07,
0.08, and 0.09.
In simulation series N, the processX was simulated under nearest-neighbor migration on
a circle. For each parameter setting, 100 simulation runs were performed. For D = 50, 125
of the 500 runs with 0.04 ≤ β ≤ 0.06 showed coexistence of altruists and cheaters, while for
D = 500, coexistence was observed in 425 of the 700 runs with 0.04 ≤ β ≤ 0.08. All other
runs of the simulation series showed fixation or extinction of altruists. For α = β, a final
altruist frequency of either zero or one is observed in 100, 45, and 0 runs (out of a total of
100 runs) for D = 5, D = 50, and D = 500, respectively. Results are shown in Figure 3.10.
Each point indicates the final altruist frequency of one simulation run. Points are spread out
horizontally. The actual values of β are 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.045, 0.05, 0.055, 0.06, 0.07,
0.08, and 0.09.
In simulation series 2D, nearest-neighbor migration in two dimensions was assumed, i.e.,
each deme sent migrants to the four immediate neighbors on a two-dimensional grid (with
a torus structure to avoid boundary effects). For each parameter setting, 100 simulation
runs were performed. In none of the simulations, fixation or extinction of altruists occurred.
Results are shown in Figure 3.11. Each point indicates the final altruist frequency of one
simulation run. Points are spread out horizontally. The actual values of β are 0.02, 0.04,
0.06, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.11, 0.12, 0.14, 0.16, and 0.18.
The process X was simulated with migration along edges of a binary tree in simulation
series T. Demes were represented as nodes of a binary tree and each node exchanged mi-
grants with its parent and its two children. The root sent migrants only to its two children.
Neighboring leaves also exchanged migrants. For each parameter setting, 100 simulation
runs were performed. In all simulations, the final altruist frequency was strictly between
zero and one. Results are shown in Figure 3.12. Each point indicates the final altruist fre-
quency of one simulation run. Points are spread out horizontally. The actual values of β are
0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.045, 0.05, 0.055, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, and 0.09.
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Figure 3.7: Mean values and standard errors from 100 simulation runs with uniform migra-
tion (U), nearest-neighbor migration (N), two-dimensional nearest-neighbor migration (2D),
and migration along edges of a binary tree (T). Dashed gray lines indicate the theoretical
predictions.
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Figure 3.8: Root mean squared errors from 100 simulation runs with uniform migration
(U), nearest-neighbor migration (N), two-dimensional nearest-neighbor migration (2D), and
migration along edges of a binary tree (T). Dashed gray lines indicate the respective values
of α.
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Figure 3.9: Final altruist frequencies from simulation series U. Points are spread out hori-
zontally. Dashed gray lines indicate the theoretical predictions. See text for details.
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Figure 3.10: Final altruist frequencies from simulation series N. Points are spread out hori-
zontally. Dashed gray lines indicate the theoretical predictions. See text for details.
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Figure 3.11: Final altruist frequencies from simulation series 2D. Points are spread out hor-
izontally. Dashed gray lines indicate the theoretical predictions. See text for details.
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Figure 3.12: Final altruist frequencies from simulation series T. Points are spread out hori-
zontally. Dashed gray lines indicate the theoretical predictions. See text for details.
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3.3 Evolution of slave rebellion in ants
In this section, the results of Metzler et al. (2015) are described. The data was analyzed using
R (R Core Team, 2015).
Prior simulations
The Prior simulations were used in an Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) anal-
ysis, to find parameter sets that best suited the field observations. From the field data of
Pamminger et al. (2014), which comprises two locations—New York State (NY) and West
Virginia (WV)—14 summary statistics were computed. The values for these summary statis-
tics are provided in Table 2.7. From the 10 000 runs of the Prior simulations, the 5% were
kept that resulted in summary statistics closest to the observed values (under Euclidean dis-
tance), separately for both locations. For some of the model parameters, this resulted in a
narrowed down range, compared to the prior distributions. Notably, the distance in which a
host nest can build satellite nests was below 1 m, for all of the selected parameter combina-
tions. However, for other parameters, such as the maximum numbers of host and slavemaker
workers per nest, the data was not informative, such that the posterior distributions closely
resembled the prior distributions.
Posterior simulations
For each of the 500 parameter sets per location chosen in the ABC analysis of the Prior
simulations, ten runs were performed. The rebel allele frequency in the beginning of the
simulation and in immigrating host queens and males was set to 0.01. Simulations with
a final host nest density below 0.1 per m2 were excluded from further analyses. This led
to a remaining number of 4063 runs for the NY Posterior simulations and 3847 for the
WV Posterior simulations. Among the remaining simulations, there were 1780 for NY and
1545 for WV with the cost parameter of the rebellion allele above 10%. For these runs, the
final rebel allele frequency never exceeded the initial value of 0.01. In a few runs with cost
parameter below 1%, the final rebel allele frequency was above that initial value. For NY and
WV combined, there was a total of 4212 simulations with final host nest density above 0.1
per m2 and cost parameter between 0.5% and 10%. Among these, four NY simulations and
seven WV simulations showed a final rebel allele frequency higher than 0.01. Furthermore,
there were 27 runs for NY and 34 runs for WV, which showed a long-term increased rebel
nest frequency over the last 1000 years of the simulation.
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Posterior simulations with fixed cost
In this simulation series, the same 1000 parameter sets as of the Posterior simulations were
used, but the cost of the rebel allele was set to 0.01 or 0.05. For both cost settings, three
runs were performed per parameter set. There were 26 parameter combinations with a cost
of 0.01 and 11 with a cost of 0.05 that showed a long-term rebel nest frequency above 0.05
in at least one of the three simulation runs.
Posterior simulations without slavemakers
For each of the parameter sets of the Posterior simulations, three additional runs were per-
formed, in which slavemakers were completely absent. Among the 3000 simulations, there
were 1515 where the cost parameter was between 0.5% and 10% and the final host nest den-
sity was above 0.1 per m2. In all of these runs, the final rebel allele frequency was below the
initial value of 0.01. In six of the remaining 1485 simulations, the final rebel allele frequency
was slightly above the initial value, with a maximum value of 0.016. The cost parameter in
these six simulations was never larger than 0.21%. Furthermore, for the NY data, there were
102 parameter combinations, in which either the mean final rebel allele frequency of the
three simulations from this series or the mean final rebel allele frequency from the first three
runs of the corresponding Posterior simulations was above 10−5. For the WV data, there
were 114 such parameter combinations. In both locations, the mean was higher for the sim-
ulations with slavemakers in the majority of the cases (64/102 for NY and 71/114 for WV). This
over-representation was significant in both locations (p = 0.013 for NY and p = 0.011 for
WV, two-sided test based on binomial distribution).
Simulations with potential for rebellion
For each of the 61 parameter sets identified in the Posterior simulations that showed a long-
term increased rebel nest frequency, additional 20 simulations were performed. Among these
1220 runs, there were 81 that again showed an average rebel nest frequency over 0.05 in the
last 1000 simulated years. In a large number of these, a pattern of extinction and recolo-
nization can be observed. Whenever the amount of slavemaker nests on the grid reaches a
critical number, all host nests die shortly afterwards. Due to a lack of hosts, the slavemakers
then quickly vanish as well. An illustration of this pattern of frequent extinction and recol-
onization is provided in Figure 3.13, where nest numbers of three simulations from a single
parameter combination with cost 0.01 are shown. In rare cases, a slow increase of the rebel
nest frequency over time could be observed, but only if the cost parameter was very low. An
73
CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
4000 4200 4400 4600 4800 5000
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
4000 4200 4400 4600 4800 5000
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
N
um
be
r 
of
 n
es
ts
600 800 1000 1200 1400
0
10
00
0
30
00
0
Year
Figure 3.13: Numbers of host nests (black), rebel host nests (bold black), and slavemaker
nests (gray) over time in three simulations of the same parameter combination with cost
parameter of 0.01. The first two plots show the last 1000 years of the simulations, while the
third one shows years 500 to 1500 of a simulation that had constant nest numbers from year
1000 onwards. Figure taken from Metzler et al. (2015).
example with cost 0.000 59 is shown in Figure 3.14.
Simulations with potential for rebellion with fixed cost
There were 37 parameter sets in the Posterior simulations with fixed cost for which a long-
term rebel nest frequency above 0.05 during the last 1000 simulated years was found in at
least one of the three simulation runs. For each of these parameter sets, 40 additional sim-
ulations were performed and checked for the criteria that (a) during the last 1000 years of
the simulation, the average host nest density was larger than 0.1 per m2 and (b) during the
last 1000 years of the simulation, the rebel allele frequency among all produced host queens
and males was larger than 0.01. For 6 of the 26 parameter sets with cost 0.01, and for 4 of
the 11 parameter sets with cost 0.05, none of the 40 simulations met both criteria (a) and (b)
combined. The majority of the 37 parameter sets fulfilled (a) and (b) together in at most 10
of the 40 simulations. Only three parameter sets fulfilled (a) and (b) in more simulations.
Two parameter combinations with cost 0.01 met both (a) and (b) in 16 and 17 out of the 40
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Figure 3.14: Numbers of host nests (black), rebel host nests (bold black), and slavemaker
nests (gray) over time in a simulation with cost parameter of 0.000 59 and an average rebel
nest frequency in the last 1000 years of 0.93. Figure taken from Metzler et al. (2015).
runs, respectively, while one parameter combination with cost 0.05 fulfilled both criteria in
16 simulations. For one of the parameter sets with cost 0.01 the nest numbers over time of
three simulations are shown in Figure 3.13. Although these simulations stem from the same
parameter set, the plots in Figure 3.13 show different outcomes. This illustrates the impor-
tant role that stochasticity plays in the simulation model. The pattern of frequent extinction
and recolonization, as described in the previous section for Simulations with potential for re-
bellion, occurred in all simulations that showed a long-term increased rebel nest frequency.
When the rebel frequency was high during the recolonization of an empty grid, this could
protect the host against invading slavemakers and thereby lead to a prolonged period of host
prevalence. Thus, host nests could be more productive in the years following a recoloniza-
tion with an increased rebel frequency. To test this effect, the rebel allele frequency among
all produced host queens and males during the last 1000 years was averaged over all 40 sim-
ulation runs for all 37 parameter sets. For the 26 parameter combinations with cost 0.01,
there were 16 with an average rebel allele frequency among produced sexuals during the last
1000 years over 0.01, with a maximum value of 0.043. Among these, 13 had an average host
nest density above 0.1 per m2 during the last 1000 years. For the 11 parameter combinations
with cost 0.05, there were 5 with an average rebel allele frequency among produced sexuals
during the last 1000 years over 0.01, with a maximum value of 0.027. Among these, 3 had
an average host nest density above 0.1 per m2 during the last 1000 years. See Figure 3.15 for
plots of the average rebel allele frequencies. These 16 parameter combinations with cost 0.01
or 0.05 that showed an increase in rebel frequency among produced sexuals and a sufficiently
large nest density, were then compared to a random sample of the 1000 parameter sets of the
Posterior simulations with fixed cost. The parameters µxp and λh were the only ones showing
a significant difference on the 5% level, with p-values of 0.000 33 and 0.0062, respectively
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Figure 3.15: Rebel allele frequencies among all host queens and males produced in the last
1000 years. Each dot shows the value for all 40 simulations of one parameter combination.
A dot is gray, if the average host nest density in the last 1000 years across all 40 simulations
was below 0.1 per m2. The dashed line shows the initial value of 0.01. Results for parameter
combinations with an average rebel allele frequency below 0.001 are not shown. Figure
taken from Metzler et al. (2015).
(Wilcoxon rank test with Bonferroni-Holm correction; see Figure 3.16 and Table 2.4). The
former parameter describes the death rate of slavemaker queens returning from their nuptial
flights and a low value is advantageous for the rebel allele. The latter controls how many
new host workers are produced by host nests, depending on the current worker number and
a large value is advantageous for the rebel allele. There may be more parameters that are
relevant in the spread of the rebel allele that could not be detected by the amount of simula-
tions, because their effects are too weak or their interactions too complicated. Furthermore,
only the range of posterior distributions was covered by the analysis. This means that some
possibly relevant parameters were already rather restricted, such as the host nest branching
distance.
Metapopulation simulations
For the three parameter sets of the Simulations with potential for rebellion with fixed cost that
fulfilled the two criteria that (a) during the last 1000 years of the simulation, the average host
nest density was larger than 0.1 per m2 and (b) during the last 1000 years of the simulation,
the rebel allele frequency among all produced host queens and males was larger than 0.01 in
more than a quarter of the 40 simulation runs, additional ten simulations were performed in a
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Figure 3.16: Parameter values of µxp (“SlavemakerPoolDie”) and λh (“hostRelProductivity”)
from all posterior samples of Posterior simulations for NY and WV combined. Black crosses
show the 13 parameter values of parameter sets with cost 0.01 chosen from the Simulations
with potential for rebellion with fixed cost with an increased rebel allele frequency among all
newly produced host queens and males and a host nest density of at least 0.1 per m2, both in
the last 1000 years. Black dots show the corresponding five values from parameter sets with
cost 0.05. Figure taken from Metzler et al. (2015).
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metapopulation scenario. In each simulation, 20 demes were connected and the within-deme
and between-deme components of Queller’s variant of the Price equation were computed
every ten years. For the parameter set with cost 0.05, the rebel allele never stabilized at a
value significantly higher than the initial value of 0.01 in any of the ten simulations. For one
of the two parameter sets with cost 0.01, the rebel allele nearly reached fixation in six of the
ten simulations, and for the other parameter set, the rebel allele frequency went up to over
90% in three of the ten simulations. At the time points when the rebel allele frequency in-
creased in value, the between-deme component of Queller’s variant of the Price equation was
clearly enlarged. On the other hand, the within-deme component stayed close to zero with
only a few exceptions of short time spans. The rebel allele frequencies and the components
of Queller’s variant of the Price equation are shown in Figure 3.17 for all nine simulations
showing an increased rebel frequency.
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Figure 3.17: Rebel allele frequencies (black, left axis) as well as between-deme component
(red, right axis) and within-deme component (blue, right axis) of Queller’s variant of the
Price equation over time from two different parameter sets with cost 0.01. Plots 1 to 6 and
plots 7 to 9 correspond to one parameter set, respectively. Figure taken from Metzler et al.
(2015).
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Proofs
4.1 Mathematical analysis and asymptotics
4.1.1 Notation
Throughout Section 4.1, the following notation will be used. Define [0,∞] := [0,∞)∪{∞}.
Assume the conventions that 00 = 1, 0 · ∞ = 0, that for any x ∈ (0,∞) it holds that
x
∞ = 0 and
x
0
= ∞, and that zero times an undefined expression is set to zero. For all
x, y ∈ R define x+ := max{x, 0}, sgn(x) := 1x>0 − 1x<0, and x ∧ y := min{x, y}. Let
sup(∅) := −∞ and inf(∅) := ∞. For a topological space (E, E) denote by B(E) the Borel
sigma-algebra of (E, E). For every countable set D and every σ = (σi)i∈D ∈ (0,∞)D define
a function ‖ · ‖σ : RD → [0,∞] by RD 3 z = (zi)i∈D 7→ ‖z‖σ :=
∑
i∈D σi|zi| and define
l1σ := {z ∈ RD : ‖z‖σ <∞}.
4.1.2 Diffusion approximation
In this section, the diffusion approximation of the Markov chain given in Section 2.1.1 is
derived.
Let D be a finite or countable set, that denotes the set of demes and let m ∈ [0,∞)D×D
such that for every i ∈ D it holds that
∑
k∈Dm(k, i) =
∑
k∈Dm(i, k) = 1. Furthermore,
let λ, K, δ, βH , ν, γ, η, ρ, βP , α, κH , κP ∈ (0,∞), such that ρ < η and let σ ∈ [0,∞)D
such that
∑
i∈D σi < ∞. Define E2 := l1σ ∩ [0,∞)D. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space.
For i ∈ D, N ∈ N, and t ∈ [0,∞), denote by ANt (i), C
N
t (i), and P
N
t (i), the numbers of
altruists, cheaters, and parasites at time t, in deme i, respectively. The diffusion approxima-
tion will be performed with unscaled parameters and the scaling will be introduced for the
resulting diffusions to arrive at the appropriate model. This means that βH is replaced by
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β̃HN , βP by β̃PN , κHN by κ̃H ,
κP
N
by κ̃P , and αN by α̃. For i ∈ D, let ai, ci, pi ∈ N0. When
(A
N
t (i), C
N
t (i), P
N
t (i)) = (ai, ci, pi), i ∈ D, assume these processes to have transition rates
given by (2.1) with parameter substitutions as stated above, i.e.,
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak + 1k=i, ck, pk)k∈D : ai
(
β̃HN + λ
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak − 1k=i, ck, pk)k∈D : ai
(
β̃HN +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
+ α̃
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck + 1k=i, pk)k∈D : ci
(
β̃HN + λ
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck − 1k=i, pk)k∈D : ci
(
β̃HN +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk + 1k=i)k∈D : pi
(
β̃PN + η
ci
N
+ (η − ρ)ai
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk − 1k=i)k∈D : pi
(
β̃PN + ν + γ
pi
N
)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak − 1k=i + 1k=j, ck, pk)k∈D : aiκ̃Hm(j, i)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck − 1k=i + 1k=j, pk)k∈D : ciκ̃Hm(j, i)
(ak, ck, pk)k∈D → (ak, ck, pk − 1k=i + 1k=j)k∈D : piκ̃Pm(j, i).
(4.1)
For i ∈ D, N ∈ N, and t ∈ [0,∞), denote by ÂNt (i), ĈNt (i), and P̂Nt (i), the respective
population sizes of altruists, cheaters and parasites, when counted in units of N individuals,
i.e., ÂNt (i) =
A
N
t (i)
N
, ĈNt (i) =
C
N
t (i)
N
, and P̂Nt (i) =
P
N
t (i)
N
. Define for N ∈ N, t ∈ [0,∞), the
notation ZNt :=
(
ÂNt (k), Ĉ
N
t (k), P̂
N
t (k)
)
k∈D
.
Denote by C(E32 ,R) the set of real-valued continuous functions on E32 and by Cb(E32 ,R)
(C2b (E
3
2 ,R)) the set of real-valued bounded, continuous functions (that are twice continu-
ously differentiable, with bounded first and second order partial derivatives) on E32 . Define
Dom(G) := {f ∈ C2b (E32 ,R) : f depends only on finitely many coordinates}. For N ∈ N,
define the operator GN : Dom(G) → C(E32 ,R), for all f ∈ Dom(G) and all zN =(
ak
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)
k∈D
∈ E32 , such that P[ZN0 = zN ] = 1, by
GNf(zN) = lim
t→0
E[f(ZNt )−f(zN )]
t
. (4.2)
For all N ∈ N, for all f ∈ Dom(G), and for all zN =
(
ak
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)
k∈D
∈ E32 , such that
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P[ZN0 = zN ] = 1, it holds that
GNf(zN) = lim
t→0
1
t
[
t
∑
i∈D
(
ai
(
β̃HN + λ
)
f((ak+1k=i
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)k∈D)
+ ai
(
β̃HN +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
+ α̃
)
f((ak−1k=i
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)k∈D)
+ ci
(
β̃HN + λ
)
f((ak
N
, ck+1k=i
N
, pk
N
)k∈D)
+ ci
(
β̃HN +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
)
f((ak
N
, ck−1k=i
N
, pk
N
)k∈D)
+ pi
(
β̃PN + η
ci
N
+ (η − ρ)ai
N
)
f((ak
N
, ck
N
, pk+1k=i
N
)k∈D)
+ pi
(
β̃PN + ν + γ
pi
N
)
f((ak
N
, ck
N
, pk−1k=i
N
)k∈D)
+
∑
j∈D
aiκ̃Hm(j, i)f((
ak−1k=i+1k=j
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)k∈D)
+
∑
j∈D
ciκ̃Hm(j, i)f((
ak
N
,
ck−1k=i+1k=j
N
, pk
N
)k∈D)
+
∑
j∈D
piκ̃Pm(j, i)f((
ak
N
, ck
N
,
pk−1k=i+1k=j
N
)k∈D)
)
+ f(zN)
(
P
[
ZNt = z
N
]
− 1
)]
.
(4.3)
For all N ∈ N, for all f ∈ Dom(G), and for all zN =
(
ak
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)
k∈D
∈ E32 , such that
P[ZN0 = zN ] = 1, it follows by Taylor approximation that
GNf(zN) =
∑
i∈D
{
ai
(
β̃HN + λ
)(
d
dai
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
da2i
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ ai
(
β̃HN +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
+ α̃
)(
− d
dai
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
da2i
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ ci
(
β̃HN + λ
)(
d
dci
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dc2i
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ ci
(
β̃HN +
λ
K
ai+ci
N
+ δ pi
N
)(
− d
dci
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dc2i
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ pi
(
β̃PN + η
ci
N
+ (η − ρ)ai
N
)(
d
dpi
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dp2i
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ pi
(
β̃PN + ν + γ
pi
N
)(
− d
dpi
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dp2i
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+
∑
j∈D
[
aiκ̃Hm(j, i)
(
− d
dai
f(zN) 1
N
+ d
daj
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
daidaj
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ ciκ̃Hm(j, i)
(
− d
dci
f(zN) 1
N
+ d
dcj
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dcidcj
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ piκ̃Pm(j, i)
(
− d
dpi
f(zN) 1
N
+ d
dpj
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dpidpj
f(zN) 1
N2
)]
+O( 1
N
)
}
.
(4.4)
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First the migration terms will be simplified. Using the fact that for all i ∈ D, it holds that∑
k∈Dm(i, k) =
∑
k∈Dm(k, i) = 1, and rearranging terms, then for all N ∈ N, for all
f ∈ Dom(G), and for all zN =
(
ak
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)
k∈D
∈ E32 , such that P[ZN0 = zN ] = 1, it follows
that
∑
i∈D
∑
j∈D
[
aiκ̃Hm(j, i)
(
− d
dai
f(zN) 1
N
+ d
daj
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
daidaj
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ ciκ̃Hm(j, i)
(
− d
dci
f(zN) 1
N
+ d
dcj
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dcidcj
f(zN) 1
N2
)
+ piκ̃Pm(j, i)
(
− d
dpi
f(zN) 1
N
+ d
dpj
f(zN) 1
N
+ 1
2
d2
dpidpj
f(zN) 1
N2
)]
=
∑
i∈D
[
− ai
N
κ̃H
d
dai
f(zN) +
∑
j∈D
aj
N
κ̃Hm(i, j)
d
dai
f(zN)− ci
N
κ̃H
d
dci
f(zN)
+
∑
j∈D
cj
N
κ̃Hm(i, j)
d
dci
f(zN)− pi
N
κ̃P
d
dpi
f(zN) +
∑
j∈D
pj
N
κ̃Pm(i, j)
d
dpi
f(zN)
+
∑
j∈D
m(j, i)O( 1
N
)
]
=
∑
i∈D
∑
j∈D
[
κ̃Hm(i, j)
(
aj
N
− ai
N
)
d
dai
f(zN) + κ̃Hm(i, j)
(
cj
N
− ci
N
)
d
dci
f(zN)
+ κ̃Pm(i, j)
(
pj
N
− pi
N
)
d
dpi
f(zN)
]
+
∑
i∈D
O( 1
N
).
(4.5)
Consequently, for all N ∈ N, all f ∈ Dom(G), and all zN =
(
ak
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)
k∈D
∈ E32 , such
that P[ZN0 = zN ] = 1, it holds that
GNf(zN) =
∑
i∈D
{
ai
N
(
λ− λ
K
ai+ci
N
− δ pi
N
− α̃
)
d
dai
f(zN) + ai
N
β̃H
d2
da2i
f(zN)
+ ci
N
(
λ− λ
K
ai+ci
N
− δ pi
N
)
d
dci
f(zN) + ci
N
β̃H
d2
dc2i
f(zN)
+ pi
N
(
− ν − γ pi
N
+ η ci
N
+ (η − ρ)ai
N
)
d
dpi
f(zN) + pi
N
β̃P
d2
dp2i
f(zN)
+
∑
j∈D
κ̃Hm(i, j)
(
aj
N
− ai
N
)
d
dai
f(zN) +
∑
j∈D
κ̃Hm(i, j)
(
cj
N
− ci
N
)
d
dci
f(zN)
+
∑
j∈D
κ̃Pm(i, j)
(
pj
N
− pi
N
)
d
dpi
f(zN) +O( 1
N
)
}
.
(4.6)
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For all N ∈ N, all f ∈ Dom(G), zN =
(
ak
N
, ck
N
, pk
N
)
k∈D
∈ E32 , such that P[ZN0 = zN ] = 1, it
follows that
GNf(zN) =
∑
i∈D
{[
κ̃H
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
aj
N
− ai
N
)
+ ai
N
(
λ− λ
K
ai+ci
N
− δ pi
N
− α̃
)]
d
dai
f(zN) + ai
N
β̃H
d2
da2i
f(zN) +
[
κ̃H
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
cj
N
− ci
N
)
+ ci
N
(
λ− λ
K
ai+ci
N
− δ pi
N
)]
d
dci
f(zN) + ci
N
β̃H
d2
dc2i
f(zN) +
[
κ̃P
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
pj
N
− pi
N
)
+ pi
N
(
− ν − γ pi
N
+ η ci
N
+ (η − ρ)ai
N
)]
d
dpi
f(zN) + pi
N
β̃P
d2
dp2i
f(zN) +O( 1
N
)
}
.
(4.7)
If for large N , it holds for all i ∈ D that ai
N
≈ Ã0(i) ∈ [0,∞), ciN ≈ C̃0(i) ∈ [0,∞), and
pi
N
≈ P̃0(i) ∈ [0,∞), then the diffusion approximation of (4.1) takes the following form. Let
W̃A(i), W̃C(i), W̃ P (i) : [0,∞) × Ω → R, i ∈ D, be independent Brownian motions with
continuous sample paths and let Ã, C̃, P̃ : [0,∞)×D × Ω→ [0,∞), be adapted processes
with continuous sample paths that for all i ∈ D and all t ∈ [0,∞) satisfy P-a.s.
Ãt(i) = Ã0(i) +
∫ t
0
(
κ̃H
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
Ãs(j)− Ãs(i)
)
+ Ãs(i)
[
λ
(
1− Ãs(i)+C̃s(i)
K
)
− δP̃s(i)− α̃
])
ds+
∫ t
0
√
β̃HÃs(i) dW̃
A
s (i),
C̃t(i) = C̃0(i) +
∫ t
0
(
κ̃H
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
C̃s(j)− C̃s(i)
)
+ C̃s(i)
[
λ
(
1− Ãs(i)+C̃s(i)
K
)
− δP̃s(i)
])
ds+
∫ t
0
√
β̃HC̃s(i) dW̃
C
s (i),
P̃t(i) = P̃0(i) +
∫ t
0
(
κ̃P
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
P̃s(j)− P̃s(i)
)
+ P̃s(i)
[
− ν − γP̃s(i)
+ ηC̃s(i) + (η − ρ)Ãs(i)
])
ds+
∫ t
0
√
β̃P P̃s(i) dW̃
P
s (i).
(4.8)
Then, to obtain the classical assumptions of weak migration, weak selection, and weak ge-
netic drift, the parameters are rescaled, i.e., β̃H is substituted by βNH , β̃P by β
N
P , κ̃H by κ
N
H ,
κ̃P by κNP , and α̃ by α
N , for N ∈ N, such that limN→∞NβNH = βH , limN→∞NβNP = βP ,
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limN→∞Nκ
N
H = κH , limN→∞Nκ
N
P = κP , limN→∞Nα
N = α, for some βH , βP , κH , κP ,
and α ∈ (0,∞). This results in the diffusion model that is analyzed in the remainder of
Section 4.1.
4.1.3 Diffusion model
The following diffusion model forms the basis of the analysis in subsequent sections. It can
be derived from the particle model in Section 2.1.1 via the diffusion approximation provided
in Section 4.1.2. The derivations and results in the remainder of Section 4.1 are adapted from
Hutzenthaler et al. (2015).
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, let D be an at most countable set (the set of demes)
and let m ∈ [0,∞)D×D satisfy for every i ∈ D that
∑
k∈Dm(k, i) =
∑
k∈Dm(i, k) = 1. Let
λ,K, δ, ν, γ, η, ρ ∈ (0,∞) satisfy ρ < η. For everyN ∈ N, let κNH , κNP , αN , βNH , βNP , ιNH , ιNP ∈
[0,∞), let WA,N(i),WC,N(i),W P,N(i) : [0,∞)×Ω→ R, i ∈ D, be independent Brownian
motions with continuous sample paths, let AN , CN , PN : [0,∞) × D × Ω → [0,∞) be
adapted processes with continuous sample paths that for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all i ∈ D satisfy
P-a.s.
ANt (i) = A
N
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
ANs (j)− ANs (i)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
ANs (i)
[
λ
(
1− A
N
s (i)+C
N
s (i)
K
)
− δPNs (i)− αN
]
+ ιNH
ANs (i)
ANs (i)+C
N
s (i)
ds
+
∫ t
0
√
βNHA
N
s (i) dW
A,N
s (i),
CNt (i) = C
N
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
CNs (j)− CNs (i)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
CNs (i)
[
λ
(
1− A
N
s (i)+C
N
s (i)
K
)
− δPNs (i)
]
+ ιNH
CNs (i)
ANs (i)+C
N
s (i)
ds
+
∫ t
0
√
βNHC
N
s (i) dW
C,N
s (i),
PNt (i) = P
N
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
PNs (j)− PNs (i)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
PNs (i)
[
−ν − γPNs (i) + ηCNs (i) + (η − ρ)ANs (i)
]
+ ιNP ds
+
∫ t
0
√
βNP P
N
s (i) dW
P,N
s (i),
(4.9)
let HN : [0,∞)×D×Ω→ [0,∞) satisfy HN = AN +CN , and let FN : [0,∞)×D×Ω→
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[0, 1] satisfy FN = A
N
HN
. For every N ∈ N, the process HN describes the size of the host (or
prey) population, PN describes the size of the parasite (or predator) population,AN describes
the number of altruists, and CN describes the number of cheaters, each measured in units of
N individuals. Existence of solutions to (4.9), which is assumed here, can be established in
suitable Liggett-Spitzer spaces if D is an Abelian group and if m is translation invariant and
irreducible, as shown in Proposition 2.1 in Hutzenthaler and Wakolbinger (2007).
Equation (4.9) extends the classical model for host-parasite interactions by Lotka (1920)
and Volterra (1926) with stochastic fluctuations and it incorporates within-species competi-
tion and spatial structure. The immigration terms
∫ t
0
ιNH
ANs (i)
ANs (i)+C
N
s (i)
ds,
∫ t
0
ιNH
CNs (i)
ANs (i)+C
N
s (i)
ds,
and
∫ t
0
ιNP ds are included for technical purposes, as they prevent the processes from going to
extinction due to random fluctuations in the finite setting N <∞, as shown in Lemma 4.1.3
and Lemma 4.1.4. In order to prove the results, some assumptions are necessary.
Assumption 4.1.1. In the setting of Section 4.1.3 it holds that λ > ν, η−ρ > λ
K
, γ ≥ 2δ, for
allN ∈ N it holds that αN+κNH ≤ λ4 , ι
N
P ≤
λ(ν+λ)
8δ
, κNP +κ
N
H+α
N ≤ λ−ν
2
, ιNH ≥
4δκNP
3(ν+λ)
+ 3
2
βNH ,
ιNP ≥ βNP , and there exist σ = (σi)i∈D ∈ (0,∞)D and c ∈ (0,∞) such that
∑
i∈D σi < ∞,
such that for every j ∈ D it holds that∑
i∈D
σim(i, j) ≤ cσj, (4.10)
and such that supN∈N E
[∥∥∥(HN0 + PN0 )4 + 1(HN0 )2 + PN0(HN0 )2 + 1PN0 + 1PN0 HN0 ∥∥∥σ] <∞.
4.1.4 Convergence of the relative frequency of altruists
In this section, the process describing the relative frequency of altruists among all hosts is
derived by speeding up the processes with a factor of N in the limit N →∞.
4.1.4.1 Setting
Assume the setting of Section 4.1.3 and define κ̄H := supN∈N κNH , κ̄P := supN∈N κ
N
P ,
β̄H := supN∈N β
N
H , β̄P := supN∈N β
N
P , ῑH := supN∈N ι
N
H , ῑP := supN∈N ι
N
P , and βH :=
limN→∞ β
N
H . For all z = (zi)i∈D ∈ (0,∞)D and p ∈ R let zp = (z
p
i )i∈D. Furthermore, let
1 := (1)i∈D ∈ l1σ. Define E1 := [0, 1]D and E2 := l1σ ∩ [0,∞)D. For all i ∈ D and all N ∈ N
let WH,N(i) : [0,∞)×Ω→ R and W F,N(i) : [0,∞)×Ω→ R be stochastic processes with
continuous sample paths such that for every t ∈ [0,∞) it holds P-a.s. that
dWH,Nt (i) =
√
ANt (i) dW
A,N
t (i)+
√
CNt (i) dW
C,N
t (i)√
HNt (i)
(4.11)
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and
dW F,Nt (i) =
√
CNt (i) dW
A,N
t (i)−
√
ANt (i) dW
C,N
t (i)√
HNt (i)
, (4.12)
respectively, with WH,N0 (i) = W
F,N
0 (i) = 0. Furthermore, define functions h∞ and p∞ by
[0, 1] 3 x 7→ h∞(x) := K(δν+γλ)λγ+δK(η−ρx) =
1
b(a−x) ∈ (0,∞),
[0, 1] 3 x 7→ p∞(x) := λK(η−ρx)−λνλγ+δK(η−ρx) =
λ
δ
(
1− 1
Kb(a−x)
)
∈ (0,∞),
(4.13)
where a := λγ+δKη
δKρ
and b := δρ
δν+λγ
. These functions are straightforward adaptations of the
equilibrium values of standard Lotka-Volterra equations (cf. Theorem 3.1.1). Note that for
the functions given by equation (4.13) to be well defined it is necessary that Kb(a− 1) > 1
or, equivalently, that K(η − ρ) > ν.
4.1.4.2 Preliminaries
Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1. In this section some first results are collected that are
used in the proofs of the statements in subsequent sections.
Lemma 4.1.2. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1. Then WH,N(i) and W F,N(i), N ∈ N,
i ∈ D, are independent Brownian motions and for all t ∈ [0,∞), all i ∈ D, and all N ∈ N
it P-a.s. holds that
HNt (i) = H
N
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNs (j) + (λ− κNH − αNFNs (i))HNs (i) (4.14)
− λ
K
(
HNs (i)
)2 − δPNs (i)HNs (i) + ιNH ds+ ∫ t
0
√
βNHH
N
s (i) dW
H,N
s (i),
FNt (i) = F
N
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
FNs (j)− FNs (i)
) HNs (j)
HNs (i)
(4.15)
− αNFNs (i)
(
1− FNs (i)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
√
βNHF
N
s (i)(1−FNs (i))
HNs (i)
dW F,Ns (i),
PNt (i) = P
N
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNs (j)− (κNP + ν)PNs (i)− γ
(
PNs (i)
)2
(4.16)
+
(
η − ρFNs (i)
)
PNs (i)H
N
s (i) + ι
N
P ds+
∫ t
0
√
βNP P
N
s (i) dW
P,N
s (i).
Proof. For all t ∈ [0,∞), all N ∈ N, and all i ∈ D it holds that
〈
WH,N(i),W F,N(i)
〉
t
=
∫ t
0
√
ANs (i)C
N
s (i)−
√
ANs (i)C
N
s (i)
HNs (i)
ds = 0 (4.17)
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as well as
〈
WH,N(i)
〉
t
=
〈
W F,N(i)
〉
t
= t. Hence, WH,N(i) and W F,N(i), N ∈ N, i ∈ D,
are independent Brownian motions. Equation (4.14) follows from Itô’s lemma (e.g., Klenke,
2008) and rearranging terms. Furthermore, applying Itô’s lemma it follows for all t ∈ [0,∞),
all i ∈ D, and all N ∈ N that P-a.s.
FNt (i) = F
N
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
CNs (i)
(HNs (i))
2
(
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
ANs (j)− ANs (i)
)
+ ANs (i)
(
λ
(
1− H
N
s (i)
K
)
− δPNs (i)− αN
)
+ ιNH
ANs (i)
HNs (i)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
CNs (i)
(HNs (i))
2
√
βNHA
N
s (i) dW
A
s (i)−
∫ t
0
ANs (i)
(HNs (i))
2
(
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
CNs (j)
− CNs (i)
)
+ CNs (i)
(
λ
(
1− H
N
s (i)
K
)
− δPNs (i)
)
+ ιNH
CNs (i)
HNs (i)
)
ds
−
∫ t
0
ANs (i)
(HNs (i))
2
√
βNHC
N
s (i) dW
C
s (i)−
∫ t
0
CNs (i)
(HNs (i))
3β
N
HA
N
s (i) +
ANs (i)
(HNs (i))
3β
N
HC
N
s (i) ds
= FN0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κNH
HNs (i)
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
((
1− FNs (i)
)
FNs (j)H
N
s (j)
− FNs (i)
(
1− FNs (j)
)
HNs (j)
)
− αNFNs (i)
(
1− FNs (i)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
√
βNHF
N
s (i)(1−FNs (i))
HNs (i)
dW F,Ns (i)
(4.18)
and (4.15) follows. Finally, the definitions of
(
HN
)
N∈N and
(
FN
)
N∈N yield (4.16).
Lemma 4.1.3. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1 and assume that for all N ∈ N it holds
that ιNH ≥ 12β
N
H . Furthermore, assume for all N ∈ N and all i ∈ D that P-a.s. HN0 (i) > 0.
Then it holds that
P
[
HNu (i) > 0, for all u ∈ [0,∞), all N ∈ N, and all i ∈ D
]
= 1. (4.19)
Proof. For every N,M ∈ N let ĤN,M : [0,∞) × D × Ω → [0,∞) be an adapted process
with continuous sample paths that for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all i ∈ D satisfies P-a.s.
ĤN,Mt (i) = Ĥ
N,M
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
[
ĤN,Ms (i)
(
λ− αN − κNH − λK Ĥ
N,M
s (i)− δM
)
+ ιNH
]
ds+
∫ t
0
√
βNH Ĥ
N,M
s (i) dW
H,N
s (i)
(4.20)
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with ĤN,M0 (i) = H
N
0 (i). Due to Feller’s boundary classification (e.g., Ethier and Kurtz,
1986, p. 366) with the assumption that for all N ∈ N it holds that ιNH ≥ 12β
N
H it follows for
every N,M ∈ N and all i ∈ D that
P
[
ĤN,Mt (i) > 0, for all t ∈ [0,∞)
]
= 1. (4.21)
For allN,M ∈ N, all i ∈ D, and all t ∈ [0,∞) consider the eventANM(i) :=
{
sup
s∈[0,t]
PNs (i) ≤
M
}
. It holds for all N,M ∈ N, all i ∈ D, and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
ANM(i) ⊆ ANM+1(i),
P
[ ⋃
M∈N
ANM(i)
]
= P
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
PNs (i) <∞
]
= 1.
(4.22)
Using a comparison result due to Ikeda and Watanabe (see e.g., Rogers and Williams, 2000,
Theorem V.43.1), implies for all N,M ∈ N, all i ∈ D, and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
P
[
∃u ∈ [0, t] : HNu (i) < ĤN,Mu (i), sup
s∈[0,t]
PNs (i) ≤M
]
= 0. (4.23)
Thus, combining (4.21), (4.22), and (4.23) it holds for all N ∈ N, all i ∈ D, and all t ∈
[0,∞) that
1 ≥ P
[
HNu (i) > 0, for all u ∈ [0, t]
]
= 1− P
[
∃u ∈ [0, t] : HNu (i) = 0
]
≥ 1−
∑
M∈N
P
[
∃u ∈ [0, t] : HNu (i) = 0, sup
s∈[0,t]
PNs (i) ≤M
]
≥ 1−
∑
M∈N
P
[
∃u ∈ [0, t] : HNu (i) < ĤN,Mu (i), sup
s∈[0,t]
PNs (i) ≤M
]
= 1.
(4.24)
This implies for all N ∈ N, all i ∈ D, and all t ∈ [0,∞) that P
[
HNu (i) > 0, for all u ∈
[0, t]
]
= 1, which in turn implies (4.19). This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1.3.
Lemma 4.1.4. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1 and assume that for all N ∈ N it holds
that ιNP ≥ 12β
N
P . Furthermore, assume for all N ∈ N and all i ∈ D that P-a.s. PN0 (i) > 0.
Then it holds that
P
[
PNt (i) > 0, for all t ∈ [0,∞), all N ∈ N, and all i ∈ D
]
= 1. (4.25)
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Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.1.3.
Lemma 4.1.5. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1. For all x = (xi)i∈D ∈ E2, all p ∈
[1,∞), and all sets D′ ⊆ D it holds that∑
i∈D′
σi
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)xj
)p
≤
∑
i∈D
cσix
p
i . (4.26)
Proof. For any x = (xi)i∈D ∈ E2, any p ∈ [1,∞), and any set D′ ⊆ D it follows from
Jensen’s inequality and (4.10) that∑
i∈D′
σi
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)xj
)p
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)xpj ≤
∑
i∈D
cσix
p
i . (4.27)
4.1.4.3 Strong convergence of the spatial stochastic Lotka-Volterra processes
In this section the convergence of the time-rescaled Lotka-Volterra processes as given in
(4.14) and (4.16) will be shown. In Lemmas 4.1.6, 4.1.7, and 4.1.8 bounds for the expected
value of the sum (over sets of demes) of functionals of the processes weighted by σ will be
provided. These are then used in Theorem 4.1.9 to show a result on the behavior of a spatial
analogue of a well-known Lyapunov function (e.g., Dobrinevski and Frey, 2012). From that
the convergence of the processes follows immediately in Theorem 3.1.1.
Lemma 4.1.6. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1, let p ∈ {1} ∪ [2,∞), and define c̄ :=
4 min
{
1
2η
λ
K
,
1
4
,
1
δ
γ
}[
2ηῑH+δῑP+(p−1)
(
2ηβ̄H+
1
2
δβ̄P
)]
(λ+(1− 1p+
c
p)(κ̄H+κ̄P ))
2 . Then it holds that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∥∥(2ηHNt + δPNt )p∥∥σ] ≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∥∥(2ηHN0 + δPN0 )p∥∥σ]
+ ‖1‖σ
(
λ+(1− 1p+
c
p)(κ̄H+κ̄P )
2 min
{
1
2η
λ
K
,
1
4
,
1
δ
γ
}
)p (
1 +
√
1 + c̄
)p
.
(4.28)
Proof. Under the assumption that supN∈N E
[∥∥(HN0 + PN0 )p∥∥σ] = ∞, the claim trivially
holds. For the remainder of the proof, assume supN∈N E
[∥∥(HN0 + PN0 )p∥∥σ] < ∞. Define
D0 := ∅ and for every n ∈ N letDn ⊆ D be a set with |Dn| = min {n, |D|} andDn ⊇ Dn−1.
Define real numbers c0 := min
{
1
2η
λ
K
, 1
4
, 1
δ
γ
}
, c1 := p
[
2ηῑH+δῑP+(p−1)
(
2ηβ̄H+
1
2
δβ̄P
)]
∈
(0,∞), c2 := λp+ (p− 1 + c)(κ̄H + κ̄P ) ∈ (0,∞), c3 := c0p
(∑
k∈D σk
)−1
p ∈ (0,∞), and
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c4 := c1
(∑
k∈D σk
)1
p ∈ (0,∞). For all N ∈ N, t ∈ [0,∞) define Y Nt := 2ηHNt + δPNt
and for all N, n ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) let MN,nt be a real-valued random variable such that
P-a.s. it holds that
MN,nt =
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(∫ t
0
2ηp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
βNHH
N
u (i) dW
H,N
u (i)
+
∫ t
0
δp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
βNP P
N
u (i) dW
P,N
u (i)
)
.
(4.29)
Applying Itô’s lemma it follows for all N, n ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that P-a.s.∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nt (i)
)p −∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y N0 (i)
)p
=
∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
2ηp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1(
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j)
+ (λ− κNH − αNFNu (i))HNu (i)− λK
(
HNu (i)
)2 − δPNu (i)HNu (i) + ιNH
)
+ δp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1(
κNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j)− (κNP + ν)PNu (i)− γ
(
PNu (i)
)2
+
(
η − ρFNu (i)
)
PNu (i)H
N
u (i) + ι
N
P
)
+ 1
2
4η2p(p− 1)
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−2
βNHH
N
u (i)
+ 1
2
δ2p(p− 1)
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−2
βNP P
N
u (i) du+M
N,n
t .
(4.30)
Because 1 ≥ c04, λK ≥ c02η, and γ ≥ δc0 it holds for all N, n ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
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P-a.s.∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nt (i)
)p −∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y N0 (i)
)p
≤
∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
p
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1(
2ηκ̄H
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j) + 2ηλH
N
u (i)
− c0(2ηHNu (i))2 − [ηδ + c04ηδ]PNu (i)HNu (i) + 2ηῑH
)
+ p
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1(
δκ̄P
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j) + λδP
N
u (i)− c0(δPNu (i))2
+ ηδPNu (i)H
N
u (i) + δῑP
)
+ p(p− 1)
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−2((
2ηβ̄H
+ 1
2
δβ̄P
)
2ηHNu (i) +
(
1
2
δβ̄P + 2ηβ̄H
)
δPNu (i)
)
du+MN,nt
=
∫ t
0
∑
i∈Dn
σip
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1
2ηκ̄H
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j) +
∑
i∈Dn
σip
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1
(
λ
(
Y Nu (i)
)
− c0
(
Y Nu (i)
)2
+ (2ηῑH + δῑP )
)
+
∑
i∈Dn
σip
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1
δκ̄P
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j)
+
∑
i∈Dn
σip(p− 1)
(
2ηβ̄H +
1
2
δβ̄P
) (
Y Nu (i)
)p−1
du+MN,nt .
(4.31)
Using Young’s inequality and Lemma 4.1.5 it holds for all N, n ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
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P-a.s.∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nt (i)
)p −∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y N0 (i)
)p
≤
∫ t
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
p−1
p
p
(
Y Nu (i)
)p
κ̄H +
∑
i∈D
σi
1
p
pκ̄Hc
(
2ηHNu (i)
)p
+
∑
i∈Dn
σiλp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p
+
∑
i∈Dn
σic1
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1 −∑
i∈Dn
σic0p
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1
+
∑
i∈Dn
σi
p−1
p
p
(
Y Nu (i)
)p
κ̄P +
∑
i∈D
σi
1
p
pκ̄P c
(
δPNu (i)
)p
du+MN,nt
≤
∫ t
0
∑
i∈D
σic2
(
Y Nu (i)
)p
+
∑
i∈Dn
σic1
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1 −∑
i∈Dn
σic0p
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1
du
+MN,nt .
(4.32)
For N, n, l ∈ N define [0,∞]-valued stopping times
τN,nl := inf
({
t ∈ [0,∞) :
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nt (i)
)p
> l
}
∪∞
)
. (4.33)
Now for all N, n, l ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) it holds that
E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
[(
2ηp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
βNHH
N
u (i)
)2
+
(
δp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
βNP P
N
u (i)
)2 ]
du
]
= E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σip
2
[
2ηβNH
((
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
2ηHNu (i)
)2
+ δβNP
((
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
δPNu (i)
)2 ]
du
]
≤
(
2ηβNH + δβ
N
P
)
E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σip
2
[(
2
(
Y Nu (i)
) 2p−1
2
)2]
du
]
(4.34)
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Young’s inequality implies for all N, n, l ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
[(
2ηp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
βNHH
N
u (i)
)2
+
(
δp
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1√
βNP P
N
u (i)
)2 ]
du
]
≤
(
2ηβNH + δβ
N
P
)
E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
[
4p2
(
2p−1
2p
(
Y Nu (i)
)p
+ 1
2p
)2]
du
]
≤
(
2ηβNH + δβ
N
P
)
E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σ2i
min
k∈Dn
σk
[(
(2p− 1)
(
Y Nu (i)
)p
+ 1
)2]
du
]
≤ 2ηβ
N
H+δβ
N
P
min
k∈Dn
σk
E
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
(∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
(2p− 1)
(
Y Nu (i)
)p
+ 1
))2 du

≤ 2ηβ
N
H+δβ
N
P
min
k∈Dn
σk
E
∫ t
0
((2p− 1) ∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y N
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)p
+ ‖1‖σ
)2 du

≤ 2ηβ
N
H+δβ
N
P
min
k∈Dn
σk
t
[
((2p− 1)l + ‖1‖σ)2
]
<∞.
(4.35)
Hence, for all N, n, l ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) it holds that E
[
MN,n
t∧τN,nl
]
= 0. This together
with (4.32) and Tonelli’s theorem implies for all N, n, l ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y N
t∧τN,nl
(i)
)p
+
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
c0p
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1
du
]
≤ E
[∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ]+ E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
c2
∥∥(Y Nu )p∥∥σ + c1 ∥∥∥(Y Nu )p−1∥∥∥σ du
]
≤ E
[∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ]+ ∫ t
0
c2E
[∥∥(Y Nu )p∥∥σ]+ c1E [∥∥∥(Y Nu )p−1∥∥∥σ] du.
(4.36)
For every N, n ∈ N the map [0,∞) 3 t 7→
∑
i∈Dn σi
(
Y Nt (i)
)p ∈ R is P-a.s. continuous
which implies for all N, n ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that P
[
liml→∞ τ
N,n
l < t
]
= 0. From
Tonelli’s theorem and monotone convergence, then using Fatou’s lemma, and finally apply-
94
4.1. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS AND ASYMPTOTICS
ing (4.36) it follows for all N ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nt (i)
)p]
+
∫ t
0
c0pE
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1]
du
= lim
n→∞
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nt (i)
)p
+
∫ t
0
c0p
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1
du
]
= lim
n→∞
E
[
lim
l→∞
(∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y N
t∧τN,nl
(i)
)p
+
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
c0p
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1
du
)]
≤ lim
n→∞
lim inf
l→∞
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y N
t∧τN,nl
(i)
)p
+
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
c0p
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1
du
]
≤ E
[∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ]+ ∫ t
0
c2E
[∥∥(Y Nu )p∥∥σ]+ c1E [∥∥∥(Y Nu )p−1∥∥∥σ] du.
(4.37)
This implies using Jensen’s inequality for all N ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[∥∥(Y Nt )p∥∥σ]− E [∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ]
≤
∫ t
0
c2E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p]
+ c1E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1]
− c0pE
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1]
du
=
∫ t
0
c2E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p]
+
∑
k∈D σk∑
l∈D σl
(
c1E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p−1]
− c0pE
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p+1])
du
≤
∫ t
0
c2E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p]
+ c4
(
E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p]) p−1p
− c3
(
E
[∑
i∈D
σi
(
Y Nu (i)
)p]) p+1p
du
=
∫ t
0
(
E
[∥∥(Y Nu )p∥∥σ]) p−1p {c4 + c2 (E [∥∥(Y Nu )p∥∥σ]) 1p
− c3
(
E
[∥∥(Y Nu )p∥∥σ]) 2p } du.
(4.38)
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For every N ∈ N let zN : [0,∞)→ R be a process that for all t ∈ [0,∞) satisfies
zNt = z
N
0 +
∫ t
0
(
zNs
) p−1
p
{
c4 + c2
(
zNs
) 1
p − c3
(
zNs
) 2
p
}
ds (4.39)
with zN0 = E
[∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ], where uniqueness follows from local Lipschitz continuity. Using
classical comparison results from the theory of ODEs, the above computation shows for all
N ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) that E
[∥∥(Y Nt )p∥∥σ] ≤ zNt and for all N ∈ N that supt∈[0,∞) zNt =
max
{
E
[∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ] ,( c22c3 +√ (c2)24c23 + c4c3)p}. Hence, it holds that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∥∥(2ηHNt + δPNt )p∥∥σ] ≤ sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
zNt ≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ]
+
(
c2
2c3
+
√
c22
4c23
+ c4
c3
)p
= sup
N∈N
E
[∥∥(Y N0 )p∥∥σ]+ c22c3 (1 +√1 + c4c3c22 )p
= sup
N∈N
E
[∥∥(2ηHN0 + δPN0 )p∥∥σ]+ ‖1‖σ
(
λ+(1− 1p+
c
p)(κ̄H+κ̄P )
2 min
{
1
2η
λ
K
,
1
4
,
1
δ
γ
}
)p(
1
+
√√√√
1 +
4 min
{
1
2η
λ
K
,
1
4
,
1
δ
γ
}[
2ηῑH+δῑP+(p−1)
(
2ηβ̄H+
1
2
δβ̄P
)]
(λ+(1− 1p+
c
p)(κ̄H+κ̄P ))
2
)p
.
(4.40)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1.6.
Lemma 4.1.7. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1 and assume γ ≥ 2δ. Furthermore,
assume for all N ∈ N that αN + κNH ≤ λ4 , ι
N
P ≤
λ(ν+λ)
8δ
, and ιNH ≥
4δκNP
3(ν+λ)
+ 3
2
βNH . Let D̂ ⊆ D
be a set. Then it holds that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
2
λ+ν
PNt (i)
(HNt (i))
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HNt (i))
2
) ≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
2
λ+ν
PN0
(HN0 )
2
+ 1
2δ
1
(HN0 )
2
)]
+ 4κ̄P c
3λ(λ+ν)
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
PNt (i)
)3
+ 4
λ(λ+ν)
(
η2
λ
+ 4λ
K2
)
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σiP
N
t (i)
+ 2
K2δ
.
(4.41)
Proof. If the right-hand side of (4.41) is infinite, then the claim trivially holds. For the
remainder of the proof assume the right-hand side of (4.41) to be finite. Define D0 := ∅ and
for every n ∈ N let Dn ⊆ D̂ be a set with |Dn| = min
{
n, |D̂|
}
and Dn ⊇ Dn−1. Define
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c1 :=
1
λ+ν
and for all n ∈ N let cn0 := 2c1κ̄P c3 sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∑
i∈Dn σi
(
PNt (i)
)3]
+ 2c1
[
η2
λ
+
4λ
K2
]
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∑
i∈Dn σiP
N
t (i)
]
+ λ
K2δ
. For N, n, l ∈ N define [0,∞]-valued stopping
times
τN,nl := inf
({
t ∈ [0,∞) :
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
PNt (i) +
(
HNt (i)
)−1)
> l
}
∪∞
)
. (4.42)
Lemma 4.1.3 yields that for all N, n ∈ N the map [0,∞) 3 t 7→
∑
i∈Dn σi
(
PNt (i) +(
HNt (i)
)−1) ∈ R is P-a.s. continuous. Thereby, for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N it holds
that
P
[
lim
l→∞
τN,nl < t
]
= 0. (4.43)
For all t ∈ [0,∞), N, n, l ∈ N, Young’s inequality implies
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
(
2c1
√
βNP P
N
u (i)
(HNu (i))
2
)2
du
]
≤ E
[∑
i∈Dn
σ5i
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
t sup
u∈[0,t]
4c21β̄P
(
1
5
(
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)5
+ 4
5
(
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−5)]
≤ t4c
2
1β̄P
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
E
 sup
u∈[0,t]
(∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i) +
(
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−1))5
≤ t4c
2
1β̄P
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
l5 <∞
(4.44)
and
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
((
4c1P
N
u (i) +
1
δ
) √βNHHNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3
)2
du
]
≤ E
[∑
i∈Dn
σ7i t supu∈[0,t](4c1+
1
δ
)2β̄H
min
k∈Dn
{σ6k}
(
2
7
(
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i) + 1
)7
+ 5
7
(
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−7)]
≤ t(4c1+
1
δ
)2β̄H
min
k∈Dn
{σ6k}
E
 sup
u∈[0,t]
(∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i) + 1 +
(
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−1))7
≤ t(4c1+
1
δ
)2β̄H
min
k∈Dn
{σ6k}
(l + ‖1‖σ)
7 <∞.
(4.45)
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Hence, for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N it follows that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
2c1
√
βNP P
N
u (i)
(HNu (i))
2 dW
P,N
u (i)
]
= 0,
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
(
4c1P
N
u (i) +
1
δ
) √βNHHNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3 dW
H,N
u (i)
]
= 0.
(4.46)
Define the function y : N× N× [0,∞)→ [0,∞] by
N× N× [0,∞) 3 (N, n, t) 7→ yN,nt := E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PNt (i)
(HNt (i))
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HNt (i))
2
)]
. (4.47)
Recall from the beginning of the proof that it is assumed for all N, n ∈ N that yN,n0 < ∞.
Now, applying Itô’s lemma and using (4.46), it holds for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N
that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
+ 1
2δ
1
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
)]
− yN,n0
= E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
2c1
1
(HNu (i))
2
(
κNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j)− (κNP + ν)PNu (i)
− γ
(
PNu (i)
)2
+
(
η − ρFNu (i)
)
PNu (i)H
N
u (i) + ι
N
P
)
−
(
2c1
2PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3
+ 1
2δ
2
(HNu )
3
)(
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j) + (−κNH + λ− αNFNu (i))HNu (i)
− λ
K
(
HNu (i)
)2 − δPNu (i)HNu (i) + ιNH
)
+ 1
2
2c1
6PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
4β
N
HH
N
u (i)
+ 1
2
1
2δ
6
(HNu (i))
4β
N
HH
N
u (i) du
]
.
(4.48)
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Dropping some negative terms shows for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
+ 1
2δ
1
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
)]
− yN,n0
≤ E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
2c1
(HNu (i))
2
(
κNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j)− νPNu (i)− γ
(
PNu (i)
)2
+ ηPNu (i)H
N
u (i) + ι
N
P
)
−
(
4c1
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3 +
1
δ
1
(HNu )
3
)(
(−κNH + λ− αN)HNu (i)
− λ
K
(
HNu (i)
)2 − δPNu (i)HNu (i) + ιNH
)
+ 6c1
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3β
N
H +
3
2δ
1
(HNu (i))
3β
N
H du
]
= E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
2c1
(
κNP
1
(HNu (i))
2
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j)− ν
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 − γ
(PNu (i))
2
(HNu (i))
2
+ η P
N
u (i)
HNu (i)
+ ιNP
1
(HNu (i))
2 − 2
(
−κNH + λ− αN
) PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 + 2
λ
K
PNu (i)
HNu (i)
+ 2δ
(PNu (i))
2
(HNu (i))
2
− 2ιNH
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3 + 3
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3β
N
H
)
+
κNH−λ+α
N
δ
1
(HNu )
2 +
λ
Kδ
1
HNu
+ P
N
u (i)
(HNu )
2 − ι
N
H
δ
1
(HNu )
3
+
3βNH
2δ
1
(HNu (i))
3 du
]
.
(4.49)
Using Young’s inequality as well as Lemma 4.1.5 gives for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N
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that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
+ 1
2δ
1
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
)]
− yN,n0
≤ E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
2c1
(
2
3
κNP
1
(HNu (i))
3 +
1
3
κNP c
(
PNu (i)
)3 − ν PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2
− γ (P
N
u (i))
2
(HNu (i))
2 +
1
2
λ
2η
η P
N
u (i)
(HNu (i))
2 +
1
2
2η
λ
ηPNu (i) + ι
N
P
1
(HNu (i))
2
− 2(−κNH + λ− αN)
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 +
1
2
K
4
2 λ
K
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 +
1
2
4
K
2 λ
K
PNu (i) + 2δ
(PNu (i))
2
(HNu (i))
2
− 2ιNH
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3 + 3
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3β
N
H
)
+
κNH−λ+α
N
δ
1
(HNu )
2 +
1
2
K
2
λ
Kδ
1
(HNu )
2 +
1
2
2
K
λ
Kδ
+ P
N
u (i)
(HNu )
2 − ι
N
H
δ
1
(HNu )
3 +
3βNH
2δ
1
((HNu (i))
3 du
]
= E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
[
4c1
3
κNP − 1δ ι
N
H +
3
2δ
βNH
]
1
(HNu (i))
3 +
2c1κNP c
3
(
PNu (i)
)3
+
[
c1
(
− 2ν + λ
2
+ 4(κNH − λ+ αN) + λ2
)
+ 1
]
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 + 2c1 [−γ + 2δ]
(PNu (i))
2
(HNu (i))
2
+ 2c1
[
η2
λ
+ 4λ
K2
]
PNu (i) +
[
2c1ι
N
P +
κNH−λ+α
N
δ
+ λ
4δ
]
1
(HNu (i))
2
+ 2c1
[
−2ιNH + 3βNH
] PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
3 +
λ
K2δ
du
]
.
(4.50)
Recall κ̄P = supN∈N κNP and that for all N ∈ N it holds that αN + κNH ≤ λ4 , ι
N
P ≤
λ(ν+λ)
8δ
,
and ιNH ≥
4δκNP
3(ν+λ)
+
3βNH
2
. Furthermore, note that λ
2
≤ 1
2c1
. Together with the assumption that
γ ≥ 2δ it follows for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
+ 1
2δ
1
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
)]
− yN,n0
≤ E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
2c1
3
κ̄P c
(
PNu (i)
)3 − PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 + 2c1
[
η2
λ
+ 4λ
K2
]
PNu (i)
− λ
4δ
1
(HNu (i))
2 +
λ
K2δ
du
]
≤
∫ t
0
cn0 du− E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
λ
2
(
2c1
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HNu (i))
2
)
du
]
.
(4.51)
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Using Tonelli’s theorem, Fatou’s lemma, and (4.43) this implies for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all
N, n ∈ N that
yN,nt +
∫ t
0
λ
2
yN,nu du = y
N,n
t + E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
λ
2
(
2c1
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HNu (i))
2
)
du
]
≤ lim inf
l→∞
(
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
+ 1
2δ
1
(HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i))2
)]
+E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
λ
2
(
2c1
PNu (i)
(HNu (i))
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HNu (i))
2
)
du
])
≤ yN,n0 +
∫ t
0
cn0 du.
(4.52)
For every N, n ∈ N let zN,n : [0,∞) → R be a process that for all t ∈ [0,∞) satisfies
zN,nt = z
N,n
0 +
∫ t
0
(
cn0 − λ2z
N,n
s
)
ds with zN,n0 = y
N,n
0 , where uniqueness follows from local
Lipschitz continuity. Due to classical comparison results of the theory of ODEs, the above
computation yields for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N that yN,nt ≤ z
N,n
t and for all N, n ∈ N
that supt∈[0,∞) z
N,n
t = max
{
zN,n0 ,
2cn0
λ
}
. For all n ∈ N it holds that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
yN,nt ≤ sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
zN,nt = max
{
sup
N∈N
zN,n0 ,
2cn0
λ
}
≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PN0
(HN0 )
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HN0 )
2
)]
+
2cn0
λ
.
(4.53)
Using monotone convergence leads to
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
2
λ+ν
PNt (i)
(HNt (i))
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HNt (i))
2
) ≤ lim
n→∞
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
yN,nt
≤ lim
n→∞
(
sup
N∈N
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
2c1
PN0
(HN0 )
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HN0 )
2
)]
+
2cn0
λ
)
≤ sup
N∈N
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
2
λ+ν
PN0
(HN0 )
2 +
1
2δ
1
(HN0 )
2
)
+ 4κ̄P c
3λ(λ+ν)
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
PNt (i)
)3
+ 4
λ(λ+ν)
(
η2
λ
+ 4λ
K2
)
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σiP
N
t (i)
+ 2
K2δ
,
(4.54)
101
CHAPTER 4. PROOFS
finishing the proof.
Lemma 4.1.8. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1 and assume λ > ν and η − ρ > λ
K
.
Furthermore, assume for all N ∈ N that ιNH ≥ 12β
N
H , κ
N
P + κ
N
H + α
N ≤ λ−ν
2
, ιNP ≥ βNP , and
ιNH ≥ βNH . Let D̂ ⊆ D be a set. Then it holds that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
(η−ρ)− λ
K
2(κ̄P+ν)
1
PNt (i)
+ 1
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
)
≤ sup
N∈N
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
(η−ρ)− λ
K
2(κ̄P+ν)
1
PN0 (i)
+ 1
PN0 (i)H
N
0 (i)
)+ 1
min{κ̄P+ν,λ−ν2 }
(
γ
(η−ρ)− λ
K
2(κ̄P+ν)
+ (γ + δ) sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∑
i∈D̂
σi
1
HNt (i)
])
.
(4.55)
Proof. If the right-hand side of (4.55) is infinite, then the claim trivially holds. For the
remainder of the proof assume the right-hand side of (4.55) to be finite. Define D0 := ∅ and
for every n ∈ N let Dn ⊆ D̂ be a set with |Dn| = min
{
n, |D̂|
}
and Dn ⊇ Dn−1. Define
c0 :=
1
2(κ̄P+ν)
[
(η − ρ)− λ
K
]
and for every n ∈ N let
Cn := γc0 +
[
γ + δ
]
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
1
HNt (i)
]
. (4.56)
Note that the assumption η − ρ > λ
K
implies c0 ∈ (0,∞). For all N, n, l ∈ N define
[0,∞]-valued stopping times
τN,nl := inf
({
t ∈ [0,∞) :
∑
i∈Dn
σi
((
PNt (i)
)−1
+
(
HNt (i)
)−1)
> l
}
∪∞
)
. (4.57)
Lemmas 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 imply that for all N, n ∈ N the map
[0,∞) 3 t 7→
∑
i∈Dn
σi
((
PNt (i)
)−1
+
(
HNt (i)
)−1) ∈ R (4.58)
is P-a.s. continuous which implies for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N that
P
[
lim
l→∞
τN,nl < t
]
= 0. (4.59)
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For all t ∈ [0,∞), N, n, l ∈ N Young’s inequality leads to
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
(√
βNP P
N
u (i)
(PNu (i))
2
(
c0 +
1
HNu (i)
))2
du
]
≤ β̄PE
[
t sup
u∈[0,t]
∑
i∈Dn
σ5i
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
(
3
5
(
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−5
+ 2
5
(
c0
+
(
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−1)5)
du
]
≤ β̄P
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
E
[
t sup
u∈[0,t]
(∑
i∈Dn
σi
((
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−1
+
(
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−1
+ c0
))5]
≤ β̄P t(l+c0‖1‖σ)
5
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
<∞
(4.60)
and
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
( √
βNHH
N
u (i)
(HNu (i))
2PNu (i)
)2
du
]
≤ β̄HE
[
t sup
u∈[0,t]
∑
i∈Dn
σ5i
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
(
3
5
(
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−5
+ 2
5
(
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−5)
du
]
≤ t sup
u∈[0,t]
β̄H
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
E
(∑
i∈Dn
σi
((
HN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−1
+
(
PN
u∧τN,nl
(i)
)−1))5
≤ tβ̄H l5
min
k∈Dn
{σ4k}
<∞.
(4.61)
Hence, for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N it holds that
E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
√
βNP P
N
t (i)
1
(PNt (i))
2
(
c0 +
1
HNt (i)
)
dW P,Nu (i)
]
= 0,
E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
√
βNHH
N
t (i)
(HNt (i))
2
PNt (i)
dWH,Nu (i)
]
= 0.
(4.62)
Define the function y : N× N× [0,∞)→ [0,∞] by
N× N× [0,∞) 3 (N, n, t) 7→ yN,nt := E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PNt (i)
+ 1
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
)]
. (4.63)
Recall from the beginning of the proof that it is assumed for all N, n ∈ N that yN,n0 < ∞.
103
CHAPTER 4. PROOFS
Applying Itô’s lemma and using (4.62), implies for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
+ 1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
)]
− yN,n0
= E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
−
(
c0
1
(PNu (i))
2 +
1
(PNu (i))
2HNu (i)
)(
κNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j)
− (κNP + ν)PNu (i)− γ
(
PNu (i)
)2
+
(
η − ρFNu (i)
)
PNu (i)H
N
u (i) + ι
N
P
)
+ 1
2
c0
2
(PNu (i))
3β
N
P P
N
u (i) +
1
2
2
(PNu (i))
3HNu (i)
βNP P
N
u (i)
− 1
PNu (i)(H
N
u (i))
2
(
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j) + (−κNH + λ− αNFNu (i))HNu (i)
− λ
K
(
HNu (i)
)2 − δPNu (i)HNu (i) + ιNH
)
+ 1
2
2
PNu (i)(H
N
u (i))
3β
N
HH
N
u (i) du
]
.
(4.64)
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Dropping some negative terms, now yields for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
+ 1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
)]
− yN,n0
≤ E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
−
(
c0
1
(PNu (i))
2 +
1
(PNu (i))
2HNu (i)
)(
− (κNP + ν)PNu (i)
− γ
(
PNu (i)
)2
+ (η − ρ)PNu (i)HNu (i) + ιNP
)
+ c0β
N
P
1
(PNu (i))
2 + β
N
P
1
(PNu (i))
2HNu (i)
+ βNH
1
PNu (i)(H
N
u (i))
2 − 1PNu (i)(HNu (i))2
(
(−κNH + λ− αN)HNu (i)
− λ
K
(
HNu (i)
)2 − δPNu (i)HNu (i) + ιNH) du
]
= E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
(
κNP + ν
)
c0
1
PNu (i)
+ γc0 − (η − ρ)c0H
N
u (i)
PNu (i)
− ιNP c0 1(PNu (i))2
+ (κNP + ν)
1
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
+ γ 1
HNu (i)
− (η − ρ) 1
PNu (i)
− ιNP 1(PNu (i))2HNu (i)
+ c0β
N
P
1
(PNu (i))
2 + β
N
P
1
(PNu (i))
2HNu (i)
+ βNH
1
PNu (i)(H
N
u (i))
2 − (−κNH + λ
− αN) 1
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
+ λ
K
1
PNu (i)
+ δ 1
HNu (i)
− ιNH 1PNu (i)(HNu (i))2 du
]
= E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
[(
κNP + ν
)
c0 − (η − ρ) + λK
]
1
PNu (i)
+ γc0 − (η − ρ)c0H
N
u (i)
PNu (i)
+
[
−ιNP c0 + c0βNP
]
1
(PNu (i))
2 +
[
(κNP + ν)− (−κNH + λ− αN)
]
1
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
+ [γ + δ] 1
HNu (i)
+
[
−ιNP + βNP
]
1
(PNu (i))
2HNu (i)
+
[
βNH − ιNH
]
1
PNu (i)(H
N
u (i))
2 du
]
.
(4.65)
Recall from Section 4.1.4.1 that κ̄P = supN∈N κNP , and from Assumption 4.1.1 that λ > ν,
η − ρ > λ
K
and that for all N ∈ N it holds that κNP + κNH + αN ≤ λ−ν2 , ι
N
P ≥ βNP , and
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ιNH ≥ βNH . Hence, for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n, l ∈ N it follows that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
+ 1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
)]
− yN,n0
≤ E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t∧τN,nl
0
− (κ̄P + ν) c0 1PNu (i) + γc0 −
λ−ν
2
1
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
+
[
γ
+ δ
]
1
HNu (i)
du
]
≤
∫ t
0
Cn du− E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
min
{
κ̄P + ν,
λ−ν
2
}∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PNu (i)
+ 1
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
)
du
]
.
(4.66)
Applying Tonelli’s theorem, Fatou’s lemma, and (4.59) for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N it
follows that
yN,nt +
∫ t
0
min
{
κ̄P + ν,
λ−ν
2
}
yN,nu du
= yN,nt + E
[∫ t
0
min
{
κ̄P + ν,
λ−ν
2
}∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PNu (i)
+ 1
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
)
du
]
≤ lim inf
l→∞
(
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
+ 1
PN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)HN
t∧τN,n
l
(i)
)]
+ E
[∫ t∧τN,nl
0
min
{
κ̄P + ν,
λ−ν
2
}∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PNu (i)
+ 1
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
)
du
])
≤ yN,n0 +
∫ t
0
Cn du.
(4.67)
For every N, n ∈ N, let zN,n : [0,∞) → R be a process that for all t ∈ [0,∞) satisfies
zN,nt = z
N,n
0 +
∫ t
0
(
Cn −min
{
κ̄P + ν,
λ−ν
2
}
zN,ns
)
ds, with zN,n0 = y
N,n
0 , where uniqueness
follows from local Lipschitz continuity. Using classical comparison results from the theory
of ODEs, the above computation yields for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N that yN,nt ≤ z
N,n
t
and for all N, n ∈ N that supt∈[0,∞) z
N,n
t = max
{
zN,n0 ,
Cn
min{κ̄P+ν,λ−ν2 }
}
. Hence, for every
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n ∈ N it holds that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PNt (i)
+ 1
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
)]
= sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
yN,nt
≤ sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
zN,nt = max
{
sup
N∈N
zN,n0 ,
Cn
min{κ̄P+ν,λ−ν2 }
}
≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PN0 (i)
+ 1
PN0 (i)H
N
0 (i)
)]
+ C
n
min{κ̄P+ν,λ−ν2 }
.
(4.68)
Monotone convergence now implies that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
c0
1
PNt (i)
+ 1
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
)
= lim
n→∞
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PNt (i)
+ 1
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
)]
≤ lim
n→∞
(
sup
N∈N
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
c0
1
PN0 (i)
+ 1
PN0 (i)H
N
0 (i)
)]
+ C
n
min{κ̄P+ν,λ−ν2 }
)
= sup
N∈N
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
c0
1
PN0 (i)
+ 1
PN0 (i)H
N
0 (i)
)+ γc0+(γ+δ) supN∈N supt∈[0,∞)E
[∑
i∈D̂ σi
1
HNt (i)
]
min{κ̄P+ν,λ−ν2 }
.
(4.69)
This completes the proof.
Theorem 4.1.9. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1 and let Assumption 4.1.1 hold. Then
for all (x, y, z) ∈ (0,∞)2 × [0, 1] it holds that
u(x, y, z) := (η − ρz)
(
x− h∞(z)− h∞(z) ln
(
x
h∞(z)
))
+ δ
(
y − p∞(z)− p∞(z) ln
(
y
p∞(z)
))
≥ 0.
(4.70)
Furthermore, there exists a constant c0 ∈ (0,∞) such that for every set D̂ ⊆ D, for every
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N ∈ N, and every t ∈ [0,∞) it holds that
E
[∑
i∈D̂
σiu
(
HNt (i), P
N
t (i), F
N
t (i)
) ]
+
∫ t
0
(η − ρ) λ
K
E
[∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
HNu (i)
− h∞
(
FNu (i)
) )2]
+ δγE
[∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
))2 ]
du
≤ E
[∑
i∈D̂
σiu
(
HN0 (i), P
N
0 (i), F
N
0 (i)
) ]
+ tc0 max
{
κNH , κ
N
P , α
N , ιNH , ι
N
P , β
N
H , β
N
P
}
.
(4.71)
Proof. For the remainder of the proof fix a set D̂ ⊆ D. Define D0 := ∅ and for every n ∈ N
let Dn ⊆ D̂ be a set with |Dn| = min
{
n, |D̂|
}
and Dn ⊇ Dn−1. First it will be shown that
for all (x, y, z) ∈ (0,∞)2 × [0, 1] it holds that u(x, y, z) ≥ 0. Define for all x ∈ (0,∞)
the real-valued function (0,∞) 3 y 7→ fx(y) := x − y − y ln
(
x
y
)
. For all x ∈ (0,∞) the
function fx has for all y ∈ (0,∞) first and second order derivatives dfxdy (y) = ln(y) − ln(x)
and d
2fx
dy2
(y) = 1
y
> 0. Thus, for all x ∈ (0,∞) the function fx has its global minimum at
x with fx(x) = 0. Consequently, for any (x, y) ∈ (0,∞)2 it holds that fx(y) ≥ fx(x) = 0.
This shows that for all (x, y, z) ∈ (0,∞)2 × [0, 1] it holds that u(x, y, z) ≥ 0. In order
to prove the second part of the claim, a Lyapunov function can be used, that is defined
here analogously to the well-known Lyapunov function in the deterministic setting. Define
DV :=
(
l1σ ∩ (0,∞)D
)
×
(
l1σ ∩ (0,∞)D
)
×E1. For any subset D̂′ ⊆ D̂ define the function
VD̂′ : DV → [0,∞] for any (h, p, f) ∈ DV by
VD̂′((h, p, f)) :=
∑
i∈D̂′
σiu(hi, pi, fi). (4.72)
Due to the non-negativity of the mapping u, it follows for any D̂′ ⊆ D̂ and any z ∈ DV that
VD̂′(z) ∈ [0,∞] is well-defined. The fact that for all x ∈ (0,∞) it holds that − ln(x) ≤√
1
x
≤ 1
2
(
1
x
+ 1
)
as well as the assumption supN∈N E
[∥∥∥(HN0 + PN0 )4 + 1(HN0 )2 + PN0(HN0 )2 +
1
PN0
+ 1
PN0 H
N
0
∥∥∥
σ
]
<∞ imply
sup
N∈N
E
[
VD
(
HN0 , P
N
0 , F
N
0
)]
<∞. (4.73)
Now the first and second order partial derivatives, which are needed in the application of
Itô’s lemma below, are calculated. For all n ∈ N, z = (h, p, f) ∈ DV , and i ∈ Dn it
holds that dVDn
dhi
(z) = σi(η − ρfi)
(
1 − h∞(fi)
hi
)
, d
2VDn
dh2i
(z) = σi(η − ρfi)h∞(fi)h2i ,
dVDn
dpi
(z) =
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σiδ
(
1− p∞(fi)
pi
)
, and d
2VDn
dp2i
(z) = σiδ
p∞(fi)
p2i
as well as
dVDn
dfi
(z) = σi
[
− ρ
(
hi − h∞(fi)− h∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
))
+ (η − ρfi)
(
− h′∞(fi)
− h′∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
)
− (h∞(fi))
2
hi
−hi
(h∞(fi))2
h′∞(fi)
)
+ δ
(
− p′∞(fi)
− p′∞(fi) ln
(
pi
p∞(fi)
)
− (p∞(fi))
2
pi
−pi
(p∞(fi))2
p′∞(fi)
)]
= σi
[
− ρ
(
hi − h∞(fi)
− h∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
))
− (η − ρfi)h′∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
)
− δp′∞(fi) ln
(
pi
p∞(fi)
)]
(4.74)
and
d2VDn
df2i
(z) = σi
[
ρ
(
h′∞(fi) + h
′
∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
)
+ (h∞(fi))
2
hi
(−1) hi
(h∞(fi))2
h′∞(fi)
)
+ ρh′∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
)
− (η − ρfi)
(
h′′∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
)
+ h′∞(fi)
h∞(fi)
hi
−hi
(h∞(fi))2
h′∞(fi)
)
− δ
(
p′′∞(fi) ln
(
pi
p∞(fi)
)
+ p′∞(fi)
p∞(fi)
pi
−pi
(p∞(fi))2
p′∞(fi)
)]
= σi
[
2ρh′∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
)
− (η − ρfi)
(
h′′∞(fi) ln
(
hi
h∞(fi)
)
− (h′∞(fi))
2 1
h∞(fi)
)
− δ
(
p′′∞(fi) ln
(
pi
p∞(fi)
)
− (p′∞(fi))
2 1
p∞(fi)
)]
.
(4.75)
Recall that for all x ∈ [0, 1] it holds that h∞(x) = 1b(a−x) and p∞(x) =
λ
δ
(
1− 1
Kb(a−x)
)
and
note that the assumption that η−ρ > ν
K
implies for all x ∈ [0, 1] that p∞(x) > 0. Therefore,
for all x ∈ [0, 1] it follows that
h′∞(x) =
1
b(a−x)2 > 0, h
′′
∞(x) =
2
b(a−x)3 > 0,
p′∞(x) = − λδKb(a−x)2 < 0, p
′′
∞(x) = − 2λδKb(a−x)3 < 0.
(4.76)
So h∞, h′∞, and h
′′
∞ are strictly monotonically increasing on [0, 1] while p∞, p
′
∞, and p
′′
∞ are
strictly monotonically decreasing on [0, 1]. Also, it holds that max
x∈[0,1]
δp∞(x) ≤ λ. Observe
that for all x ∈ (0,∞) it holds that |ln(x)| ≤
√
x+ 1√
x
. Together with Young’s inequality as
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well as Lemmas 4.1.6, 4.1.7, and 4.1.8 this implies for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N that
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
(√
βNP P
N
u (i)δ
(
1− p∞(F
N
u (i))
PNu (i)
))2
du
]
≤ β̄P δ2E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
PNu (i)
(
1 + (p∞(0))
2
(PNu (i))
2
)
du
]
≤ β̄P δ2 sup
u∈[0,t]
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σit
(
PNu (i) +
(p∞(0))
2
PNu (i)
)]
<∞
(4.77)
and
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
(√
βNHH
N
u (i)(η − ρFNu (i))
(
1− h∞(F
N
u (i))
HNu (i)
))2
du
]
≤ β̄Hη2 sup
u∈[0,t]
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σit
(
HNu (i) +
(h∞(1))
2
HNu (i)
)]
<∞
(4.78)
and
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
(√
βNHF
N
u (i)(1−FNu (i))
HNu (i)
(
− ρ
(
HNu (i)− h∞(FNu (i))
− h∞(FNu (i)) ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
))
− (η − ρFNu (i))h′∞(FNu (i)) ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
)
− δp′∞(FNu (i)) ln
(
PNu (i)
p∞(FNu (i))
)))2
du
]
≤ β̄HE
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
∫ t
0
1
HNu (i)
(
ρHNu (i) + ρh∞(1) + ρh∞(1)
(√
HNu (i)√
h∞(0)
+
√
h∞(1)√
HNu (i)
)
+ ηh′∞(1)
(√
HNu (i)√
h∞(0)
+
√
h∞(1)√
HNu (i)
)
+ δ |p′∞(1)|
(√
PNu (i)√
p∞(1)
+
√
p∞(0)√
PNu (i)
))2
du
]
≤ β̄H sup
u∈[0,t]
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi2
7
(
ρ2HNu (i) + ρ
2 (h∞(1))
2
(
1
HNu (i)
+ 1
h∞(0)
+ h∞(1)
(HNu (i))
2
)
+ η2 (h′∞(1))
2
(
1
h∞(0)
+ h∞(1)
(HNu (i))
2
)
+ δ2 (p′∞(1))
2
(
1
p∞(1)
PNu (i)
HNu (i)
+ p∞(0)
PNu (i)H
N
u (i)
))]
<∞.
(4.79)
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Hence, for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N it follows that
E
[∫ t
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
√
βNP P
N
u (i)δ
(
1− p∞(F
N
u (i))
PNu (i)
)
dW P,Nu (i)
]
= 0,
E
[∫ t
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
√
βNHH
N
u (i)(η − ρFNu (i))
(
1− h∞(F
N
u (i))
HNu (i)
)
dWH,Nu (i)
]
= 0,
E
[∫ t
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
√
βNHF
N
u (i)(1−FNu (i))
HNu (i)
[
− ρ
(
HNu (i)− h∞(FNu (i))
− h∞(FNu (i)) ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
))
− (η − ρFNu (i))h′∞(FNu (i)) ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
)
−δp′∞(FNu (i)) ln
(
PNu (i)
p∞(FNu (i))
)]
dW F,Nu (i)
]
= 0.
(4.80)
For all t ∈ [0,∞), all N ∈ N, and all i ∈ D define
RNt (i) := max
{
max
{
ηc, ρc, ρ, cη h
′
∞(1)
h∞(0)
, η h
′
∞(1)
h∞(0)
}
HNt (i), ηh∞ (1) , η,
max
{
η
2
h∞ (1) , ρ (h∞ (1))
2 , η
2
(h′∞(1))
2
h∞(0)
, δ
2
(p′∞(1))
2
p∞(1)
}
1
HNt (i)
, δcPNt (i), δp∞ (0) , δ,
δ
2
p∞(0)
PNt (i)
,max
{
1
2
ρ2 (h∞ (1))
2 , 3
4
ρ
4
3 (h∞ (1))
2 , 3
4
(
ηh′∞ (1)
√
h∞ (1)
) 4
3
, 1
4
,
η
2
h′′∞ (1)h∞ (1)
}
1
(HNt (i))
2 ,
1
2
c
(
HNt (i)
)2
, 1
4
c
(
HNt (i)
)4
, 1
2
(
δ|p′∞(1)|√
p∞(1)
)2
PNt (i)
(HNt (i))
2 ,
1
2
δ2 |p′∞ (1)|
2 p∞(0)
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
, δ |p′∞ (1)|
√
p∞(0)
PNt (i)
, ρh
′
∞(1)
h∞(0)
, δ
2
|p′′∞(1)|
p∞(1)
PNt (i)
HNt (i)
,
}
,
bN := max
{
κNH , κ
N
P , α
N , ιNH , ι
N
P , β
N
H , β
N
P
}
.
(4.81)
Note that lim
N→∞
bN = 0. Define c0 := 32 sup
M∈N
sup
u∈[0,∞)
E
[∥∥RMu ∥∥σ]. Lemmas 4.1.6, 4.1.7, and
4.1.8 imply c0 ∈ (0,∞). For all t ∈ [0,∞), all N ∈ N, and all a ∈
{
η, ρ, η h
′
∞(1)
h∞(0)
}
it holds
that ∑
i∈D
σia
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j) ≤
∑
i∈D
σicaH
N
t (i) ≤
∑
i∈D
σiR
N
t (i). (4.82)
Furthermore, for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N ∈ N it holds that∑
i∈D
σiδ
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNt (j) ≤
∑
i∈D
σiδcP
N
t (i) ≤
∑
i∈D
σiR
N
t (i). (4.83)
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Young’s inequality and Lemma 4.1.5 yield for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N ∈ N that
∑
i∈D
σiρ
h∞(FNt (i))
HNt (i)
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
1
2
(
ρ
h∞(FNt (i))
HNt (i)
)2
+ 1
2
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
)2)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
RNt (i) +
1
2
c
(
HNt (i)
)2) ≤∑
i∈D
σi2R
N
t (i),
(4.84)
and ∑
i∈D
σi
−δp′∞(FNt (i))√
p∞(FNt (i))
√
PNt (i)
HNt (i)
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
1
2
((
δ|p′∞(1)|√
p∞(1)
√
PNt (i)
HNt (i)
)2
+
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
)2)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
RNt (i) +
1
2
c
(
HNt (i)
)2) ≤∑
i∈D
σi2R
N
t (i),
(4.85)
and
∑
i∈D
σi(−1)δp′∞
(
FNt (i)
) √p∞(FNt (i))√
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
1
2
δ2 |p′∞ (1)|
2 p∞(0)
PNt (i)H
N
t (i)
+ 1
2
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
)2
1
HNt (i)
)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
RNt (i) +
1
4
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
)4
+ 1
4
1
(HNt (i))
2
)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
RNt (i) +
1
4
c
(
HNt (i)
)4
+RNt (i)
)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi3R
N
t (i).
(4.86)
Again using Young’s inequality and Lemma 4.1.5 it follows that for all t ∈ [0,∞), all
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a ∈
{
ρ
(
h∞(1)
) 3
2 , ηh′∞(1)
√
h∞(1)
}
, and all N ∈ N that
∑
i∈D
σia
(
1
HNt (i)
) 3
2
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
3
4
a
4
3
(
1
HNt (i)
)2
+ 1
4
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNt (j)
)4)
≤
∑
i∈D
σi
(
RNt (i) + 14c
(
HNt (i)
)4) ≤∑
i∈D
σi2R
N
t (i).
(4.87)
Due to Lemma 4.1.2 it follows that WH,N(i), W F,N(i), N ∈ N, i ∈ D, are independent
Brownian motions and due to Lemmas 4.1.6, 4.1.7, and 4.1.8 it holds for all t ∈ [0,∞) and
all N ∈ N that P-a.s.
(
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
)
∈ DV . Thus, Itô’s lemma and (4.80) imply for all
t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N that
E
[
VDn
((
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
))]
− E
[
VDn
((
HN0 , P
N
0 , F
N
0
))]
= E
[∫ t
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
((
η − ρFNu (i)
)(
1− h∞(F
N
u (i))
HNu (i)
){
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
HNu (j)
−HNu (i)
)
+HNu (i)
[
λ
(
1− H
N
u (i)
K
)
− δPNu (i)− αNFNu (i)
]
+ ιNH
}
+
(η−ρFNu (i))
2
h∞(FNu (i))
(HNu (i))
2 β
N
HH
N
u (i) + δ
(
1− p∞(F
N
u (i))
PNu (i)
){
κNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
PNu (j)
− PNu (i)
)
+ PNu (i)
[
−ν − γPNu (i) +
(
η − ρFNu (i)
)
HNu (i)
]
+ ιNP
}
+ δ
2
p∞(FNu (i))
(PNu (i))
2 β
N
P P
N
u (i) +
[
− ρ
(
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
)
− h∞
(
FNu (i)
)
ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
))
−
(
η − ρFNu (i)
)
h′∞
(
FNu (i)
)
ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
)
− δp′∞
(
FNu (i)
)
ln
(
PNu (i)
p∞(FNu (i))
)]{
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
FNu (j)− FNu (i)
) HNu (j)
HNu (i)
− αNFNu (i)
(
1− FNu (i)
)}
+
{
ρh′∞
(
FNu (i)
)
ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
)
− η−ρF
N
u (i)
2
(
h′′∞
(
FNu (i)
)
ln
(
HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
)
− (h
′
∞(FNu (i)))
2
h∞(FNu (i))
)
− δ
2
(
p′′∞(F
N
u (i)) ln
(
PNu (i)
p∞(FNu (i))
)
− (p
′
∞(F
N
u (i)))
2
p∞(FNu (i))
)}
βNHF
N
u (i)(1−FNu (i))
HNu (i)
)
du
]
.
(4.88)
Note that for all x ∈ [0, 1] it holds that 0 < η − ρx ≤ η. Together with the fact that for all
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x ∈ (0,∞) it holds that ln(x) ≤
√
x, ln(x) ≤ x,
∣∣∣ ln(x)∣∣∣ ≤ √x+√ 1x , and ∣∣∣ ln(x)∣∣∣ ≤ x+√ 1x
and dropping negative terms, this implies for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N that
E
[
VDn
((
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
))]
− E
[
VDn
((
HN0 , P
N
0 , F
N
0
))]
≤ E
[∫ t
0
∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
ηκNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j) + ηh∞
(
FNu (i)
)
κNH
+
(
η − ρFNu (i)
) (
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
)) [
λ
(
1− H
N
u (i)
K
)
− δPNu (i)
]
+ ηh∞
(
FNu (i)
)
αN + ηιNH +
η
2
h∞
(
FNu (i)
)
βNH
1
HNu (i)
+ δκNP
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)PNu (j) + δp∞
(
FNu (i)
)
κNP + δ
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
)) [
− ν
− γPNu (i) +
(
η − ρFNu (i)
)
HNu (i)
]
+ διNP +
δ
2
p∞(FNu (i))
PNu (i)
βNP
+ ρκNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j) + ρH
N
u (i)α
N + ρ
h∞(FNu (i))
HNu (i)
(
1 + H
N
u (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
+
√
h∞(FNu (i))
HNu (i)
)
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNu (j) + ρh∞
(
FNu (i)
) h∞(FNu (i))
HNu (i)
αN
+
[
ηh′∞
(
FNu (i)
)(√h∞(FNu (i))
HNu (i)
+ H
N
u (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
)
− δp′∞
(
FNu (i)
)(√ PNu (i)
p∞(FNu (i))
+
√
p∞(FNu (i))
PNu (i)
)]
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)H
N
u (j)
HNu (i)
+
[
ηh′∞
(
FNu (i)
) HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
− δp′∞
(
FNu (i)
)√p∞(FNu (i))
PNu (i)
]
αN + ρh′∞
(
FNu (i)
) HNu (i)
h∞(FNu (i))
βNH
HNu (i)
+ η
2
(
h′′∞
(
FNu (i)
) h∞(FNu (i))
HNu (i)
+
(h′∞(FNu (i)))
2
h∞(FNu (i))
)
βNH
HNu (i)
+ δ
2
(
−p′′∞(FNu (i))
PNu (i)
p∞(FNu (i))
+
(p′∞(FNu (i)))
2
p∞(FNu (i))
)
βNH
HNu (i)
)
du
]
.
(4.89)
Using (4.82), (4.83), (4.84), (4.85), (4.86), and (4.87) it follows for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all
114
4.1. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS AND ASYMPTOTICS
N, n ∈ N that
E
[
VDn
((
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
))]
− E
[
VDn
((
HN0 , P
N
0 , F
N
0
))]
≤ E
[∫ t
0
∑
i∈D
σi
(
bN32RNu (i) +
(
η − ρFNu (i)
) (
HNu (i)
− h∞
(
FNu (i)
) )[
λ
(
1− H
N
u (i)
K
)
− δPNu (i)
]
+ δ
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
)) [
− ν
− γPNu (i) +
(
η − ρFNu (i)
)
HNu (i)
])
du
]
.
(4.90)
Note that for all x ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
δp∞(x) +
λ
K
h∞(x)− λ = δλK(η−ρx)−δλν+λδν+λ
2γ
λγ+δK(η−ρx) − λ =
δK(η−ρx)+λγ
λγ+δK(η−ρx)λ− λ = 0,
ν − (η − ρx)h∞(x) + γp∞(x) = ν − (η−ρx)Kδν+(η−ρx)Kγλ−γλK(η−ρx)+γλνλγ+δK(η−ρx)
= ν − (η−ρx)Kδ+γλ
λγ+δK(η−ρx)ν = 0.
(4.91)
From (4.91) it follows that for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N, n ∈ N
E
[
VDn
((
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
))]
− E
[
VDn
((
HN0 , P
N
0 , F
N
0
))]
≤ E
[∫ t
0
∑
i∈D
σi
(
bN32RNu (i) +
(
η − ρFNu (i)
) (
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
)) [
λ
− λ
K
(
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
) )
− δ
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
) )
− λ
]
+ δ
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
)) [
− ν − γ
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
) )
+
(
η − ρFNu (i)
) (
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
) )
+ ν
])
du
]
.
(4.92)
Hence, it follows for every N, n ∈ N and every t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[
VDn
(
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
)]
+
∫ t
0
(η − ρ) λ
K
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
))2]
+ δγE
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
))2]
du
≤ E
[
VD̂
(
HN0 , P
N
0 , F
N
0
)]
+ tbN32 sup
M∈N
sup
u∈[0,∞)
E
[∥∥RMu ∥∥σ] .
(4.93)
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Applying monotone convergence now yields for every N ∈ N and every t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[
VD̂
(
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
)]
+
∫ t
0
(η − ρ) λ
K
E
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
))2
+ δγE
∑
i∈D̂
σi
(
PNu (i)− p∞
(
FNu (i)
))2 du = lim
n→∞
(
E
[
VDn
(
HNt , P
N
t , F
N
t
)]
+
∫ t
0
(η − ρ) λ
K
E
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
HNu (i)− h∞
(
FNu (i)
))2]
+ δγE
[∑
i∈Dn
σi
(
PNu (i)
− p∞
(
FNu (i)
) )2]
du
)
≤ E
[
VD̂
(
HN0 , P
N
0 , F
N
0
)]
+ tbNc0.
(4.94)
The set D̂ ⊆ D was arbitrarily chosen and thus, this completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.9.
4.1.4.4 Proof of Theorem 3.1.2
In this section, the proof of Theorem 3.1.2 will be given, after providing some useful lemmas.
For convenience of the reader, Lemma 3.3 of Klenke and Mytnik (2012) is restated.
Lemma 4.1.10. Let D be a countable set, let σ ∈ (0,∞)D such that
∑
i∈D σi < ∞, and let
l1σ := {z ∈ RD : ‖z‖σ :=
∑
i∈D σizi < ∞}. A subset K ⊆ l1σ is relatively compact if and
only if
(i) supx∈K ‖x‖σ <∞
(ii) for every ε ∈ (0,∞) there exists a finite subset E ⊆ D such that supx∈K ‖x1D\E‖σ <
ε.
Lemma 4.1.11. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, let D be a countable set, let σ ∈
(0,∞)D such that
∑
i∈D σi < ∞, let l1σ := {z ∈ RD : ‖z‖σ :=
∑
i∈D σizi < ∞}, let E2 :=
l1σ ∩ [0,∞)D, let I be a set, and let Zi : Ω → E2, i ∈ I , be a family of random variables.
Assume that supi∈I E[‖Zi‖σ] <∞ and infS⊆D,|S|<∞ supi∈I
∑
k∈D\S σkE[Zik] = 0. Then the
family {Zi : i ∈ I} is relatively compact in E2.
Proof. Fix ε ∈ (0,∞). For each m ∈ N by assumption there exists a set Sm,ε ⊆ D such that
sup
i∈I
∑
k∈D\Sm,ε
σkE[Zik] < ε2m2(m+1) . (4.95)
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Define the set Kε ⊆ E2 by
Kε :=
{
x ∈ E2 : ‖x‖σ ≤ 2 supi∈I E[‖Z
i‖σ ]
ε
, sup
m∈N
{
m
∑
k∈D\Sm,ε
σk|xk|
}
≤ 1
}
. (4.96)
Due to the Heine-Borel theorem, Lemma 4.1.10 can be applied and yields relative compact-
ness of Kε. By Markov’s inequality it now holds that
sup
i∈I
P
[
Zi /∈ Kε
]
≤ sup
i∈I
P
[
Zi /∈ Kε
]
≤ sup
i∈I
P
[
‖Zi‖σ >
2 supj∈I E[‖Zj‖σ ]
ε
]
+ sup
i∈I
∞∑
m=1
P
[ ∑
k∈D\Sm,ε
σkZ
i
k >
1
m
]
≤ ε supi∈I E[‖Z
i‖σ ]
2 supj∈I E[‖Zj‖σ ]
+
∞∑
m=1
m sup
i∈I
∑
k∈D\Sm,ε
σkE
[
Zik
]
≤ ε
2
+
∞∑
m=1
m ε
2m2(m+1)
= ε.
(4.97)
Since ε was arbitrarily chosen it follows that {Zi : i ∈ I} is tight in E2. Due to Prohorov’s
theorem (e.g., Ethier and Kurtz, 1986, Theorem 3.2.2) the claim follows.
Lemma 4.1.12. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.4.1 and assume for all N ∈ N that∑
i∈D σiE
[
HN0 (i)
]
< ∞. For all n ∈ N denote by mn the n-fold matrix product of m.
Then it holds for all t ∈ [0,∞), all i ∈ D, and all N ∈ N that
E
[
HNt (i)
]
≤ E
[∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
e−tκ
N
H
(tκNH)
n
n!
mn(i, j)HN0 (j)
]
+ K
2
(
1 +
√
1 + 4ῑH
Kλ
)
. (4.98)
Proof. For every n ∈ N and every i, j ∈ D it holds that mn(i, j) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, for all
T ∈ [0,∞) and all i, j ∈ D it follows that
∞∑
n=0
sup
t∈[0,T ]
e−t t
n
n!
mn(i, j) <∞. (4.99)
Now, define for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all i, j ∈ D
mt(i, j) :=
∞∑
n=0
e−t t
n
n!
mn(i, j). (4.100)
By (4.99) and using dominated convergence, it follows for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all i, j ∈ D
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that
d
dt
mt(i, j) = −mt(i, j) +
∞∑
n=1
e−t t
n−1
(n−1)!m
n(i, j)
= −mt(i, j) +
∞∑
n=0
e−t t
n
n!
mn+1(i, j)
= −mt(i, j) +
∞∑
n=0
e−t t
n
n!
∑
k∈D
mn(i, k)m(k, j) =
∑
k∈D
mt(i, k)(m(k, j)− 1j=k).
(4.101)
Furthermore, note that for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all i ∈ D it holds that
∑
j∈D
mt(i, j) =
∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
e−t t
n
n!
mn(i, j) =
∞∑
n=0
e−t t
n
n!
= 1. (4.102)
For all t ∈ [0,∞), s ∈ [0, t], i ∈ D, N ∈ N define
Y N,ts (i) :=
∑
j∈D
m(t−s)κNH (i, j)H
N
s (j). (4.103)
Observe that since for all i, j ∈ D it holds that m0(i, j) = 1i=j it follows for all t ∈ [0,∞),
all i ∈ D, and all N ∈ N that
Y N,tt (i) = H
N
t (i). (4.104)
Furthermore, using (4.10) yields for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all N ∈ N that
∑
i∈D
σiE
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
=
∑
i∈D
σiE
[∑
j∈D
mtκNH (i, j)H
N
0 (j)
]
=
∑
i∈D
σi
∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
e−tκ
N
H
(tκNH)
n
n!
mn(i, j)E
[
HN0 (j)
]
=
∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
e−tκ
N
H
(tκNH)
n
n!
E
[
HN0 (j)
]∑
i∈D
σim
n(i, j)
≤
∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
e−tκ
N
H
(tκNH)
n
n!
E
[
HN0 (j)
]
cnσj =
∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
e−tκ
N
H
(tκNHc)
n
n!
E
[
HN0 (j)
]
σj
= etκ
N
H(c−1)E
[∥∥HN0 ∥∥σ] .
(4.105)
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For all t ∈ [0,∞), s ∈ [0, t], i, j ∈ D, N ∈ N it follows from (4.101) that
d
ds
m(t−s)κNH (i, j) = −κ
N
H
∑
k∈D
m(t−s)κNH (i, k)(m(k, j)− 1j=k). (4.106)
For t ∈ [0,∞), N, l ∈ N, i ∈ D define
τN,tl (i) := inf
({
u ∈ [0, t] : Y N,tu (i) > l
}
∪∞
)
. (4.107)
Using the fact that for all t ∈ [0,∞), all u ∈ [0, t], all N ∈ N, and all i, j ∈ D it holds that
m(t−u)κNH (i, j) ∈ [0, 1] implies for all t ∈ [0,∞), all s ∈ [0, t], all N, l ∈ N, and all i ∈ D
that ∫ s∧τN,tl (i)
0
∑
j∈D
(
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
√
βNHH
N
u (j)
)2
du
≤
∫ s∧τN,tl (i)
0
∑
j∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)β
N
HH
N
u (j) du =
∫ s∧τN,tl (i)
0
βNHY
N,t
u (i) du
≤
∫ s
0
βNHY
N,t
u∧τN,tl (i)
(i) du ≤ tβNH l.
(4.108)
For all t ∈ [0,∞), s ∈ [0, t], i ∈ D, N ∈ N using Itô’s lemma with (4.102) and (4.106)
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yields P-a.s.
Y N,ts (i)− Y
N,t
0 (i) =
∫ s
0
∑
j∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
(
κNH
∑
k∈D
m(j, k)HNu (k) +
(
λ− κNH
− αNFNt (j)
)
HNu (j)− λK
(
HNu (j)
)2 − δHNu (j)PNu (j) + ιNH
)
−
∑
j∈D
κNH
∑
k∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, k)(m(k, j)− 1j=k)H
N
u (j) du
+
∑
j∈D
∫ s
0
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
√
βNHH
N
u (j) dW
N,H
u (j)
=
∫ s
0
∑
j∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
((
λ− αNFNt (j)
)
HNu (j)− λK
(
HNu (j)
)2
− δHNu (j)PNu (j)
)
+ ιNH du+
∑
j∈D
∫ s
0
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
√
βNHH
N
u (j) dW
N,H
u (j)
≤
∫ s
0
∑
j∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
(
λHNu (j)− λK
(
HNu (j)
)2)
+ ιNH du
+
∑
j∈D
∫ s
0
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
√
βNHH
N
u (j) dW
N,H
u (j).
(4.109)
Thus, using (4.108) and (4.109) it follows for all t ∈ [0,∞), all s ∈ [0, t], all i ∈ D, and all
N, l ∈ N that
E
[
Y N,t
s∧τN,tl (i)
(i)
]
− E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
≤ E
[∫ s∧τN,tl (i)
0
∑
j∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)λH
N
u (j) + ι
N
H du
]
≤ E
[∫ s
0
∑
j∈D
m(t−u∧τN,tl (i))κNH
(i, j)λHN
u∧τN,tl (i)
(j) + ιNH du
]
=
∫ s
0
λE
[
Y N,t
u∧τN,tl (i)
(i)
]
+ ιNH du ≤ tιNH + λ
∫ s
0
E
[
Y N,t
u∧τN,tl (i)
(i)
]
du.
(4.110)
Now, using Gronwall’s lemma (e.g., Klenke, 2008), it follows for all t ∈ [0,∞), all s ∈ [0, t],
all i ∈ D, and all N, l ∈ N that
E
[
Y N,t
s∧τN,tl (i)
(i)
]
≤
(
E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
+ tιNH
)
eλs ≤
(
E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
+ tιNH
)
eλt. (4.111)
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For all t ∈ [0,∞), N ∈ N, i ∈ D the P-a.s. continuous paths of
(
Y N,tu (i)
)
u∈[0,t] imply
P
[
supu∈[0,t] Y
N,t
u (i) <∞
]
= 1. Hence, it holds for all t ∈ [0,∞), all N ∈ N, and all i ∈ D
that
P
[
lim
l→∞
τN,tl (i) =∞
]
= 1. (4.112)
Using the assumption that for all N ∈ N it holds that
∑
i∈D σiE
[
HN0 (i)
]
<∞ together with
(4.104), (4.105), (4.111), and (4.112) with Fatou’s lemma implies for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all
N ∈ N that∑
i∈D
σiE
[
HNt (i)
]
=
∑
i∈D
σiE
[
Y N,tt (i)
]
=
∑
i∈D
σiE
[
lim
l→∞
Y N,t
t∧τN,tl (i)
(i)
]
≤
∑
i∈D
σi lim inf
l→∞
E
[
Y N,t
t∧τN,tl (i)
(i)
]
≤
∑
i∈D
σi lim inf
l→∞
(
E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
+ tιNH
)
eλt
=
∑
i∈D
σi
(
E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
+ tιNH
)
eλt ≤
(
etκ
N
H(c−1)E
[∥∥HN0 ∥∥σ]+∑
i∈D
σitι
N
H
)
eλt
<∞.
(4.113)
Using the fact that for all t ∈ [0,∞), all u ∈ [0, t], all N ∈ N, and all i, j ∈ D it holds that
m(t−u)κNH (i, j) ∈ [0, 1] this implies for all t ∈ [0,∞), all s ∈ [0, t], all N ∈ N, and all i ∈ D,
that
E
[∑
j∈D
∫ s
0
(
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
√
βNHH
N
u (j)
)2
du
]
=
∫ s
0
E
[∑
j∈D
(
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
√
βNHH
N
u (j)
)2]
du
≤ βNH
∫ s
0
E
[∑
j∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)H
N
u (j)
]
du = βNH
∫ s
0
E
[
Y N,tu (i)
]
du <∞.
(4.114)
Thus, taking expectations in (4.109) gives for all t ∈ [0,∞), all s ∈ [0, t], all i ∈ D, and all
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N ∈ N using Jensen’s inequality
E
[
Y N,ts (i)
]
− E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
≤
∫ s
0
(
λE
[
Y N,tu (i)
]
− λ
K
E
[∑
j∈D
m(t−u)κNH (i, j)
(
HNu (j)
)2])
+ ιNH du
≤
∫ s
0
(
λE
[
Y N,tu (i)
]
− λ
K
E
[(
Y N,tu (i)
)2])
+ ιNH du
≤
∫ s
0
(
λE
[
Y N,tu (i)
]
− λ
K
(
E
[
Y N,tu (i)
])2)
+ ῑH du.
(4.115)
For t ∈ [0,∞), i ∈ D, N ∈ N let zN,t(i) : [0,∞) → R be a process that for all s ∈ [0,∞)
satisfies
zN,ts (i) = z
N,t
0 (i) +
∫ s
0
(
λzN,tu (i)− λK
(
zN,tu (i)
)2
+ ῑH
)
du (4.116)
with zN,t0 (i) = E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
where uniqueness follows from local Lipschitz continuity. Define
c1 :=
K
2
+
√
K2
4
+ KῑH
λ
∈ (0,∞). Using classical comparison results from the theory of
ODEs, the above computation shows for all N ∈ N, all i ∈ D, and all t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[
HNt (i)
]
= E
[
Y N,tt (i)
]
≤ zN,tt (i) ≤ max
{
E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
, lim sup
s→∞
zN,ts (i)
}
= max
{
E
[
Y N,t0 (i)
]
, c1
}
≤ E
[∑
j∈D
mtκNH (i, j)H
N
0 (j)
]
+ c1.
(4.117)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1.12.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.2. The result will be proved using stochastic averaging (see Kurtz,
1992, Theorem 2.1). First the conditions of the aforementioned theorem are verified. Note
that E1 = [0, 1]D and E2 = l1σ ∩ [0,∞)D are complete separable metric spaces. Tychonoff’s
theorem implies that E1 is compact. Since for all N ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) the random
variable FNtN takes values in the compact space E1, the compact containment condition holds
for
{ (
FNtN
)
t∈[0,∞) : N ∈ N
}
. Now Lemma 4.1.11 is used to show for each T ∈ [0,∞) that
the family
{
HNtN : t ∈ [0, T ], N ∈ N
}
is relatively compact in E2. From Lemma 4.1.6 and
the assumption supN∈N E
[∥∥∥(HN0 + PN0 )4] <∞ it follows that
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∥∥HNtN∥∥σ] <∞. (4.118)
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Define D0 := ∅ and for all n ∈ N let Dn ⊆ D be a set with |Dn| = min{n, |D|} and
Dn ⊇ Dn−1. Define c1 := K2
(
1 +
√
1 + 4ῑH
Kλ
)
. From Lemma 4.1.12 with the assumption
that
∑
i∈D supN∈N σiE
[
HN0 (i)
]
<∞ it follows for all T ∈ [0,∞) that
∑
i∈D
σi sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
HNtN(i)
]
≤
∑
i∈D
σi sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
e−tNκ
N
H
(tNκNH)
n
n!
mn(i, j)E
[
HN0 (j)
]
+ c1
)
≤
∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
(∑
i∈D
σim
n(i, j)
)
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,TNκNH ]
e−t t
n
n!
E
[
HN0 (j)
]
+ c1
∑
i∈D
σi
≤
∑
j∈D
∞∑
n=0
cnσj sup
N∈N
(TNκNH)
n
n!
E
[
HN0 (j)
]
+ c1‖1‖σ
≤ e
cT sup
M∈N
MκMH
∑
j∈D
σj sup
N∈N
E
[
HN0 (j)
]
+ c1‖1‖σ <∞.
(4.119)
Now the dominated convergence theorem yields for all T ∈ [0,∞) that
lim
n→∞
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∑
k∈D\Dn
σkE
[
HNtN(k)
]
≤ lim
n→∞
∑
k∈D\Dn
sup
N∈N
sup
t∈[0,T ]
σkE
[
HNtN(k)
]
= 0.
(4.120)
Hence, for all T ∈ [0,∞) Lemma 4.1.11 can be applied to the family
{
HNtN : t ∈ [0, T ], N ∈
N
}
to show that it is relatively compact in E2. Denote by Cb(E1,R) the set of bounded,
continuous real-valued functions on E1 and by C2b (E1,R) the set of all real-valued functions
on E1 that are twice continuously differentiable and bounded, with bounded first and second
order partial derivatives. For f ∈ C2b (E1,R) let cf ∈ (0,∞) be such that for all x ∈ E1 and
all i ∈ D it holds that
∣∣∣ dfdxi (x)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣d2fdx2i (x)∣∣∣ ≤ cf . Define
Dom(A) :=
{
f ∈ C2b (E1,R) : f depends only on finitely many coordinates
}
(4.121)
and for any f ∈ Dom(A) denote by Df the finite set of coordinates that f depends on. Due
to the Stone-Weierstrass theorem (e.g., Klenke, 2008, Theorem 15.2) it follows that Dom(A)
is dense in Cb(E1,R) in the topology of uniform convergence. Denote by C(E1×E2,R) the
set of real-valued continuous functions on E1×E2 and define the operatorA1 : Dom(A)→
C(E1 × E2,R) for all f ∈ Dom(A), all x ∈ E1, and all y ∈ E2 by
(
A1f
)
(x, y) :=
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∑
i∈D
1yi>0
([
κH
∑
j∈D
(
m(i, j)
yj
yi
(xj − xi)
)
− αxi(1− xi)
]
df
dxi
(x) + 1
2
βH
xi(1−xi)
yi
d2f
dx2i
(x)
)
. For
all f ∈ Dom(A), all N ∈ N, and all t ∈ [0,∞) define
εNf (t) :=
1
N
∫ t
0
(A1f)
(
FNu , H
N
u
)
du−
∑
i∈D
∫ t
0
df
dxi
(FNu )
[
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
FNu (j)
− FNu (i)
)HNu (j)
HNu (i)
− αNFNu (i)
(
1− FNu (i)
) ]
+ 1
2
d2f
dx2i
(FNu )
βHF
N
u (i)(1−FNu (i))
NHNu (i)
du.
(4.122)
From Itô’s lemma and Lemma 4.1.5 it follows for all f ∈ Dom(A), all N ∈ N, and all
t ∈ [0,∞) that P-a.s.
f
(
FNt
)
− f
(
FN0
)
=
∑
i∈D
∫ t
0
df
dxi
(FNu ) dF
N
u (i)
+ 1
2
∑
i,j∈D
∫ t
0
(
d2f
dxidxj
(FNu )
)
d
〈
FN(i), FN(j)
〉
u
=
∑
i∈D
∫ t
0
df
dxi
(FNu )
[
κNH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
FNu (j)− FNu (i)
) HNu (j)
HNu (i)
− αNFNu (i)
(
1− FNu (i)
) ]
+ 1
2
d2f
dx2i
(FNu )
βNHF
N
u (i)(1−FNu (i))
HNu (i)
du
+
∑
i∈D
∫ t
0
df
dxi
(FNu )
√
βNHF
N
u (i)(1−FNu (i))
HNu (i)
dW F,Nu (i).
(4.123)
Hence, it follows for all f ∈ Dom(A), all N ∈ N, and all t ∈ [0,∞) that P-a.s.
f
(
FNtN
)
−
∫ t
0
(A1f)
(
FNuN , H
N
uN
)
du+ εNf (tN)
= f
(
FN0
)
+
∑
i∈D
∫ t
0
df
dxi
(FNuN)
√
βHF
N
uN (i)(1−FNuN (i))
HNuN (i)
dW F,NuN (i).
(4.124)
From Tonelli’s theorem and Lemma 4.1.7 it follows for all f ∈ Dom(A), all N ∈ N, and all
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t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[∫ t
0
(∑
i∈D
df
dxi
(FNu )
√
βNHF
N
u (i)(1−FNu (i))
HNu (i)
)2
du
]
≤ t|Df |c2f β̄H max
i∈Df
sup
M∈N
sup
u∈[0,∞)
E
[
1
HMu (i)
]
≤ t|Df |c2f β̄H max
i∈Df
1
σi
sup
M∈N
sup
u∈[0,∞)
E
[∥∥∥ 1HMu ∥∥∥σ] <∞.
(4.125)
Thus for all f ∈ Dom(A), all N ∈ N, and all t ∈ [0,∞) the left-hand side of (4.124) is a
martingale. Next, for all f ∈ Dom(A) and all T ∈ [0,∞) it holds that
sup
N∈N
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣(A1f) (FNtN , HNtN)∣∣ 43 dt]
= sup
N∈N
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Df
(
κH
∑
j∈D
(
m(i, j)
HNtN (j)
HNtN (i)
(
FNtN(j)− FNtN(i)
))
− αFNtN(i)
(
1− FNtN(i)
))
df
dxi
(
FNtN
)
+ 1
2
∑
i∈Df
βH
FNtN (i)(1−FNtN (i))
HNtN (i)
d2f
dx2i
(
FNtN
) ∣∣∣∣∣
4
3
dt
]
≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∫ T
0
(∑
i∈Df
(∣∣∣κH∑
j∈D
(
m(i, j)
HNtN (j)
HNtN (i)
)
cf
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣αcf ∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣12βH 1HNtN (i)cf ∣∣∣
)) 4
3
dt
]
.
(4.126)
Young’s inequality and Jensen’s inequality imply for all f ∈ Dom(A) and all T ∈ [0,∞)
that
sup
N∈N
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣(A1f) (FNtN , HNtN)∣∣ 43 dt] ≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∫ T
0
(∑
i∈Df
(
2
3
(
κHcf
1
HNtN (i)
) 3
2
+ 1
3
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNtN(j)
)3
+ αcf +
1
2
βH
1
HNtN (i)
cf
)) 4
3
dt
]
≤ sup
N∈N
E
[∫ T
0
(4|Df |) 13
mink∈Df {σk}
∑
i∈Df
σi
((
2
3
) 4
3
(
κHcf
1
HNtN (i)
)2
+
(
1
3
) 4
3
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNtN(j)
)4
+
(
αcf
) 4
3
+
(
1
2
βH
1
HNtN (i)
cf
) 4
3
)
dt
]
.
(4.127)
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Lemma 4.1.5, Tonelli’s theorem, and Lemmas 4.1.6 and 4.1.7 imply for all f ∈ Dom(A)
and all T ∈ [0,∞) that
sup
N∈N
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣(A1f) (FNtN , HNtN)∣∣ 43 dt]
≤ sup
N∈N
(4|Df |) 23
mink∈Df {σk}
∫ T
0
(
4
9
) 2
3
(κHcf )
2 E
[∥∥∥∥ 1(HNtN)2
∥∥∥∥
σ
]
+
(
1
9
) 2
3
cE
[∥∥∥∥(HNtN)4∥∥∥∥
σ
+ (αcf )
4
3 ‖1‖σ
]
+
(
1
4
) 2
3
(βHcf )
4
3 E
[∥∥∥∥( 1HNtN ) 43
∥∥∥∥
σ
]
dt <∞.
(4.128)
Furthermore, for all f ∈ Dom(A), all N ∈ N, and all T ∈ [0,∞) it holds that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣εNf (tN)∣∣∣
]
= E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Df
∫ t
0
df
dxi
(FNuN)
[(
κH
−NκNH
)∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
FNuN(j)− FNuN(i)
) HNuN (j)
HNuN (i)
+
(
α−NαN
)
FNuN(i)
(
1
− FNuN(i)
)]
+ 1
2
d2f
dx2i
(FNuN)
(
βH −NβNH
) FNuN (i)(1−FNuN (i))
HNuN (i)
du
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∑
i∈Df
cf
( ∣∣κH −NκNH∣∣∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
HNuN (j)
HNuN (i)
+
∣∣α−NαN ∣∣
+ 1
2
∣∣βH −NβNH ∣∣ 1HNuN (i)) du
]
.
(4.129)
Young’s inequality, Lemma 4.1.5, and Tonelli’s theorem imply for all f ∈ Dom(A), all
N ∈ N, and all T ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣εNf (tN)∣∣∣
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∑
i∈Df
σicf
mink∈Df {σk}
(
|κH−NκNH|
2
((
1
HNuN (i)
)2
+
(∑
j∈D
m(i, j)HNuN(j)
)2)
+
∣∣α−NαN ∣∣+ |βH−NβNH |
2
1
HNuN (i)
)
du
]
≤ cf
mink∈Df {σk}
∫ T
0
|κH−NκNH|
2
(
E
[∥∥∥∥ 1(HNuN)2
∥∥∥∥
σ
]
+ cE
[∥∥∥(HNuN)2∥∥∥
σ
])
+
∣∣α−NαN ∣∣ ‖1‖σ + |βH−NβNH |2 E [∥∥∥ 1HNuN ∥∥∥σ] du.
(4.130)
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Hence, from Lemmas 4.1.6 and 4.1.7 it follows for all f ∈ Dom(A) and all T ∈ [0,∞) that
0 ≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣εNf (tN)∣∣∣
]
≤ lim
N→∞
Tcf
mink∈Df {σk}
(
|κH−NκNH|
2
sup
M∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
(
E
[∥∥∥∥ 1(HMt )2
∥∥∥∥
σ
]
+ cE
[∥∥∥(HMt )2∥∥∥
σ
] )
+
∣∣α−NαN ∣∣ ‖1‖σ + |βH−NβNH |2 sup
M∈N
sup
t∈[0,∞)
E
[∥∥∥ 1HMt ∥∥∥σ]
)
= 0.
(4.131)
Define the set
R :=
{×
i∈D
Bi : (Bi)i∈D ⊆ B([0,∞)D),
Bi = [0,∞) for all but finitely many i ∈ D
}
.
(4.132)
For all N ∈ N, all t ∈ [0,∞), and all B ∈ R define the measure-valued random variables
ΛN([0, t]×B) :=
∫ t
0
1B
(
HNuN
)
du =
∫ t
0
∏
i∈D
1Bi
(
HNuN(i)
)
du, (4.133)
Due to Carathéodory’s theorem (e.g., Klenke, 2008, Theorem 1.41) there is a unique exten-
sion of this pre-measure to a measure on [0, t] × E2, which will be denoted by the same
name. Define the space `(E2) := {µ : µ is a measure on [0,∞) × E2 such that for all t ∈
[0,∞) it holds that µ([0, t] × E2) = t} and define the space D([0,∞)) := {f : [0,∞) →
E1|f is càdlàg}. Having checked all assumptions, Theorem 2.1 from Kurtz (1992) can now
be applied, to show that the sequence
{((
FNtN
)
t∈[0,∞),Λ
N
)
: N ∈ N
}
is relatively compact
in D([0,∞)) × `(E2). Let (F,Λ) be a D([0,∞)) × `(E2)-valued random variable and let
(Nk)k∈N ⊆ N be an increasing sequence such that limk→∞
((
FNktNk
)
t∈[0,∞),Λ
Nk
)
= (F,Λ).
Due to Skorohod’s representation theorem (see Ethier and Kurtz, 1986, Theorem 3.1.8) it
can be assumed without loss of generality and for ease of notation that (F,Λ) acts on the
probability space (Ω,F ,P). Using Hölder’s inequality and Theorem 3.1.1 it follows for all
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t ∈ [0,∞) that
0 ≤ lim
N→∞
∫ t
0
E
[∥∥∥HNuN − (h∞ (FNuN(i)))i∈D∥∥∥σ] du
= lim
N→∞
∫ t
0
E
[∑
i∈D
σi
∣∣HNuN(i)− h∞ (FNuN(i))∣∣
]
du
≤ lim
N→∞
√√√√∫ t
0
E
[∑
i∈D
σi (HNuN(i)− h∞ (FNuN(i)))
2
]
du
√
t
∑
k∈D
σk = 0.
(4.134)
For any bounded Lipschitz continuous function f : l1σ → R with Lipschitz constant c̄f and
all t ∈ [0,∞), applying (4.134), it follows that
0 ≤ E
[∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
∫
E2
f(y) Λ(du× dy)−
∫ t
0
f(h∞(Fu)) du
∣∣∣]
= lim
k→∞
E
[∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
f
(
HNkuNk
)
du−
∫ t
0
f
(
h∞
(
FNkuNk
))
du
∣∣∣]
≤ c̄f lim
k→∞
E
[ ∫ t
0
∥∥HNkuNk − h∞(FNkuNk)∥∥ du] = 0.
(4.135)
Define the operator A2 : Dom(A)→ C(E1,R) for all f ∈ Dom(A) and all x ∈ E1 by
(A2f) (x) :=
∑
i∈D
(
κH
∑
j∈D
(
m(i, j) a−xi
a−xj (xj − xi)
)
− αxi(1− xi)
)
df
dxi
(x)
+ 1
2
∑
i∈D
βHb(a− xi)xi(1− xi)d
2f
dx2i
(x).
(4.136)
For all t ∈ [0,∞), all f ∈ Dom(A), and all x ∈ E1 it holds P-a.s. that∫ t
0
∫
E2
(A1f) (Fs, y)Λ(ds× dy)
=
∫ t
0
∫
E2
[∑
i∈D
(
κH
∑
j∈D
(
m(i, j)
yj
yi
(Fs(j)− Fs(i))
)
− αFs(i)(1
− Fs(i))
)
df
dxi
(Fs) +
1
2
∑
i∈D
βH
Fs(i)(1−Fs(i))
yi
d2f
dx2i
(Fs)
]∏
i∈D
1yi (h∞ (Fs(i))) dy ds
=
∫ t
0
(A2f) (Fs) ds.
(4.137)
Applying Theorem 2.1 of Kurtz (1992) together with (4.137), it follows for each f ∈
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Dom(A) that (
f(Ft)−
∫ t
0
(A2f) (Fs)ds
)
t∈[0,∞) (4.138)
is a martingale. Hence, F is a solution to (3.2). Note that for all z1, z2 ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
a−z1
a−z2 (z2 − z1) = (a − z1)(
a−z1
a−z2 − 1). Using this and (4.10) it then follows for any subset
S ⊆ D and any x, y ∈ E2 that∑
i∈S
σi1xi≥yi
(
κH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
( (a−xi)2
a−xj − (a− xi)−
(a−yi)2
a−yj + (a− yi)
)
− α(xi(1− xi)− yi(1− yi))
)
=
∑
i∈S
σi1xi≥yi
(
κH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)
(
(xi − yi) + ((a− xi)2 − (a− yi)2) 1a−xj
− (a− yi)2
(
1
a−yj −
1
a−xj
))
+ α(−(xi − yi) + x2i − y2i )
)
≤
∑
i∈S
σi
(
κH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)1xj≥yj(a− yi)2
(
1
a−xj −
1
a−yj
))
+
∑
i∈S
σi(κH
+ 2α)1xi≥yi(xi − yi)
≤
∑
i∈S
σi
(
κH
∑
j∈D
m(i, j)1xj≥yj
a2
(a−1)2 (xj − yj)
)
+
∑
i∈S
σi(κH
+ 2α)1xi≥yi(xi − yi)
≤
∑
i∈S
σicκH1xi≥yi
a2(xi−yi)
(a−1)2 +
∑
i∈S
σi(κH + 2α)1xi≥yi(xi − yi)
=
∑
i∈S
σi
(
cκHa
2
(a−1)2 + κH + 2α
)
(xi − yi)+.
(4.139)
This implies that equation (26) of Hutzenthaler and Wakolbinger (2007) is fulfilled. Together
with the assumptions on m in Assumption 4.1.1 it now follows, analogous to Proposition 2.1
of Hutzenthaler and Wakolbinger (2007), that the system (3.2) has a unique strong solution
with a.s. continuous paths. Consequently, any limit point of
{ (
FNtN
)
t∈[0,∞) : N ∈ N
}
solves
(3.2). Combining this with the fact that
{ (
FNtN
)
t∈[0,∞) : N ∈ N
}
is relatively compact it
follows that
(
FNtN
)
t∈[0,∞) =⇒ (Xt)t∈[0,∞), as N →∞. This completes the proof of Theorem
3.1.2.
4.1.5 McKean-Vlasov limit
In this section the convergence of a sequence of exchangeable systems of stochastic differ-
ential equations is investigated in the limit of infinitely many components. This result is then
applied to the case of altruistic defense traits and the many-demes limit is derived.
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4.1.5.1 Setting
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, let I ⊂ [0,∞) be an interval of length |I| ∈ (0,∞]
which is either of the form [0, |I|] if |I| < ∞ or of the form [0,∞) if |I| = ∞, let A ⊆ R
be a convex set, and let ψ : I → A, ξ : A × I → R, and σ2 : I → [0,∞) be functions. The
function σ2 : I → [0,∞) is locally Lipschitz continuous in I and satisfies σ2(0) = 0 and if
|I| <∞, then σ2(|I|) = 0. Furthermore, the function σ2 is strictly positive on (0, |I|). There
exists a constant L ∈ (0,∞) such that σ2 satisfies the growth condition that for all y ∈ I it
holds that σ2(y) ≤ L(y + y2) and such that ξ satisfies for all (u, x), (v, y) ∈ A× I that
1x≥y
(
ξ(u, x)− ξ(v, y)
)
≤ L(u− v)+ + L(x− y)+. (4.140)
The function ψ : I → [0,∞) satisfies for all x, y ∈ I that |ψ(x) − ψ(y)| ≤ L|x − y|. Let
W (i) : [0,∞) × Ω → R, i ∈ N, be independent Brownian motions with continuous sample
paths. For allD ∈ N letXD : [0,∞)×{1, . . . , D}×Ω→ I be an adapted stochastic process
with continuous sample paths that for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all i ∈ {1, . . . , D} P-a.s. satisfies
XDt (i) = X
D
0 (i)+
∫ t
0
ξ
(
1
D
∑
j∈{1,...,D}
ψ
(
XDs (j)
)
, XDs (i)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
√
σ2 (XDs (i)) dWs(i).
(4.141)
Let M : [0,∞)×Ω→ I be an adapted stochastic process with continuous sample paths that
for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s. satisfies
Mt = M0 +
∫ t
0
ξ(E[ψ(Ms)],Ms) ds+
∫ t
0
√
σ2(Ms) dWs(1). (4.142)
4.1.5.2 McKean-Vlasov limit
The following proposition, Proposition 4.1.13, partly generalizes Proposition 4.29 of Hutzen-
thaler (2012) where ξ depends linearly on its first argument.
Proposition 4.1.13. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.5.1, let M0 be an I-valued random
variable, for every D ∈ N let
(
XD0 (j)
)
j∈{1,...,D} be exchangeable and integrable random
variables with values in I . Then, there exists a unique solution M of (4.142) and for all
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D ∈ N and all t ∈ [0,∞) it holds that
√
DE
[∣∣XDt (1)−Mt∣∣]
≤ e(L2+L+Lµ)t
(√
DE
[∣∣XD0 (1)−M0∣∣]+ L∫ t
0
(
Var
(
ψ
(
Ms
))) 12
ds
)
.
(4.143)
Proof. Existence of a weak solution is straightforward using a tightness argument. Next,
pathwise uniqueness for the SDE (4.142) is shown. LetM, M̄ : [0,∞)×Ω→ I be two solu-
tions of the SDE (4.142). Then our assumptions and a standard Yamada-Watanabe argument
(e.g., Yamada and Watanabe, 1971, Theorem 1) shows for all t ∈ [0,∞) that P-a.s.
|Mt − M̄t| = |M0 − M̄0|+
∫ t
0
sgn(Ms − M̄s)d(Ms − M̄s). (4.144)
Let (τl)l∈N be a localizing sequence for the local martingale
( ∫ t
0
sgn(Ms − M̄s)(σ2(Ms) −
σ2(M̄s)) dWs
)
t∈[0,∞). Then Fatou’s Lemma and our assumptions imply for all t ∈ [0,∞)
that
E[|Mt − M̄t|] ≤ lim
l→∞
E[|Mt∧τl − M̄t∧τl |] ≤ E[|M0 − M̄0|]
+ E
[ ∫ t
0
sgn(Ms − M̄s)
(
ξ(E[ψ(Ms)],Ms)− ξ(E[ψ(M̄s)], M̄s)
)
ds
]
≤ E[|M0 − M̄0|] + L
∫ t
0
∣∣E[ψ(Ms)]− E[ψ(M̄s)]∣∣+ E[|Ms − M̄s|] ds
≤ E[|M0 − M̄0|] + (L+ 1)2
∫ t
0
E
[
|Ms − M̄s|
]
ds.
(4.145)
This together with Gronwall’s lemma implies pathwise uniqueness for the SDE (4.142).
Therefore, the theorem of Yamada and Watanabe (1971) implies that the SDE (4.142) is
exact. The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.29 of Hutzenthaler
(2012) and it is omitted here.
4.1.5.3 Application to altruistic defense in structured populations
In this section, the applicability of Proposition 4.1.13 to the case of altruistic defense in
structured populations is verified.
Lemma 4.1.14. Let α, β, κ ∈ (0,∞) and a ∈ (1,∞), let I = [0, 1] and define the function
σ2 : I → [0,∞) by I 3 x 7→ σ2(x) := β(a − x)x(1 − x), the function ψ : I → [0,∞) by
I 3 x 7→ ψ(x) := 1
a−x , and the function ξ : [0,∞) × I → R by [0,∞) × I 3 (u, x) 7→
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ξ(u, x) := κ(a− x)
(
(a− x)u− 1
)
− αx(1− x). Then the interval I and the functions σ2,
ψ, and ξ satisfy the setting of Section 4.1.5.1 with L = max
{
βa, κa2, κ+ α, 1
(a−1)2
}
.
Proof. For all (u, x), (v, y) ∈ [0,∞)× [0, 1] it holds that
1x≥y
(
ξ(u, x)− ξ(v, y)
)
= 1x≥y
(
κ(a− x)((a− x)u− 1)
− κ(a− y)((a− y)v − 1)− αx(1− x) + αy(1− y)
)
= 1x≥y
(
κ[(a− x)2u− (a− x)− (a− y)2v + (a− y)]
− α(1− (x+ y))(x− y)
)
= 1x≥y
(
κ[(x− y) + ((a− x)2 − (a− y)2)u
− (a− y)2(v − u)]− α(1− (x+ y))(x− y)
)
≤ (κ+ α)(x− y)+ + κa2(u− v)+ ≤ L(x− y)+ + L(u− v)+.
(4.146)
Moreover, for all x, y ∈ I it holds that σ2(x) = β(a− x)x(1− x) ≤ βax ≤ L(x + x2) and
that
|ψ(x)− ψ(y)| =
∣∣ 1
a−x −
1
a−y
∣∣ = ∣∣ ∫ x
y
1
(a−z)2 dz
∣∣ ≤ 1
(a−1)2 |x− y| ≤ L|x− y|. (4.147)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1.14.
4.1.6 Long-term behavior of the average altruist frequency
In this section, the many-demes limit of the process describing the altruist frequency is in-
vestigated in the limit t→∞.
4.1.6.1 Setting
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, let κ, α, β ∈ (0,∞), a ∈ (1,∞), c ∈ (0, 1), let
W : [0,∞)× Ω→ R be a Brownian motion with continuous sample paths, let Z : [0,∞)×
Ω → [0, 1] be an adapted process with continuous sample paths that for all t ∈ [0,∞)
satisfies P-a.s.
Zt = Z0 +
∫ t
0
(
κ(a− Zs)
(
(a− Zs)E
[
1
a−Zs
]
− 1
)
− αZs(1− Zs)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
√
β(a− Zs)Zs(1− Zs) dWs.
(4.148)
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Moreover, for all θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
let Zθ : [0,∞) × Ω → [0, 1] be an adapted process with
continuous sample paths that for all t ∈ [0,∞) satisfies P-a.s.
Zθt = Z
θ
0 +
∫ t
0
(
κ
(
a− Zθs
) ((
a− Zθs
)
θ − 1
)
− αZθs
(
1− Zθs
))
ds
+
∫ t
0
√
β (a− Zθs )Zθs (1− Zθs ) dWs.
(4.149)
For all θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
and all z ∈ [0, 1] define
mθ(z) :=βc
2κ
β
(aθ−1)(1− c)
2κ
β
(1−θ(a−1))(a− c)
2α
β 1
β(a−z)z(1−z)
· exp
(∫ z
c
2κ(a−y)((a−y)θ−1)−αy(1−y)
β(a−y)y(1−y) dy
)
=z
2κ
β
(aθ−1)−1(1− z)
2κ
β
(1−θ(a−1))−1(a− z)
2α
β
−1.
(4.150)
Note that this defines the speed density (see Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p. 95) for (4.149).
Furthermore, note that for all θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
it holds that
∫ 1
0
mθ(z)dz <∞. (4.151)
For all θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
define cθ :=
∫ 1
0
mθ(z)dz, for all x ∈ {0, 1} denote by δx the Dirac
measure on [0, 1], and for all θ ∈
[
1
a
, 1
a−1
]
define the mapping Ψθ : B([0, 1])→ [0, 1] by
B([0, 1]) 3 A 7→ Ψθ(A) :=

δ0(A), if θ = 1a ,
δ1(A), if θ = 1a−1 ,∫
A
1
cθ
mθ(z) dz, if θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
.
(4.152)
4.1.6.2 Results for the equilibrium distribution
Assume the setting of Section 4.1.6.1. Existence and uniqueness of the solution of (4.148)
follow from Proposition 4.1.13. When θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
it holds that Ψθ defines a probability
distribution by (4.151), and Theorem V.54.5 of Rogers and Williams (2000) can be applied to
conclude that it is the unique equilibrium distribution for (4.149). The proof of the following
lemma, Lemma 4.1.15, is clear and therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.1.15. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.6.1. A probability measure Φ: B([0, 1])→
[0, 1] is an equilibrium distribution of the dynamics (4.148) if and only if there exists a θ ∈[
1
a
, 1
a−1
]
such that Φ = Ψθ.
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Lemma 4.1.16. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.6.1 and let θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
. Then it holds
that ∫ 1
0
1
a−z Ψθ(dz)

< θ, if α > β,
= θ, if α = β,
> θ, if α < β.
(4.153)
Proof. Define u := 2κ
β
(aθ − 1) and v := 2κ
β
(1 − θ(a − 1)) and note that u, v ∈ (0,∞).
Let Γ: (0,∞) → (0,∞) be the Gamma function, i.e., for all x ∈ (0,∞) let Γ(x) :=∫∞
0
zx−1e−z dz. It is well-known that for all x ∈ (0,∞) the Gamma function satisfies Γ(x+
1) = xΓ(x) and that for all x, y ∈ (0,∞) it holds that
∫ 1
0
zx−1(1−z)y−1 dz = Γ(x)Γ(y)
Γ(x+y)
. Thus,
it follows that∫ 1
0
zu−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)
(
1
a−z − θ
)
dz
=
∫ 1
0
zu−1(1− z)v−1 dz − aθ
∫ 1
0
zu−1(1− z)v−1 dz + θ
∫ 1
0
zu(1− z)v−1 dz
= Γ(u)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v)
− aθΓ(u)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v)
+ θΓ(u+1)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v+1)
=
(
(1− aθ) (u+v)Γ(u)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v+1)
+ θ uΓ(u)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v+1)
)
= (u(1− aθ + θ) + v(1− aθ)) Γ(u)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v+1)
= 2κ
β
(
(aθ − 1)(1− θ(a− 1)) + (1− θ(a− 1))(1− aθ)
) Γ(u)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v+1)
=
(
2κ
β
(1− θ(a− 1))(aθ − 1 + 1− aθ)
)
Γ(u)Γ(v)
Γ(u+v+1)
= 0.
(4.154)
First, consider the case α = β. Using (4.154) it follows that∫ 1
0
1
a−z Ψθ(dz)− θ =
∫ 1
0
cθz
2κ
β
(aθ−1)−1(1− z)
2κ
β
(1−θ(a−1))−1(a− z)
2α
β
−1( 1
a−z
− θ
)
dz = cθ
∫ 1
0
zu−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)
(
1
a−z − θ
)
dz = 0.
(4.155)
Now, consider the case α > β. Let δ̂ := α − β, δ := 2δ̂
β
, and z∗ := sup{z ∈ (0, 1) :
1
a−z − θ < 0}. Note that δ̂, δ > 0 and z
∗ = a− 1
θ
∈ (0, 1). Also note that for all z ∈ (0, z∗)
it holds that 1
a−z − θ < 0 and (a− z)
δ > (a− z∗)δ. Furthermore, for all z ∈ (z∗, 1) it holds
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that 1
a−z − θ > 0 and (a− z)
δ < (a− z∗)δ. Together with (4.154) it thereby follows that
∫ 1
0
1
a−z Ψθ(dz)− θ =
∫ 1
0
(
1
a−z − θ
)
Ψθ(dz)
=
∫ 1
0
cθz
u−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)
2α
β
−1 ( 1
a−z − θ
)
dz
=
∫ z∗
0
cθz
u−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)1+δ
(
1
a−z − θ
)
dz
+
∫ 1
z∗
cθz
u−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)1+δ
(
1
a−z − θ
)
dz
< cθ(a− z∗)δ
(∫ z∗
0
zu−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)
(
1
a−z − θ
)
dz
+
∫ 1
z∗
zu−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)
(
1
a−z − θ
)
dz
)
= cθ(a− z∗)δ
∫ 1
0
zu−1(1− z)v−1(a− z)
(
1
a−z − θ
)
dz = 0.
(4.156)
The case α < β can be proved analogously and is omitted here. This completes the
proof.
4.1.6.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1.3
Proof of Theorem 3.1.3. Applying Itô’s lemma yields for all t ∈ [0,∞) that
1
a−Zt −
1
a−Z0 =
∫ t
0
1
(a−Zs)2
(
κ(a− Zs)
(
(a− Zs)E
[
1
a−Zs
]
− 1
)
− αZs(1− Zs)
)
+ 1
2
2(a−Zs)
(a−Zs)4β(a− Zs)Zs(1− Zs) ds
+
∫ t
0
1
(a−Zs)2
√
β(a− Zs)Zs(1− Zs) dWs =
∫ t
0
κ
(
E
[
1
a−Zs
]
− 1
a−Zs
)
− αZs(1−Zs)
(a−Zs)2 +
βZs(1−Zs)
(a−Zs)2 ds+
∫ t
0
1
(a−Zs)2
√
β(a− Zs)Zs(1− Zs) dWs.
(4.157)
After taking expectations, Fubini’s theorem yields for all t ∈ [0,∞) that
E
[
1
a−Zt
]
− E
[
1
a−Z0
]
=
∫ t
0
κ
(
E
[
1
a−Zs
]
− E
[
1
a−Zs
])
− αE
[
Zs(1−Zs)
(a−Zs)2
]
+ βE
[
Zs(1−Zs)
(a−Zs)2
]
ds = (β − α)
∫ t
0
E
[
Zs(1−Zs)
(a−Zs)2
]
ds.
(4.158)
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Since for all s ∈ [0,∞) it holds that E
[Zs(1−Zs)
(a−Zs)2
]
≥ 0 it follows that the function [0,∞) 3
t 7→ E
[
1
a−Zt
]
∈
[
1
a
, 1
a−1
]
converges monotonically non-increasing as t → ∞ if α > β,
monotonically non-decreasing if α < β, or is constant if α = β.
First, assume α > β. From (4.148) it follows that δ1 is an invariant measure for Z. So if
P[Z0 = 1] = 1, then for all t ∈ [0,∞) it holds that P[Zt = 1] = 1. Now let P[Z0 = 1] < 1,
implying E
[
1
a−Z0
]
∈
[
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
. Define θ := lim
t→∞
E
[
1
a−Zt
]
and fix it for the rest of the
paragraph. Note that due to the monotonicity stated above it holds that θ ∈
[
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
. Aiming
at a contradiction, assume that θ ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
. Choose any ε ∈
(
0, 1
a−1 − θ
)
and fix it for the
rest of the proof. By definition of θ there exists an sε ∈ (0,∞), such that for all t ∈ [sε,∞) it
holds that E
[
1
a−Zt
]
< θ+ε. Let W̃ : [0,∞)×Ω→ R be a Brownian motion with continuous
sample paths, let Z̃ : [0,∞)×Ω→ [0, 1] and Z̃θ+ε : [0,∞)×Ω→ [0, 1] be adapted processes
with continuous sample paths that satisfy for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s.
Z̃t = Z̃0 +
∫ t
0
(
κ(a− Z̃s)
(
(a− Z̃s)E
[
1
a−Z̃s
]
− 1
)
− αZ̃s(1− Z̃s)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
√
β(a− Z̃s)Z̃s(1− Z̃s) dW̃s,
Z̃θ+εt = Z̃
θ+ε
0 +
∫ t
0
(
κ(a− Z̃θ+εs )
(
(a− Z̃θ+εs )(θ + ε)− 1
)
− αZ̃θ+εs (1− Z̃θ+εs )
)
ds+
∫ t
0
√
β(a− Z̃θ+εs )Z̃θ+εs (1− Z̃θ+εs ) dW̃s,
(4.159)
such that Z̃θ+ε0 = Z̃0 and such that Z̃0 and Zsε are equal in distribution. Then for each
t ∈ [sε,∞) it holds that Zt and Z̃t−sε are equal in distribution and the drift term of Z̃t−sε is
lower than that of Z̃θ+εt−sε . Together with the fact that the mapping [0, 1] 3 z 7→
1
a−z is strictly
monotonically increasing this implies for all t ∈ [sε,∞) that
E
[
1
a−Zt
]
= E
[
1
a−Z̃t−sε
]
≤ E
[
1
a−Z̃θ+εt−sε
]
. (4.160)
Recall from Section 4.1.6.2 that for any η ∈
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
it holds that Ψη is the unique equi-
librium distribution of Z̃η. Combining this with (4.160), it follows that (cf., Rogers and
Williams, 2000, Theorem V.54.5)
θ = lim
t→∞
E
[
1
a−Zt
]
≤ lim
t→∞
E
[
1
a−Z̃θ+εt−sε
]
=
∫ 1
0
1
a−z Ψθ+ε(dz). (4.161)
The dominated convergence theorem yields that the mapping
(
1
a
, 1
a−1
)
3 η 7→ Ψη is contin-
uous with respect to the weak topology. Applying this, (4.161) together with the fact that
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ε ∈
(
0, 1
a−1 − θ
)
was arbitrarily chosen, and Lemma 4.1.16, yields the contradiction
θ ≤ lim
δ→0
∫ 1
0
1
a−z Ψθ+δ(dz) =
∫ 1
0
1
a−z Ψθ(dz) < θ. (4.162)
Hence, it holds that θ = 1
a
, implying
0 ≤ lim
t→∞
E [Zt] ≤ lim
t→∞
a2E
[
Zt
a(a−Zt)
]
= lim
t→∞
a2E
[
1
a−Zt
]
− a2 1
a
= 0. (4.163)
The case α < β can be proved analogously and is omitted here.
Finally, assume α = β, define θ := E[ 1
a−Z0 ], and fix it for the rest of the proof. From
(4.158) it follows that E[ 1
a−Zt ] is constant in t ∈ [0,∞). Thus, assuming that Z0 and Z
θ
0
are equal in distribution it follows from (4.148) and (4.149) that for all t ∈ [0,∞) it holds
that Zt and Zθt are equal in distribution. Recall from Section 4.1.6.2 that Ψθ is the unique
equilibrium distribution of Zθ. Consequently, Ψθ is the unique equilibrium distribution of
Z. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.3.
4.1.7 Invasion of an altruistic defense allele
In this section, the invasion of an allele for altruistic defense in a structured population of
non-altruistic individuals is investigated.
4.1.7.1 Setting
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space, let κ, α, β ∈ (0,∞), a ∈ (1,∞), and letW (i) : [0,∞)×
Ω → R, i ∈ N, be independent Brownian motions with continuous sample paths. For all
D ∈ N let XD : [0,∞) × {1, . . . , D} × Ω → [0, 1] be an adapted process with continuous
sample paths that for all t ∈ [0,∞) and all i ∈ {1, . . . , D} P-a.s. satisfies
XDt (i) = X
D
0 (i) +
∫ t
0
κ(a−XDs (i))
(
(a−XDs (i)) 1D
D∑
j=1
1
a−XDs (j)
− 1
)
− αXDs (i)(1−XDs (i)) ds+
∫ t
0
√
β(a−XDs (i))XDs (i)(1−XDs (i)) dWs(i).
(4.164)
Let ã : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be a function defined by
[0,∞) 3 x 7→ ã(x) := κa min{x,1}
a−min{x,1} + (x− 1)
+. (4.165)
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Then, assuming there is positive mass only in deme 1, the dynamics in deme 1 follows
asymptotically the following process Y . Let Y : [0,∞) × Ω → [0, 1] be an adapted process
with continuous sample paths such that for all t ∈ [0,∞) it P-a.s. holds that
Yt = Y0−
∫ t
0
κ
a
Ys(a−Ys) +αYs(1−Ys) ds+
∫ t
0
√
β(a− Ys)Ys(1− Ys) dWs(1). (4.166)
In addition, let QY be the excursion measure which satisfies QY = lim0<ε→0 1εP[Y ∈ ·|Y0 =
ε] in a suitable sense (see Pitman and Yor, 1982; Hutzenthaler, 2009, for details). Asymp-
totically in the many-demes limit, every deme with population path χ ∈ C([0,∞), [0, 1])
populates demes through migration and these new populations are given by a Poisson point
process with intensity measure ã(χt)dt × QY (dψ). Now let (Vt)t∈[0,∞) be the total mass
process of the associated tree of excursions with initial island measure that equals the distri-
bution of Y in (4.166) and excursion measure QY .
4.1.7.2 Condition for extinction of an invading defense allele
Proposition 4.1.17. Assume the setting of Section 4.1.7.1. Let x ∈ (0, 1] and assume Y0 =
x = V0. Then the total mass process dies out (i.e., converges in probability to zero as t→∞)
if and only if
α ≥ β. (4.167)
Proof. Define the functions s : [0, 1] → [0,∞) and S : [0, 1] → [0,∞) by [0, 1] 3 z 7→
s(z) := exp
(
−
∫ z
0
−κ
a
x(a−x)−αx(1−x)
1
2
β(a−x)x(1−x) dx
)
and [0, 1] 3 y 7→ S(y) :=
∫ y
0
s(z) dz. Note that
for all z ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
s(z) = exp
(∫ z
0
2κ
aβ
1
1−x +
2α
β
1
a−x dx
)
= (1− z)
−2κ
aβ
(
a−z
a
)−2α
β
(4.168)
and
S(z) =
∫ z
0
s(x) dx ≤ zs(z). (4.169)
The result will be shown using Theorem 5 from Hutzenthaler (2009). First, verify that the
assumptions of the aforementioned theorem are satisfied. Using (4.169) yields
∫ 1
2
0
S(y) 2
β(a−y)y(1−y)s(y) dy ≤
∫ 1
2
0
2
β(a−y)(1−y) dy ≤
1
2
2
β(a− 1
2
)(1− 1
2
)
<∞. (4.170)
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Furthermore, it holds that
lim
ε→0
∫ 1
2
ε
−κ
a
(a−y)y−αy(1−y)
1
2
β(a−y)y(1−y) dy = limε→0
∫ 1
2
ε
−2κ
aβ(1−y) −
2α
β(a−y) dy
= lim
ε→0
(
2κ
aβ
(ln(1− 1
2
)− ln(1− ε)) + 2α
β
(ln(a− 1
2
)− ln(a− ε))
)
= 2κ
aβ
ln(1− 1
2
) + 2α
β
(ln(a− 1
2
)− ln(a)) ∈ (−∞,∞).
(4.171)
From (4.168) as well as the fact that 2κ
aβ
> 0 it follows that
∫ 1
1
2
ã(y)
1
2
β(a−y)y(1−y)s(y) dy =
∫ 1
1
2
κa y
a−y
1
2
β(a−y)y(1−y)(1− y)
2κ
aβ
(
a−y
a
) 2α
β
dy
= 2κa
β
a−
2α
β
∫ 1
1
2
(1− y)
2κ
aβ
−1(a− y)
2α
β
−2 dy
≤ 2κa
β
a−
2α
β
(
(a− 1
2
)
2α
β
−2 + (a− 1)
2α
β
−2
)∫ 1
1
2
(1− y)
2κ
aβ
−1 dy <∞.
(4.172)
It follows from (4.170), (4.171), and (4.172) together with a straightforward adaptation of
Lemmas 9.6, 9.9, and 9.10 in Hutzenthaler (2009) to the state space [0, 1] that the assump-
tions of Theorem 5 in Hutzenthaler (2009) are satisfied. Applying the aforementioned theo-
rem shows that the total mass process dies out if and only if∫ ∫ ∞
0
ã(χt) dtQY (dχ) ≤ 1. (4.173)
Moreover, a straightforward adaptation of Lemma 9.8 in Hutzenthaler (2009) to the state
space [0, 1] together with (4.168) shows that∫ ∫ ∞
0
ã(χt) dtQY (dχ) =
∫ 1
0
κa y
a−y
1
2
β(a−y)y(1−y)(1− y)
2κ
aβ
(
a−y
a
) 2α
β
dy. (4.174)
Observe that 2κ
aβ
∫ 1
0
(1 − y)
2κ
aβ
−1 dy = 1. Combining this with (4.173) and (4.174) it follows
that the total mass process dies out if and only if
0 ≥
∫ 1
0
κa y
a−y
1
2
β(a−y)y(1−y)(1− y)
2κ
aβ
(
a−y
a
) 2α
β
dy − 1
= 2κ
aβ
∫ 1
0
(1− y)
2κ
aβ
−1
(
a−y
a
) 2α
β
−2
dy − 1
= 2κ
aβ
∫ 1
0
(1− y)
2κ
aβ
−1
((
a−y
a
) 2α
β
−2
− 1
)
dy.
(4.175)
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Consequently, the total mass process dies out if and only if α ≥ β. This completes the proof
of Proposition 4.1.17.
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Discussion
Factors influencing the success of altruistic defense traits
Understanding the evolution of altruistic behavior is an important topic in evolutionary biol-
ogy. The theories of kin selection, group selection, game theory, or the Price equation can
provide predictions of the success of altruism in a general setting. However, in the context of
altruistic defense behavior against a parasite or predator, these methods may be difficult to
apply. The interactions between host and parasite (or prey and predator) lead to complicated
dynamics, especially in a structured setting, that can make it difficult to entangle the effects
of altruistic defense behavior, and thus, to predict the success of altruists. The goal of the
mathematical analysis was to understand the dynamics of altruists in a simple individual-
based model for interactions of host and parasite or, equivalently, prey and predator. For
the diffusion approximation of this model, it was possible to derive an expression for the
frequency of altruists, as given by equation (3.2). This process was derived in Theorem 3.1.2
in the limit of infinitely large populations under a complete separation of ecological and evo-
lutionary time scales. After taking the limits of infinitely many demes and an infinite time
horizon, a simple condition determining the success of altruists was obtained. This condition
allows to predict whether altruists will go to fixation or extinction depending on the ecolog-
ical model parameters. Theorem 3.1.3 shows that in the limit of large populations structured
in many demes, the altruist frequency will go to zero, if α > β and it will go to one, if
α < β. In the critical case of α = β, there is coexistence between altruists and cheaters and
the equilibrium distribution for the altruist frequency is given by equation (3.5).
The term β is defined as
β = ρ δ
δν+λγ
βH , (5.1)
which can be interpreted as the benefit of defense, scaled with the relative parasite pressure.
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The parameter ρ denotes the decrease in parasite growth rate per altruist, and thus it is a
measure of the effect of the defense allele. Furthermore, δ is the host death rate per parasite,
ν denotes the parasite death rate, λ defines the host birth rate, γ is the competition rate
among parasites, and βH describes the randomness in host reproduction. Thus, the factor
δ
δν+λγ
denotes the relative strength of parasites compared to hosts, i.e., the larger this factor
is, the bigger the potential harm that hosts suffer from parasites. This represents the selective
pressure on the host population to evolve defense mechanisms. If the pressure is strong, then
the potential benefit from defending is high. In addition, randomness in host reproduction is
beneficial to the evolution of the altruistic defense allele.
Débarre et al. (2012) investigate the evolution of altruistic defense traits in a host-parasite
system with population structure. They conclude that the altruistic trait of suicide upon
infection with an additional fecundity cost for the ability to detect the parasite can evolve in
a structured population if the parasite is sufficiently harmful to the host population. This is in
line with the definition of β in the present model that captures the parasite-induced selection
pressure on hosts as well as the necessity of κH being positive, which ensures the population
structure in the present model.
Notably, there are several parameters—κH , κP , βP , η, and K—that do not enter the
condition for fixation or extinction of the defense allele. At first it appears surprising that
the amount of host migration is not relevant for the success of the altruistic allele, as long
as it is positive. Berngruber et al. (2013) conclude that intermediate levels of mixing are
necessary for suicide defense against infection to evolve in bacteria. Other studies also find
that too much gene flow can hinder the success of altruism (Maynard Smith, 1964; Wade,
1978; Slatkin and Wade, 1978). In the present model, the parameter scaling ensures that
the migration rate is small compared to the population size in the limit of large populations
and thus, the amount of migration is in the appropriate range, irrespective of the value of
κH ∈ (0,∞). Parasites mediate the altruistic effects and for this role the strength of their
fluctuations or migration rates do not seem to be important, as long as they are in the required
range that is achieved by the population size scaling in the limit of N →∞.
These results build on the assumption that the defense allele is already present in positive
frequency in all demes and the evolutionary stability of altruism is investigated. This does
not cover the case of a newly arisen defense allele that tries to invade the host population.
Invasion is treated in Proposition 4.1.17. There, the defense allele is assumed to exist in
positive frequency only in a single deme and the condition for a positive survival probability
in a population structured in infinitely many demes is derived. Notably, a similar condition
as for the case of evolutionary stability is retrieved and the survival probability is positive if
and only if β > α. A positive probability of survival does not ensure that the newly arisen
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allele does, in fact, survive. So even if the condition β > α is satisfied, there may still be a
chance that the altruistic defense allele goes extinct before reaching a positive frequency in
the population. Nevertheless, the result states that if β ≤ α, then the defense allele will never
be able to reach and sustain a positive frequency in a population structured in infinitely many
demes. In a setting of finite population sizes, the probability of the allele frequency crossing
some small threshold value is always positive, because of the pronounced impact of random
fluctuations at low frequencies. Thus, the result is not as substantial in the finite setting, as
it is in the case of large populations in many demes. Nevertheless, it gives the qualitative
insight that it is possible for the altruistic allele to invade a population of cheaters.
The starting point of Hutzenthaler et al. (2015) is the diffusion model given in Section
4.1.3 and it is only mentioned that this diffusion model can be obtained from an individual-
based model via a diffusion approximation. Section 2.1.1 and Section 4.1.2 close this gap by
explicitly defining the individual-based model and providing the diffusion approximation.
Theorem 3.1.1 extends well-known results on Lotka-Volterra equations. To the best of
my knowledge, this result is new even in the panmictic setting. If in the setting of Section
4.1.3 it is assumed for some N ∈ N that κNH = κNP = ιNH = ιNP = αN = βNH = βNP = 0
and that AN0 (i) = 0, i ∈ D, then for all i ∈ D it holds that AN(i) ≡ 0 and (HN(i), PN(i))
satisfy classical Lotka-Volterra equations (Lotka, 1920; Volterra, 1926). Thus, if Kη > ν,
then these equations have the nontrivial equilibrium ( Kδν
λγ+Kδη
, λKη−λν
λγ+δKη
) ∈ (0,∞)2. Due to
the assumptions of weak migration, weak immigration, weak selection, and low genetic
drift, in the limit of large population sizes, the processes (HN(i), PN(i)), i ∈ D, can be
approximated by these classical equilibrium values, if η is replaced by η − ρFN(i). Thus,
the result extends the classical case to two host types—altruistic defenders and cheaters—
with genetic drift in the spatial setting. These findings are formalized in Theorem 3.1.1.
Effect of finite population sizes
There are several approximations necessary in order to obtain the condition for the fixation
or extinction of altruists. These approximations include observing infinitely large popula-
tions living in infinitely many demes for an infinite amount of time (cf. Figure 3.1). All
of these conditions will obviously be violated when investigating any natural population.
Furthermore, the assumption of a complete separation of ecological and evolutionary time
scales implies that changes in altruist frequency immediately affect the host-parasite dynam-
ics. Hence, there is no time lag between an act of altruistic defense and its benefit to the
local host population. Still—without these idealizations being fully realistic—it is possible
that the condition provides a good approximation for sufficiently large finite populations liv-
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ing in finitely many demes that are observed for a limited amount of time. This was tested
with the simulation models described in Section 2.2. In the case of small population sizes of
the simulation model described in Section 2.2.1.1, the theoretical prediction is qualitatively
correct. Namely, there is either extinction or fixation of altruists, with a narrow transition
range between the two outcomes. However, the value for which this transition occurs does
not coincide with the one predicted by the condition derived in Section 3.1. This is due to the
fact that there is a large amount of inherent randomness when dealing with finite population
sizes. The effect can clearly be observed in simulation series α. Even without altruism pro-
viding any “benefit”—i.e., b = 0, with b = ρδ/δν+λγ = β/βH—the selective disadvantage of
altruism needs to be relatively high in order for altruist extinction to be a stable result across
simulations (see Figure 3.2). In 3 of the 100 runs with b = 0 and α = 0.2 altruistic defense
went to fixation. This effect was considerably more pronounced for positive (but relatively
low) values of b. In general, in the finite setting, altruists are more highly favored than pre-
dicted by the asymptotic result. The effect of stochasticity in finite populations is captured
by simulation series βH , which evaluates the process for different values of the amount of
randomness in host reproduction, βH (see Figure 3.3). Even for βH = 0, altruism can be
favored when b is sufficiently large. In the diffusion approximation, all randomness based
on the finiteness of the individual-based model disappears. Thereby, it relies on a positive
value of βH , to achieve differences between demes and βH directly enters the condition for
fixation or extinction of altruists. Thus, altruistic defense would always go extinct in the
mathematical model, if βH = 0. Apart from that difference, the qualitative influence of βH
in the simulations behaves according to the theoretical prediction, i.e., larger values of βH
lead to a stronger benefit of altruists (see Figure 3.3).
The asymptotic result predicts that there is no influence of the host migration rate κH on
the evolution of altruistic defense (as long as κH > 0). In the context of small population
sizes, migration rates may play a more important role than for the setting of large populations.
Ecological and evolutionary time scales are not fully separated in the finite setting and thus,
a large value of κH may mean that migration events interfere with host-parasite interactions.
On the other hand, a small value may result in very little mixing of the population and thereby
diminish a possible benefit of altruists. However, no significant effect of the host migration
rate could be detected in simulation series κH (see Figure 3.4), even though values of κH
range from 0.01 to 10, hence, spanning a 1000-fold difference. Note that this does not
necessarily mean that there is no effect of κH . A significant influence might be found if
more simulations were performed. Nevertheless, the amount of gene flow under which the
evolution of altruism is favored may not be as limited in the present study as suggested by
other approaches (Maynard Smith, 1964; Wade, 1978).
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The positive effect of random differences in population sizes between demes on the suc-
cess of altruists is also visible in simulation series af . Random fluctuations in the carrying
capacities of the host and parasite populations were added in different amounts. Even though
changes in carrying capacities affect both altruists and cheaters, they may be beneficial for
the altruistic defense allele. This is due to the fact that, similar to increasing βH , the ran-
dom fluctuations in carrying capacities amplify differences between demes. These increased
differences may lead to a more pronounced Yule-Simpson effect. Indeed, larger fluctuations
lead to a benefit for the altruistic defense allele (see Figure 3.5). For the investigated param-
eter ranges, this effect is not as large as that of changing βH , though. But note that stronger
or more frequent fluctuations may provide even larger benefits for the defense allele.
In simulation series βH , simulation series κH , and simulation series af , fixation or ex-
tinction of altruists is very stable across different simulation runs with the same parameter
settings, except for the narrow transition ranges between the two outcomes. Thus, depend-
ing on the parameter setting, there is a clear advantage of either altruists or cheaters that can
overcome the randomness that may lead to fixation of a disfavored type in a finite setting.
This result is in line with the theoretical prediction. However, the exact value where the
transition from an advantage of cheaters to an advantage of altruists occurs differs. This may
be caused by the increased effect of randomness in the finite setting.
Effect of population structure
Simulations assuming infinite population sizes were performed in order to compare the suc-
cess of altruists in finite and infinite settings and to investigate effects of population structure.
The process X , which describes the relative frequencies of altruists in the limit of large pop-
ulation sizes under a complete separation of time scales according to equation (3.2) (see
Theorem 3.1.2), was simulated.
The discretization of the process X makes it necessary to introduce a cutoff value ε, such
that in each deme, values of X below ε or above 1 − ε are set to zero or one, respectively
(see Box 2.5). In simulation series ε the appropriate choice of ε was determined to be 10−7,
which was the only value among the tested ones that showed a root mean squared error of
zero for all simulated values of β (see Figure 3.6 for the outcome of all runs). For simulations
with ε = 0, extinction or fixation of altruists never occurred within the given time frame of
T = 2000, while for ε = 10−8, it only occurred for the smallest value of β, but never for
any other value. Thus, for ε = 0 and ε = 10−8, the results indicate a quasi-equilibrium of
altruists and cheaters, with a large altruist frequency for β > α and a low altruist frequency
for β < α. On the other hand, for ε = 10−6, the final altruist frequency was zero or one in
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97 out of 100 runs. In these cases, the outcome always matched the prediction. However, for
three simulation runs with β > α, a relatively low altruist frequency was observed at the end
of the simulation run. Note that if the process runs for a very long time, then the outcome
may still coincide with the prediction. Only for ε = 10−7, all simulations agreed with the
theoretical predictions and fixation or extinction of altruists was reached in the given time
frame.
The simulations with uniform migration and D = 500 fit the theoretical prediction ex-
tremely well (see Figure 3.9). In the mathematical analysis, uniform migration is assumed,
because it is necessary for the mean field approximation (see Section 4.1.5). Nevertheless,
for the other migration schemes investigated, the prediction was also closely met, when
the number of demes was large enough (i.e., 500, 484, or 511). For these other migration
schemes, fixation or extinction of altruists was often not reached within the given time frame
when β was very close to α. This may be explained by the fact that under uniform migration,
population mixing is strongest and any given deme can best be reached by individuals.
In several simulation series, fixation or extinction of altruists was also observed for β =
α, contrary to the theoretical predictions. Because of the finite number of demes, there is
always a positive probability of one type going extinct. This probability gets smaller with an
increasing number of demes, as the simulations show (see e.g., Figure 3.9).
For intermediate values of D (i.e., 50, 49, or 63), fixation or extinction contradicting
the prediction could be seen in several runs. This never occurred for the largest values of
D (500, 484, or 511), though. All runs with a final altruist frequency of zero or one were
in accordance with the prediction. If the simulations had been kept running longer, then a
fixation or extinction contradicting the prediction might still have happened. However, the
larger the number of demes, the more unlikely it gets to observe such a contradiction to the
prediction.
Across all simulation series it is apparent that less than ten demes are not enough for
altruists to be strongly favored. For all four migration patterns that were investigated, the
mean final altruist frequency over the 100 simulation runs never exceeded 0.8. This is also
reflected in the relatively high root mean squared errors for the lowest values ofD in the four
simulation series.
For uniform migration and nearest neighbor migration on a circle, extinction of altruists
was stable across the 100 simulations, if β is sufficiently small. This was not the case for
nearest neighbor migration in two dimensions and migration along the edges of a binary tree.
Indeed, for simulation series 2D and simulation series T, the final altruist frequency stayed
strictly within the boundaries of zero and one for all simulations runs across all parameter
settings. Thus, there is an effect of the specific form of how the population is structured.
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Migration between nearest neighbors in two dimensions and along edges of a binary tree
appears to prolong the time of coexistence between altruists and cheaters, compared to the
uniform migration and nearest neighbor migration on a circle.
Effect of stochasticity
An altruistic act of defense leads to a deme-wide reduction of parasite pressure. Conse-
quently, the equilibrium values of population sizes of hosts and parasites in the deme change,
and the effective host carrying capacity increases, according to the function h∞ (see equation
4.13). The larger a deme is, the more migrants it sends to other demes. Thus, the increase
in carrying capacity becomes a benefit for altruists, if there are smaller demes, with a high
frequency of cheaters. Then, even though being disfavored within each deme, altruists can
obtain an advantage when looking at the whole population. This reasoning is known as the
Yule-Simpson effect or as Simpson’s paradox (Yule, 1903; Simpson, 1951; Blyth, 1972). In
the result from the mathematical analysis, stochastic effects are captured by the factor βH in
the “benefit” term β = ρ δ
δν+λγ
βH . Hence, randomness in host reproduction—which leads
to differences between demes, and thus makes the Yule-Simpson effect possible—directly
affects the evolution of the altruistic defense allele. Findings from the simulation studies
confirm this view. In the setting of finite population sizes, randomness in host reproduction
is increased. Consequently, between-deme differences are enhanced, which results in altru-
ism being more strongly favored than predicted by the mathematical analysis. This effect
of randomness is further shown by varying the value of βH in the simulations (see Figure
3.3) as well as adding random fluctuations to the carrying capacities of host and parasite (see
Figure 3.5).
Overall, simulation results of the process X approximate the theoretical prediction well,
if the number of demes is sufficiently large. Due to the assumption of infinite population sizes
and a complete separation of time scales, random effects are reduced to those introduced by
β and by the finite number of demes. Hence, the simulations of X fit the prediction better
than the simulations of the individual-based model. Nevertheless, the theoretical prediction
is insightful for the finite setting, in which the transition from altruist fixation to extinction
is shifted in favor of altruists due to a larger impact of stochasticity. This is in line with the
original result that predicts a strong influence of randomness, captured by the factor βH in
the term β = ρ δ
δν+λγ
βH .
The role of stochasticity in evolutionary processes has long been recognized (see Lenor-
mand et al., 2009 for a review). Finite population sizes are an important source of stochas-
ticity and lead to so-called “genetic drift”. In a finite population with random reproduction,
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some individuals will have disproportionately large success in producing offspring, while
others leave few or no descendants. The larger the population gets, the smaller the effect of
this random sampling will be on the development of allele frequencies over time. The im-
pact of genetic drift is typically modeled to be inversely proportional to the population size,
such that it can be neglected in a sufficiently large population. This is why many models
assume large population sizes and then proceed to describe the evolution of the population
in a deterministic fashion. In the context of host-parasite interactions, a large amount of
studies models the numbers of susceptible and infected individuals of a host population by
deterministic differential equations (Boots and Haraguchi, 1999; Boots and Bowers, 2004;
Miller et al., 2007; Best et al., 2009; Berngruber et al., 2013). Typically, this is an adequate
approach for understanding host-parasite dynamics, but there may be phenomena that re-
quire the consideration of randomness to obtain a suitable model. One example is that of
rare events, as shown by Handel et al. (2009). They investigate the creation of antiviral re-
sistance and show that a stochastic model produces different results than the deterministic
approximation. Even though large populations are considered in the present model, a de-
terministic approach would not yield the correct results. Ignoring all stochasticity for large
populations neglects the fact that very small random effects can add up over time and become
noticeable. Hence, viewing the same process on a larger time scale reveals the influence of
very small evolutionary forces. This is captured in Section 4.1.4, where the forces of genetic
drift, migration, and selection are negligible on the original ecological time scale, but once
the processes are sped up and thus investigated on the much larger evolutionary time scale,
these forces prove to be relevant. In Theorem 3.1.2 the convergence of the altruist frequency
on the evolutionary time scale in the limit of large populations is shown and the limit pro-
cess captures effects of genetic drift, migration, and selection. The result demonstrates the
importance of random effects. If all stochasticity in host reproduction was excluded from
the diffusion model 4.9—i.e., βH = 0—then the altruist would always go extinct. For the
evolution of altruists in the present model, it is necessary that there are random fluctuations
around the expected values. These fluctuations can produce differences between demes that
lead to an advantage for demes with a larger altruist frequency. Note that random disturbance
of average effects needs to be an ongoing process, and it is not sufficient to simply start with
random frequencies. The maintenance of between-deme variation by the random forces of
genetic drift, fluctuating environments, and mutation and its role in the evolution of altruism
is discussed in various studies (Lande, 1976; Slatkin and Wade, 1978; Uyenoyama, 1979,
discussed below).
Parvinen et al. (2003) demonstrate differences between a stochastic model and its de-
terministic approximation when investigating the evolution of dispersal rates. When local
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population sizes fluctuate around their carrying capacity, it can be beneficial for an indi-
vidual to move to a deme with more available resources. This effect is not captured by
deterministic models. Randomness does not simply add noise to average results, but can
qualitatively change the outcome of a model. Nevertheless, the approach of a deterministic
approximation leads to important insights into evolutionary dynamics and, hence, is a stan-
dard approach used in a large number of studies (see Parvinen et al., 2003 for an overview).
Relation to kin selection, group selection, and game theory
As discussed above, random differences between demes, as obtained by genetic drift in
the present model, can invoke the Yule-Simpson effect (Yule, 1903; Simpson, 1951; Blyth,
1972). Its connection to group selection theory has already been discussed by Sober and
Wilson (1998) and Gardner (2015). There are, in fact, two different concepts of group (or
multilevel) selection, as discussed by Okasha (2006) and Gardner (2015). When studying a
population of individuals living in groups, the different notions arise from the question what
constitutes the focal level. If the goal is to understand how frequencies of different types
of individuals in the population change, then the focus is on the individual. This concept is
known as multilevel selection 1 or MLS-1. On the other hand, if the analysis aims at under-
standing how frequencies of different types of groups change, then the focus is on the group.
This notion is referred to as multilevel selection 2 or MLS-2 (Okasha, 2006; Gardner, 2015).
Thus, the present analysis of altruistic defenders is in line with the concept of MLS-1. The
question is how frequencies of different types of individuals change and there is no plausible
notion of reproducing groups, which would be necessary for MLS-2 to be invoked.
The present result extends earlier analytical approaches considering the evolution of al-
truism under group selection to the case of individual-based migration in the context of
defense against a parasite. Uyenoyama (1979) investigates the evolution of altruism in an
island model, assuming a stage of random mixing of the whole population followed by re-
colonization of islands in each generation. This model goes back to Levene (1953) and has
also been utilized by Gillespie (1974). The simplification of assuming a stage of random
mixing allows to immediately obtain a one-dimensional diffusion approximation. This as-
sumption is removed in the present analysis, which drastically increases the complexity of
deriving a one-dimensional diffusion for the frequency of altruists (Sections 4.1.2 to 4.1.5).
In line with MLS-1, Uyenoyama (1979) concludes that for group selection to act, it is not
necessary to invoke a mechanism for complete extinction of whole groups, but instead, it
is enough if there is maintained variation between the groups, e.g., due to genetic drift or
fluctuating environments. Also note that Lande (1976) explains how mutation can help in
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maintaining genetic variability in a polygenic character. In the present model, variation be-
tween groups is maintained solely via genetic drift, which is a sufficient force even in large
populations, when the processes are analyzed on a large enough time scale. Thus, if some
of the other mechanisms to increase and maintain genetic variability (as discussed by Lande,
1976; Uyenoyama, 1979) are introduced in the model, this might in fact provide an even
larger benefit for altruism.
In the model of Slatkin and Wade (1978) whole demes may go extinct with a certain prob-
ability in each generation. Selection acts on the level of individuals within the demes and
there is gene flow between all demes. These two forces act to decrease between-deme vari-
ation, while mutation (Lande, 1976) and genetic drift increase it. Two different approaches
of how empty sites may be recolonized are investigated. The founding population can either
be sampled randomly from the whole population or it stems completely from a single deme,
chosen at random. For the character at interest, the equilibrium values for its mean and
between-deme variance are computed. It is concluded that recolonization from single demes
increases between-deme variance. Furthermore, the impact of genetic drift is largest when
the effective population size per deme is small and the probability of extinction per gener-
ation is low, as this increases the time that drift has to show an effect. However, variation
between demes can also be increased by a strong founder effect, caused by small founding
population sizes and high extinction probabilities, especially when vacant sites are colonized
from single demes. In the present study, the assumptions of Slatkin and Wade (1978) (small
population sizes per deme, extinction of demes, mutation, migration in groups) are not sat-
isfied, yet, genetic drift produces enough variation between demes in order for deme-level
selection to counteract the cost of altruism, when looking at a large enough time scale (as
discussed in the section on the effect of stochasticity). As Wade (1978) notes, assuming
that all demes contribute an equal amount of migrants independent of their size, can reduce
the effects of selection on the group level. This is in agreement with the present study, for
which allowing larger demes to send out more migrants is the key part in the success of
altruists, because demes with a high altruist frequency tend to be larger. Maynard Smith
(1964) concludes that migration is detrimental to the strength of group selection, because
it reduces variance between demes. As Wade (1978) points out, this reasoning is based on
the large amount of individual selection assumed in the haystack model of Maynard Smith
(1964), where a single non-altruistic individual takes over a local population of altruists.
Maynard Smith (1964) notes that this model is very artificial and due to its extreme assump-
tions it may not provide convincing evidence for the evolution of altruism by means of group
selection. However, later studies find that group selection is relevant also under less restrict-
ing conditions (Wade, 1978; Slatkin and Wade, 1978; Uyenoyama, 1979). This view is also
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supported by the results of simulation series κH , which do not show a significant effect of
the host migration rate (Figure 3.4). Thus, even moderate levels of mixing do not seem to
hinder the success of altruism in the present approach.
The same effect can also be interpreted according to the theory of kin selection. The
relatedness term in Hamilton’s rule captures genetic similarity between the focal individ-
ual and its interaction partners, regardless of how that similarity arises. Birch and Okasha
(2015) state that the most common source of such genetic correlation between partners is
kinship, but it may also stem from other mechanisms, such as greenbeard effects (Dawkins,
1976; Gardner and West, 2010). Relatedness is strictly defined as the coefficient of a least
squares linear regression analysis, in which the genetic value of the focal individual’s part-
ner is predicted by the genetic value of the focal individual’s character of interest (Hamilton,
1963, 1964a; Gardner et al., 2011). Denoting by g the actor’s genetic value for the char-
acter of interest and by g′ that of the actor’s social partner, relatedness can be expressed
as Cov(g,g′)/Cov(g,g), where covariances are taken over the whole population (Gardner et al.,
2011). If fitness effects are mediated by phenotypes, then this formulation can be adapted to
Cov(g,p′)/Cov(g,p), where p and p′ denote phenotypic values of actor and recipient, respectively
(Orlove and Wood, 1978; Queller, 1992). Informally, relatedness can be seen as an indicator
of how likely it is that a focal gene of the actor is found in the recipient, in relation to the
population average, which is given by the average gene frequency over the whole popula-
tion (Bourke, 2011). Thus, a value of zero means that the gene frequency among recipients
equals the population average, while a value of one means that all recipients share the fo-
cal gene. Intermediate values are derived accordingly, assuming a large population (Grafen,
1985). Furthermore, the relatedness term can also take negative values, if it is less likely
that the focal individual shares the gene in question with the interaction partner, than with a
randomly sampled individual. A geometrical representation of this concept of relatedness is
given by Grafen (1985). In the simplified model presented here, there is no distinction be-
tween individuals of the same type and all altruists are basically clones. Furthermore, effects
of an increased carrying capacity influence all individuals in the deme equally. Thereby, a
high altruist frequency in any given deme corresponds to a high relatedness of an altruist
to other individuals in that deme that all gain the same benefit from the defense behavior
of the altruist. Differences between demes, which rely on varying altruist frequencies and
changes in carrying capacity, can thus be analogously explained by relatedness and benefits
of altruistic defense.
However, high amounts of relatedness in a structured population can also mean that rela-
tives compete for limited space or resources. This competition has been shown to potentially
cancel the beneficial effects of cooperation and thus prevent the evolution of altruism (Wil-
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son et al., 1992; Taylor, 1992). However, Alizon and Taylor (2008) show how this effect of
competition can be reduced by allowing for empty sites in local populations and varying dis-
persal rates depending on the size of a deme. Thereby, migration increases with increasing
density in a deme and competition can be reduced. In fact, Alizon and Taylor (2008) show
that Hamilton’s rule holds in their model when an infinite number of demes is assumed.
Van Baalen and Rand (1998) investigate a lattice model, in which each node can harbor an
altruist or a cheater or it can be empty. They specify rates at which each pair of connected
nodes change their states due to a birth, death, or migration event. Using the approach of
“correlation dynamics” (Durrett and Levin, 1994; Durrett, 1995), this model can be ana-
lyzed using differential equations describing the expected rates of change of the proportion
of sites (or pairs of sites) in different states. By allowing for empty sites, clusters of altruists
can grow bigger than clusters of non-altruists and thus, altruism can evolve. Furthermore,
Van Baalen and Rand (1998) obtain the validity of Hamilton’s rule for their model. Platt
and Bever (2009) review the mechanisms that reduce effects of kin competition and allow
for a spread of altruism in structured populations. Apart from allowing for empty sites, an
important concept is that of population elasticity. By allowing local carrying capacities to
increase under a high density of cooperators, the effect of kin competition can be reduced.
Other factors include kin recognition (greenbeards) and kin-structured dispersal to increase
relatedness without increasing kin competition. Moreover, if dispersal occurs immediately
after cooperation, then benefits may be shared between cooperators, while kin competition
is reduced (Platt and Bever, 2009). Lastly, in a group-structured population, increased pro-
ductivity of cooperative groups may favor altruism via between-group selection (Platt and
Bever, 2009). In the present model, kin competition is reduced due to population elasticity.
Here, a high altruist frequency reduces parasite pressure and thereby increases the potential
local host population size.
In the present approach, it is not necessary to decompose effects into cost, benefit, and
relatedness terms or into components acting within and between groups. Instead, the altruist
frequency is described in a diffusion process and the tools from diffusion theory are used to
analyze this process and determine its longterm behavior. As Berngruber et al. (2013) point
out, the success of an altruistic defense trait depends on parasite presence. Thus, benefits
of altruistic acts are not constant in the scenario of defense. These fluctuations of effect
strengths as well as changing values of relatedness do not need to be considered using the
present result. Notably, the current state of host and parasite populations does not enter in the
condition for the success of altruism. Instead, the advantage or disadvantage of the defense
trait remains fixed throughout its evolution, if all demes start with the same distribution of
altruist frequency.
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Similar to game theoretic approaches such as the Prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod and Hamil-
ton, 1981), cheating appears to be the favorable strategy in the present analysis. Independent
of the types of other individuals in a deme, a focal individual has an increased immediate
reproductive success by cheating compared to cooperating. Nevertheless, the results show
that, in fact, altruism will prevail under suitable conditions. Several explanations have been
given for such seemingly contradicting results using the methods of game theory. Including
spatial structure in evolutionary games can lead to the evolution of altruism (e.g., Ohtsuki
et al., 2006). In the context of the Prisoner’s dilemma, the effect of population structure on
the success of cooperation has also been recognized (Fletcher and Zwick, 2007). This, of
course, is reflected in the present analysis, which also relies on spatial structure and differ-
ences among demes to achieve an advantage of altruists. Furthermore, introducing repeated
interactions has been shown to increase the long-term success of cooperators compared to
cheaters when considering the Prisoner’s dilemma (Trivers, 1971; Nowak, 2006). In the
present modeling approach, this insight may be applied as well. There are not merely sin-
gle interactions between individuals, but instead partners will stay together (and interact) for
considerable amounts of time. This is achieved by a relatively weak migration process, such
that individuals do not change demes too quickly. Thus, the present results can also be in-
terpreted in the light of repeated interactions, for which cooperating is beneficial in the long
run (under suitable conditions), while cheating provides only short-term benefits. Débarre
et al. (2014) investigate a lattice model of fixed size with one individual at each site. The
mechanisms for dispersal and social interactions (in the form of the Prisoner’s dilemma and
other games) are separated and the model allows for birth-death updating (i.e., first choose
an individual to reproduce, then determine which individual gets replaced) and death-birth
updating (i.e., first determine which individual dies, then choose an individual to place its
offspring at the corresponding site). The choice between these updating mechanisms seems
arbitrary, but it can influence the success of altruism (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al.,
2007). In the approach of Débarre et al. (2014), social interactions can influence both steps
of either updating scheme. They find that altruism is favored, if it affects the second step.
In that case, social interactions range over two edges of the lattice and direct competition
between relatives is reduced. Otherwise, the benefits are negated by kin competition effects
and thus, spatial structure does not increase the chances of the evolution of altruism. This
effect is based on the assumption of fixed population sizes. Hence, it is not visible in the
present approach, where altruists increase the carrying capacity of the host population.
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Negative feedback effects
The special case of altruism taking the form of defense against a parasite may lead to results
that differ from the general case, because the fate of the altruist is linked to the fate of the
parasite. If there is a high altruist frequency in a deme, this means that there are relatively
few parasites. This could, in turn, reduce the benefit that altruists provide to the host popu-
lation, and thereby lead to a reduction in altruist frequency. Consequently, there could be a
negative feedback mechanism, which prevents the altruist frequency from growing beyond
a certain level. This reasoning is in accordance with Sibly and Curnow (2011), who find
that there can be coexistence of altruists and cheaters in a population if help is subject to
diminishing returns. Thus, if there are already many cooperators in the population, then in-
creasing the amount of cooperation even further will yield relatively little additional benefit.
Interestingly, in the mathematical results, there is no such negative feedback mechanism and
coexistence occurs only in the critical case β = α. This can be explained by the function
h∞ : [0, 1] → (0,∞), given by equation (4.13), which determines the equilibrium host pop-
ulation size in dependence of the altruist frequency. The second order derivative of h∞ is
positive, meaning that the additional benefit increases with the current value of the altru-
ist frequency. Hence, altruism is not subject to diminishing returns in the present scenario.
Consequently, the above-mentioned result from Sibly and Curnow (2011) does not apply and
there will not be coexistence of altruists and cheaters. Thus, in the case that β > α, altruists
can reach fixation instead of fluctuating at an intermediate level. Nevertheless, an extreme
case of negative feedback can be observed in simulation series βH of the individual-based
simulations. For the largest “benefit” value b = 0.7 (where b = β/βH), the average final
altruist frequency is lower than for b = 0.6 (see Figure 3.3). The strong defense of altruists
in the case b = 0.7 actually leads to extinction of parasites in most cases (see Section 3.2.1).
If this extinction of parasites occurs before the fixation of altruists, then altruism provides no
further benefit and cheaters can take over the population. Thus, in this scenario, the benefit
of defense can actually be detrimental to the evolution of altruism in the long run, due to the
fact that parasites can go extinct in this finite system. This result is similar to the findings
of Duncan et al. (2011), who show in Paramecium Caudatum that after removing contact
to a parasite, costly resistance is no longer maintained and productivity of the host popula-
tion slowly increases. Due to lack of mutation in the simulation model of Section 2.2.1.1
this is only apparent in runs where both cheaters and altruists are present after parasites go
extinct. Notably, a negative feedback mechanism only occurs in this extreme scenario of
simulation series βH , while otherwise the situation resembles that of the mathematical anal-
ysis. It would be interesting to see if adapting the model such that effects of defense yield
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diminishing returns, would allow for the possibility of coexistence and cheaters as predicted
by Sibly and Curnow (2011).
Model assumptions
Several assumptions of the model suppose an ideal scenario, which will not occur in na-
ture. Notably, the assumption that a single biallelic locus determines whether an individual
behaves altruistically or not, is very strong. It might be more realistic, as well as possibly in-
sightful, to extend the present modeling approaches to allow for a wider spectrum of defense
strategies depending on several loci. Furthermore, individuals are assumed to be haploid to
simplify the analysis. Thus, the dynamics of the altruistic allele may be altered when pop-
ulations of different ploidy are considered. Another important assumption is the idealized
structure of the populations. All demes are modeled to provide the same conditions for the
populations and they are connected only by a slow migration process. An additional strong
assumption is that of weak selection, weak migration, and weak genetic drift that is achieved
by the parameter scaling in the limit of N → ∞. This leads to the complete separation of
time scales, as discussed above. Although such a split of ecological and evolutionary forces
will not be as rigid in natural populations, it is a standard assumption in population genetics.
Nevertheless, one has to be careful in interpreting the results and keep in mind that they rely
on an idealized scenario. The effects of these assumptions can be seen in the differences
between the simulation studies for finite and infinite population sizes (Sections 3.2.1 and
3.2.2).
Coevolutionary dynamics of host and parasite may lead to changes in strategies of viru-
lence or resistance over time, especially in the context of spatially structured populations—as
captured by the concept of a geographic mosaic of coevolution (Thompson, 1999; Best et al.,
2009). Details of the coevolutionary process are not explicitly modeled in the present ap-
proach and thus, changes of strategies cannot be observed. Especially, as Best et al. (2009)
show, parasite virulence can be highly dependent on evolutionary dynamics of the host,
which may influence the outcome in the present approach. Nevertheless, important con-
clusions can be drawn from the current results. If there is adaptation of the parasite to the
defense strategies of altruists, this may lead to complex dynamics in the spirit of a coevo-
lutionary arms race (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979; Foitzik et al., 2003). Counter-adaptations
of parasites to the defense strategies of altruists become relevant only after altruists have
reached a high frequency. Since the present results predict that there is no coexistence of
different host strategies, i.e., altruism and cheating, it is likely that fixation of altruism will
occur shortly after parasites feel the pressure of evolving counter-adaptations. This may re-
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sult in a step-wise arms race, allowing the present results to be applied successively. Still,
an extension of the present modeling approach to explicitly allow for coevolution might be
insightful.
Notably, no direct mechanism allowing altruists to preferentially cooperate with each
other, such as kin recognition or greenbeards, is assumed in the present model. Further-
more, there is no explicit deme competition, as modeled in some classical group selection
approaches such as the haystack model of Maynard Smith (1964). Instead, demes are con-
nected only via (weak) migration of individuals. This is sufficient to compensate for the
disadvantage that altruists suffer within any given deme, provided that β > α. This relates
to the findings of Slatkin and Wade (1978) and Uyenoyama (1979), discussed above.
The case of slave rebellion
A special case of altruistic defense in the form of ant slave rebellion was investigated with the
simulation model described in Section 2.3.1. This first paragraph is based on the discussion
by Metzler et al. (2015). Interactions of slavemaker ants and a host species were modeled
on a grid that represented a forest area of 100 m × 100 m. First, data from field observations
of Protomognathus americanus and Temnothorax longispinosus from New York State and
West Virginia was combined with prior knowledge in an ABC approach to find plausible
parameter combinations. Using these parameter settings, the possibility of a spread of the
rebel allele, starting at a frequency of 1%, was investigated. The results show that a spread
of rebellion is indeed possible, although only for few of the plausible parameter combina-
tions. Pamminger et al. (2014) show that the evolution of slave rebellion could possibly be
explained by kin selection on the level of individuals. Enslaved host workers could help
their nearby relatives in unparasitized nests by reducing the raiding pressure via rebellion. If
instead whole nests are viewed as “superorganisms” (Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009), then a
kin selection argument may still apply. Close-by nests are related to each other (Pamminger
et al., 2014) and thus, rebels in one nest can benefit their relatives in nests in close prox-
imity. Thus, considering nests—or genes in queens and males of the nests—can provide a
new perspective. Indeed, the results show that kin selection on the nest level can explain the
evolution of rebellion, but only in a very small number of simulation runs and only if the
cost of rebellion is extremely low (see Figure 3.14 for an example). The analysis of Pam-
minger et al. (2014) includes a simplified mathematical model. In the present approach, a lot
of biological details have been included, such as modeling nest sizes and ages, or splitting
of satellite nests. Due to this added complexity, the model can only be investigated with
computer simulations. According to Pamminger et al. (2011), the cost of rebellion might
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be between 5% and 10%. In the present simulations, a spread of rebellion could also be
observed if the cost was 1% or higher. These cases did not involve a steady increase in rebel
frequency over a longer period of time, though. Instead, the populations of host and parasite
show a pattern of frequent extinctions and recolonizations. Thus, if there is a high rebel
allele frequency among the founders during a recolonization, then rebels are wide-spread
during the following years, which better protects the host population from slavemakers (ex-
amples are shown in Figure 3.13). Hence, if the rebel frequency is high, host nests can be
more productive for a longer amount of time. This could lead to an advantage of rebels, if
several patches are connected via migration to form a metapopulation. In fact, for several
parameter combinations, this effect can be observed for simulations of a metapopulation of
20 connected patches. The rebel allele can get close to fixation and an analysis of Queller’s
group selection variant of the Price equation (Price, 1970; Queller, 1992) shows that the
impact of the between-deme component is much stronger than that of the within-deme com-
ponent (see Figure 3.17). This effect in the Metapopulation simulations could potentially be
further increased by allowing not only the relative frequency of altruists among migrants to
be determined by the average frequency across patches, but by also varying the amount of
migrants depending on local population sizes. This may allow for a faster spread of altruists
compared to the current approach. The results on the metapopulation can also be interpreted
from a kin selection perspective (Hamilton, 1963, 1964a,b). In order for the rebel frequency
in a patch to be high after a recolonization, it is necessary that the patch is populated by only
a few queens and their offspring. Otherwise, if there are many queens among the founding
population, then the rebel allele frequency among them will not be far from the average value
in the metapopulation. Thus, relatedness between nests in the grid will be large shortly after
a recolonization with a high rebel allele frequency occurred. Indeed, a positive correlation
between the chance of the rebel allele to spread and the deme-wide host nest relatedness after
recolonization was found. This leads to a large between-deme variation in allele frequencies,
which is necessary for the Yule-Simpson effect to work (Yule, 1903; Simpson, 1951; Blyth,
1972). Thereby, the explanations derived from kin selection and group selection theory are
tightly linked for the case of slave rebellion. The need for a quick growth during a recol-
onization of the grid explains the significant influence of the parameter hostRelProductivity
that describes the growth rate of host nests. The significance of the parameter Slavemaker-
PoolDie that represents the death rate of Slavemaker queens trying to conquer a host nest,
can be explained similarly, as a high rebel frequency is only beneficial if slavemakers occur
quickly. Otherwise, if slavemakers remain absent long enough, the cost of rebellion will
result in a decline of rebel nests (see Figure 3.16).
In the simulation model for the evolution of slave rebellion, effects that multiple host
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species (Brandt et al., 2005b) or multiple slavemaker species (Johnson and Herbers, 2006)
may have, are ignored. These may impact the results, though, especially because the rebel-
lion behavior relies upon differences in the cuticular hydrocarbons between host and para-
site. If multiple host and parasite species are considered, differences could become more
pronounced. This might lead to complicated dynamics, such as parasites shifting to a par-
ticular host species and the results could qualitatively be altered. Furthermore, it could be
relevant whether the defense strategy is specific to a particular parasite or whether it targets
multiple parasites at once (Frank, 2000). However, including multiple species of host and
parasite would greatly increase the complexity of the simulation program and make it even
more difficult to obtain meaningful insights into the evolution of the rebellion behavior.
An important assumption of the mathematical model is that extinctions of host and para-
site do not occur in any given deme. However, frequent extinction and recolonization events
are a key element in the simulations for the evolution of slave rebellion. Thus, these results
cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way by the condition derived from the mathemati-
cal analysis. Similarly, in simulation series βH of the individual-based model, extinction of
parasites was observed in a large number of runs with the largest value of b, rendering the
theoretical prediction meaningless. However, among the simulations of ants, there was a sin-
gle parameter set that showed a stable equilibrium of slavemaker and host over the full 5000
years in ten out of ten simulations of the Posterior simulations. This parameter combination
did not allow for the spread of rebellion, though, and was thus not investigated further. It may
well be possible that combinations exist that allow for stable population sizes and a spread of
rebellion. These might then be analyzed in the light of the asymptotic results. However, an
extremely large number of simulations with the prior distributions would be necessary to fur-
ther explore the huge parameter space. Despite the theoretical prediction not being directly
applicable to the simulations of ant interactions, the general insights are still relevant. In
particular, the effects of population structure, finite population sizes, and stochasticity, found
in the analysis of an abstract altruistic defense trait, apply to the case of slave rebellion. The
importance of population structure is shown by the impact of relatedness and the results of
the Metapopulation simulations. Furthermore, the metapopulation study reveals that random
differences between demes are necessary for the success of the altruist, which is in line with
the insights from simulation series βH and simulation series af . In finite populations, ran-
domness plays a major role in the case of slave rebellion, where success of rebels relies on
an over-representation of the rebel allele during a recolonization event—a phenomenon that
could never be observed in a deterministic setting. This agrees with the conclusion of Slatkin
and Wade (1978), who state that large extinction rates of local subpopulations together with
small founding populations increase the between-deme variance in a structured population
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and thus favor the evolution of altruism.
Conclusion
The present results show that an altruistic defense trait against a parasite or predator can pre-
vail in a structured population under certain assumptions. Starting from an individual-based
model of altruists, cheaters, and parasites, a condition for fixation or extinction of altruists
was derived. This result provides insights into mechanisms that influence the success of
altruistic defense traits. Randomness in host reproduction is necessary for the population
structure to be relevant. Furthermore, the reduction of parasite pressure by altruistic defense
does not lead to a negative feedback of the abundance of altruists. Instead, either altruists
or cheaters are typically favored, and coexistence only occurs in the critical case of equal-
ity of the relevant parameters. The parasite acts as a mediator of the benefits provided by
altruists to the host population, and migration rates or randomness in parasite reproduction
are not influential. However, the relative strength of parasites is important and enters the
“benefit” term β. The mathematical findings were confirmed by simulations and the impact
of randomness was highlighted. For small populations or for populations that are divided
in small subpopulations, stochasticity is more pronounced. This can be beneficial for the
altruistic allele, which relies on randomness to create differences between demes that enable
the Yule-Simpson effect. As shown in the simulation study, the evolution of altruism in the
population structured in demes appears robust towards different intensities of gene flow. In
particular, there is no detectable difference in the success of altruists for a large range of
migration rates. However, the pattern of migration is shown to be highly relevant. Thus, in
order to derive meaningful predictions for any natural population, the spatial structure has
to be modeled appropriately. The simulations indicate that a sufficiently large number of
demes is necessary for the results to apply. Otherwise, the effects of the population structure
do not become relevant and the success of altruists is mainly determined by random effects.
The simulations also indicate that the results are shifted when small populations are consid-
ered and when evolutionary and ecological time scales are not fully separated. This shows
that although general insights may remain valid, results obtained from models with idealized
assumptions need to be considered carefully when applied to natural populations. Applica-
bility may be improved if model assumptions better reflect the details of the system that is
investigated. In the simulation study on slavemaking ants, this is achieved by using field data
to obtain reasonable parameter choices for the complex model. The insights from studying
an abstract altruistic defense trait remain valid in the case of slave rebellion. In particular,
it is shown that a costly allele for rebellion can be selectively favored under certain parame-
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ter combinations. Nevertheless, the mechanisms involved in the evolution of a hypothetical
allele for slave rebellion can be understood in greater detail with the more complex model.
The benefit of protection against slavemakers provided by rebellion is especially influential
in a metapopulation scenario. In any case, random effects of small (founding) population
sizes play an important role in the success of the defense allele.
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